Manuel Liz

There are very few analyses of the structure of points of view. However, we can identify two general approaches. One of them assumes as a paradigm the structure of propositional attitudes. Here, points of view are understood as having an internal structure similar to the one we can find in propositional attitudes. The other approach is based on the notions of location and access. Here, the internal structure of points of view is not directly addressed. The features that are emphasised are related with the role that points of view are intended to have. Points of view would be ways of having access to the world, and to ourselves, from certain emplacements. The paper has three parts. In the first one, we present these two approaches and some interesting developments inside each one of them. In the second one, we examine more closely the relationships between the two approaches. In the third part of the paper, we defend the non-reducible relational nature and modal character of points of view obtaining some conclusions.

Existen tres grandes estrategias para intentar combinar realismo y antirrealismo: una distinción de niveles, una distinción de aspectos y una distinción de partes. En el trabajo se analizan estas tres estrategias. La primera de ellas ha sido desarrollada por numerosos autores. Comentamos en detalle los planteamientos recientes de José Zalabardo a propósito de ciertas tesis de John McDowell, Crispin Wright y Wittgenstein. Esta estrategia plantea graves dificultades. La segunda estrategia parece poder escapar a ellas. Sin embargo, no puede ser adoptada en un sentido máximamente general. Proponemos una combinación basada en la tercera estrategia. Realismo y antirrealismo podrían combinarse de una manera muy natural cuando son adoptados en un sentido local.

There are very few analyses of the structure of points of view. However, we can identify two general approaches. One of them assumes as a paradigm the structure of propositional attitudes. Here, points of view are understood as having an internal structure similar to the one we can find in propositional attitudes. The other approach is based on the notions of location and access. Here, the internal structure of points of view is not directly addressed. The features that are emphasised are related with the role that points of view are intended to have. Points of view would be ways of having access to the world, and to ourselves, from certain emplacements. The paper has three parts. In the first one, we present these two approaches and some interesting developments inside each one of them. In the second one, we examine more closely the relationships between the two approaches. In the third part of the paper, we defend the non-reducible relational nature and modal character of points of view obtaining some conclusions.

Discussions about physicalism, reduction, special sciences, the layered image of reality, multiple realizability, emergence, downward causation, etc., typically make the ontological presupposition that there is no room for new properties in the physical world. The domain of physical properties would thus have been established once and for all. It is my purpose in this paper to explore the alternative hypothesis that there can be, and that in fact there are, new physical properties. In the first section, I propose a brief analysis of the notions of property, physical property, and new physical property. In the second section, I present four general situations in which it would be plausible to speak of the existence of new physical properties. All of this is used to evaluate the content and scope of the hypothesis of physical novelty. Lastly, I examine certain interesting consequences of such a physical novelty in relation to some of the above mentioned topics.

This paper is about perception and its objects. My aim is to suggest a new way to articulate some of the central ideas of direct realism. Sections 1 and 2 offer from different perspectives a panoramic view of the main problems and options in the philosophy of perception. Section 3 introduces the notion of “camouflage” as an interesting and promising alternative in order to explain the nature of the intentional objects of perception. Finally, section 4 makes use of this new notion in the analysis of the relationships between the intentionality of perception, the intentionality of thought, and the intentionality of language.

Discussions on physicalism, reduction, special sciences, the layered image of reality, multiple realizability, emergence, downward causation, and so forth, typically make the ontological presupposition that there is no room for new properties in the physical world. It is my purpose in this paper to explore the alternative hypothesis that there can be—and in fact are—new physical properties. In the first section, I will propose a brief analysis of the notions of property, physical property, and new physical property. In the second section, I will present four general situations in which it would be plausible to speak of the existence of new physical properties. All of that will be used to evaluate the content and scope of the hypothesis of physical novelty. Finally, in the third section, I will examine certain very interesting and promising consequences of such a physical novelty in relation to some of the topics above mentioned.

Disjunctivism in philosophy of perception maintains that whereas veridical perceptions are relational states involving objects of the external world, illusions and hallucinations are non-relational states of the subjects. Veridical and non veridical perceptions could be subjectively indistinguishable, but this fact would not be able to support fundamental psychological explanations. Disjunctivism has to face some important problems. The aim of this paper is to explore a peculiar elaboration of disjunctivism able to face them. Our proposal intends to be substantive, offering a counterfactual explanation of the differences between veridicaland non veridical perceptions. We will arrive to an a posteriori disjunctivism for some relevant types of perceptual experiences. The a posteriori character of our position will be consequent with the external nature of the intentional objects of veridical perceptions. But our disjunctivism will be concerned only with types of perceptual experiences. That way, it could make room for many sorts of internalist psychological explanations in the context of a general disjunctivist approach.

