Manuel Camassa

In ‘Overcoming Empathy’s Judgemental Biases’ is the topic of the supposed biases empathy inherently has which is scrutinised in depth. In particular, it is shown that many of the biases attributed to empathy are in fact prejudices already present in the subject and which are not caused by empathy. Quite on the opposite, they can affect it. Examples from the literature, together with psychological and philosophical studies, are here discussed in order to demonstrate how empathy can help to overcome our prejudices, make us more receptive, disclose a world of values, and develop important ethical capabilities such as representative thinking.

The chapter ‘Empathy and Moral Judgment’ investigates the connection that exists between empathy and moral judgment by highlighting the epistemic role that empathy plays (making visible and giving us access to the intentions and in general the mental states of the target of our empathy), by explaining how we should we empathise with others and by emphasising what the author calls the ‘moralising power’ of empathy, which is the capability empathy has of making us see things that appear prima facie as morally neutral, as things that matter morally.

In this chapter, the criticisms advanced to empathy by Jesse Prinz are taken into account and carefully analysed. In particular the author attempts to trace the structure Prinz gave to his criticisms by dividing them into three: those concerning moral judgement, those concerning moral development, and those concerning moral motivation and conduct. This structure will be of fundamental importance to the work, because it is by tracing this structure that the author will respond to the criticism of empathy and simultaneously present his theories.

This chapter addresses the issue of whether empathy is a necessary feature for the development of morality. Scholars who deny this role usually tend to stress the importance of imitation and role models to the detriment of empathy. However, in this chapter, it is shown not only that imitation without empathy cannot suffice for the development of a healthy, reflected, and adult morality, but also that the psychological mechanism of imitation based on role models depends on empathy as well to work correctly. In particular, empathy seems fundamental to learn moral rules.

In ‘Moral Education: An Alternative to the Anti-empathic Model’ is a topic deeply related to that of moral development that is taken into consideration: that of moral education. Empathy—so the claim of this chapter—allow us to cross our egocentric boundaries and let us see the world from the perspective of another human being. This permits a richer understanding of the others. Empathy offers us an insight into the agency of the other person, into the ways in which they act, based on certain reasons and hence is a precondition for moral judgement and conduct and an indispensable part of moral education. Moreover, this chapter also show in what sense can psychopaths and autists be seen as lacking empathy.

This chapter is dedicated to the theme of caring in ethics. It is here explained how can empathy develop a caring perspective and, by means of that, a moral character. The concept of receptivity (analysed, i.e. by Michael Slote) is demonstrated to be essential for moral behaviour and receives in this chapter further attention that links it inextricably to empathy. Finally, the causal chain that connects empathy with care and care with (moral) action is illustrated in its circularity, which, far from being a weakness, reveals the strength of the ties between empathy, caring, and morality.

I wrote this book with the intention of making it understandable and interesting both for laypeople and for researchers from other disciplines, in the belief that the questions raised and the answers given might have significance for a larger audience than solely a philosophical one. After all, an illustration of the nature of empathy, its phenomenology and functioning, as well as its role within the ethical sphere should be an endeavour welcomed by a variety of individuals and constitute a knowledge which can be useful and fruitful in many different domains, such as the social, the psychological, but also the political and the economic. In fact, the choice of whether to encourage and develop, or, conversely, to disincentivise a culture of empathy, are questions that concern first and foremost our political and economic representatives.

‘Empathy and Moral Conduct and Motivation’ takes on a very special perspective in defending empathy: instead of confuting some of the criticisms made to empathy by anti-empathic scholars, it is here pointed out how these apparent shortcomings can in fact become strengths. What Paul Bloom calls the spotlight effect of empathy carries—if properly harnessed—the potentiality of being a great and irreplaceable stimulus for moral action and the so-called ‘identifiable victim effect’ can, if generalised, provide empathy with a stark emotional energy leading to moral motivation.

This chapter is dedicated to the in-depth analysis of the link between empathy and virtue. The main claim is that empathy can be considered as a virtue, and to prove that, several topics are dealt with. Firstly, it is illustrated how empathy can be guided by phronesis and, thanks to it, can become a reliable ally of morality and a virtue in the traditional sense of the term. Furthermore, the moral benefits of feeling with (i.e. ‘empathy’) are made visible by means of a comparison with feeling for (i.e. ‘compassion’ or ‘pity’), and finally, the possible role empathy might play within Kantian ethics is here examined in order to demonstrate how even the supporters of a rationalist kind of ethics should not be too hasty in leaving empathy out of the picture.

This chapter argues that empathy is the basic emotional mechanism we use to understand others and that is always in place. The idea that we are guided by an objective attitude in interpersonal relationships is confuted and, on the opposite, it is illustrated how empathy makes visible the notion of import in the moral field and calls for a participatory attitude. The case of death penalty is examined to provide an explanation for the transformative power of empathy regarding our understanding of moral values.

The final chapter addresses the topic of the lack of empathy. The idea is to see what would happen if empathy were kept outside the ethical realm. The supported claim is that this would constitute a serious deficit for morality ultimately leading to indifference and, in the worst scenario, dehumanisation and brutality. The argument is backed by an extensive analysis of the extermination camps and by an investigation on shame and on being in the presence of others conducted with suggestions stemming, i.a., from Sartre, Levinas, and Scheler.

‘A Taxonomy of Empathy’ presents a new systematisation for the phenomenon of empathy, based on the difference between what the author calls low-level empathy and high-level empathy. The first one is a form of direct, unmediated, conceptually poor, and intuitive kind of empathy which does not require the use of imagination and is akin to the concept of empathy supported by many phenomenologists, the second one is instead based on the use of imagination, mental simulations, and narratives. Narrative empathy is here represented as a subcategory of high-level empathy. The idea of the author is to overcome the rigid separation between advocates of empathy as perspective-taking and proponents of empathy as an unreflective phenomenon.

‘The Way to a Definition’ offers a clear-cut definition of empathy thanks to a descriptive, genealogical, and conceptual reconstruction of this phenomenon which is based especially on the phenomenological views on empathy by Edith Stein. It is shown how the proposed definition is able to accommodate the perspectives of the old and new exponents of the phenomenological tradition with the Smithian-derived idea widely present in many modern scholars of empathy who see, unlike the phenomenologists, imagination as the basis of this phenomenon.

This book has two main objectives. The first is to identify and adequately describe the phenomenon of empathy. This essentially means offering a strong, reasoned and accurate description of the phenomenon of empathy in order to capture the essence of the empathic phenomenon and clearly distinguish it from other similar emotional phenomena such as sympathy or compassion The second part focuses on the role that this phenomenon can play on the ethical-moral level. The question is whether empathy is necessary or at least important for morality, and if so, to what extent, in what way and for what reasons. This is an open access book.

After the great enthusiasm about the moral potentialities of empathy of the last thirty years, this phenomenon has been recently called into question, if not openly criticized, by both philosophers and psychologists among whom we find Jesse Prinz or Paul Bloom. This paper aims to show why empathy should not too easily be regarded as useless or even deleterious for morality and to propose a special role for it. In order to reach this goal, I will briefly sketch what I mean with the term empathy and how is this psychological mechanism different from other akin phenomena like compassion. I will then turn my attention to some criticisms that can be made about the role of empathy for morality which show that empathy seems not a necessary element of the three main dimensions of morality, that is moral judgment, moral development and moral conduct. After that, I will try to defend empathy thanks to the identification of some important roles it can play both at a moral and at an epistemological level, in the attempt to demonstrate that empathy is in fact part of the fundamental features of a moral person.