There is a widespread view in philosophy of language and in philosophy of mind according to which the «quinean» rejection of analyticity can be made compatible with some sort of realism about meaning. Against such compatibilist claim, Paul Boghossian has recently held the thesis that one cannot coherently reject the analytical/synthetical distinction maintaining at the same time a meaning realism. His arguments are very pervasive, but they can be replied. The main objective of this paper is to show that in fact it is possible to reject analyticity being at the same time a meaning realist, even a meaning realist of a non-holist kind. The prevailing view is basically right. Moreover, it is possible to go on maintaining the compatibilist claim in its most radical form. In short, even if we adopt a non-holist meaning realism, we must reject analyticity because language is always conceptually motivated and engaged with reality. There is no linguistic arbitrariness. That forces us to go far from classical conceptions of meaning and to have a much more pluralistic one. With respect to it, for instance, to say that some statements are true once their meanings are fixed would not entail that they are true by virtue of meanings. The problem to get such a conception of meaning remains open. However, the reasons against analyticity do not force us to any irreductible meaning holism

En este trabajo se ofrece una introducción a esa área de investigación filosófica de la mente. Se abordarán, en primer lugar, algunos aspectos de su evolución histórica como disciplina diferenciada. En segundo lugar, se describirán las principales opciones existentes a la hora de conceptualizar las relaciones de lo mental con el mundo estudiado por las ciencias naturales. Se precisarán también algunos de los conceptos más recurrentes en la actual filosofía de la mente, proporcionándose a continuación una panorámica general de los autores más representativos en este terreno. Por último, se comentan varios grupos importantes de problemas abiertos. La actual filosofía de la mente nos mostraría, sobre todo, una nueva forma de hacer filosofía que pone constantemente en práctica la inexistencia de fronteras claramente definidas entre filosofía y ciencia.

In this paper, we analyze a way of valuing positively something which rarely has been taking into account in the literature: to value positively something because it could be valued positively by someone else. The main features of that way of valuing something are really very suggesting. Here, we would not have instrumental valuations, nor valuations directly sensitive to intrinsic values either. However, there would be cases in which valuations made in that way would make us able to detect things that can be valued in an inconditional way. When we imagine or conceive what could be value positively, our motivational structures face us with something that is valued without evaluative conditions and, therefore, with something that is a good candidate to have an intrinsic value.

Discussions on physicalism, reduction, special sciences, the layered image of reality, multiple realizability, emergence, downward causation, and so forth, typically make the ontological presupposition that there is no room for new properties in the physical world. It is my purpose in this paper to explore the alternative hypothesis that there can be—and in fact are—new physical properties. In the first section, I will propose a brief analysis of the notions of property, physical property, and new physical property. In the second section, I will present four general situations in which it would be plausible to speak of the existence of new physical properties. All of that will be used to evaluate the content and scope of the hypothesis of physical novelty. Finally, in the third section, I will examine certain very interesting and promising consequences of such a physical novelty in relation to some of the topics above mentioned

The main starting point of many of the contributions collected into the book is the kind of Twin Earth considerations, along with meaning individualism. Is Putnam's claim about water in this world and a stuff in an alternative world being different materials?. Is meaning in the head? One seems allowed to be skeptical about the starting point of the debate between such as emphasize broad content and those who think that the basic semantic entities are narrow contents, which would fail to be world-dependent or world-oriented. The kind of motivations prompting the essays collected into the book are likely to be regarded as in need of a deeper elucidation by such as have been more or less influenced by Quine. Pettit & McDowell's collection of essays is one of the books most scholars interested in the confines of philosophy of language and philosophy of mind will find worth reading.

Existen tres grandes estrategias para intentar combinar realismo y antirrealismo: una distinción de niveles, una distinción de aspectos y una distinción de partes. En el trabajo se analizan estas tres estrategias. La primera de ellas ha sido desarrollada por numerosos autores. Comentamos en detalle los planteamientos recientes de José Zalabardo a propósito de ciertas tesis de John McDowell, Crispin Wright y Wittgenstein. Esta estrategia plantea graves dificultades. la segunda estrategia parece poder escapar a ellas. Sin embargo, no puede ser adoptada en un sentido máximamente general. Proponemos una combinación basada en la tercera estrategia. Realismo y antirrealismo podrían combinarse de una manera muy natural cuando son adoptados en un sentido local. There are three main strategies to try to combine realism and anti-realism: a distinction of levels, a distinction of aspects, and a distinction of parts. In the paper, these strategies are analysed. The first one has been elaborated by many authors. We discuss in detail the approach of José Zalabardo concerning some theses of John McDowell, Crispin Wright and Wittgenstein. This strategy entails important problems. The second strategy seems to be capable of offering a way out of them. However, it cannot be adopted in a maximally general sense. We argue for a combination based on the third strategy. Realism and anti-realism can be combined in a very natural way when they are adopted in a local sense

We propose an analysis of the notion of model as crucially related to the notion of point of view. A model in this sense would always suggest a certain way of looking at a real system, a certain way of thinking about it and a certain way of acting upon it. We focus on System Dynamics as a paradigmatic case with respect to many of the features and problems we can find in the field of modelling and simulation. We analyse in detail some of those features. All of them would be present in many other cases of construction and use of models. Furthermore, they would support the thesis that a model can be fruitfully understood as offering a point of view capable of improving our own points of view over a certain system. The point of view offered by the model could include both non-conceptual and conceptual contents, it would have a complex structure and behaviour, and it would have direct consequences on the decisions made by the subjects adopting that point of view