Manuel Rodeiro

Movements for environmental justice ought to engage the powerful mechanisms of change deployed in a Transitional Justice context. There is reason for restraint, however, in calling upon radically disruptive procedures to immediately amend the basic structure of society. I propose a modest expansion of the purview of Transitional Justice to recognize a class of environmental harms severe enough to trigger transitional measures. This class of harms is ecocide as social death, which I define as deliberate, state-sponsored environmental destruction resulting in the annihilation of ways of life intimately connected to the natural world. The article then considers potential criticisms of this framework: its foundation in liberal political theory, its anthropocentrism, and its exclusion of global environmental harms. Despite being anthropocentric, the model offers a means of politically and legally representing the value of the natural world beyond its role as a stock of resources for human consumption. I defend an expressly liberal approach to Transitional Justice that emphasizes the core of the liberal social contract—respect for diversity.

This paper analyzes how Transitional Justice mechanisms might be deployed to redress injustices resulting from the perpetration of ecocide. It develops the notion of ecocide as social deathas a class of environmental harms severe enough to trigger a Transitional Justice response. If a state authorizes ecological destruction in a way that demonstrates wanton disregard for the cultures intimately connected to those ecosystems, then it has violated core liberal principles of respect for pluralism. Transitional Justice can be effectively utilized in overcoming these harms to transform societies from ones that tolerate grave forms of environmental destruction to eco-friendly states that further environmentalist aims. This paper explores how the four kinds of transitional justice mechanisms can aid in abating and mitigating environmental problems: (1) punitive justice mechanisms (criminal trials, lustration, and sanctions); (2) reparative justice mechanisms(reparations, rehabilitation, memorialization, apologies, and guarantees of non-repetition); (3) truth-oriented mechanisms(truth commissions, reports, and education programs); and (4) institutional reform mechanisms(changing laws and amending constitutions).

Environmentalists have long claimed it is unjust for the state to prioritize economic interests over environmental ones by sacrificing ecosystem integrity and functioning to unsustainably expand the economy. Recently, mainstream environmentalists have moved to a more conciliatory approach highlighting the common ground between environmental and economic goals. They today claim processes of economic growth and development can be made just if they become green. This paper explores the question: should states pursue “green growth”? Although some critics claim green growth is impossible, I maintain it is. I theorize three conditions that must be met for an instance of growth to be truly considered green. That a development project is green, however, does not automatically ensure it is just. Justice considerations remain in adjudicating the competing interests of different groups of stakeholders. I then examine four reasonable approaches to resolving controversies over the pursuit of green growth: cost-benefit analysis, sufficientarianism, democracy, and pluralism. I conclude a liberal pluralist form of decision-making is best for ensuring fairness.

Environmental theorists and practitioners generally accept that responsibility for environmental harm is best understood as common but differentiated, yet little work has been done to philosophically articulate this idea. This paper develops this theory by bringing Iris Marion Young's two-tiered model of responsibility to bear on the topic of addressing and redressing environmental damage. I demonstrate how her approach can satisfy the commonality criterion (i.e. that everyone has a role to play in confronting environmental harm), while still satisfying the differentiation criterion (i.e. that different actors have different kinds and degrees of responsibility), and that it does so in a manner that is persuasive, politically useful, and reasonably acceptable to all sides. In aiming to satisfy the commonality criterion, the paper identifies traditional sustainable communities as environmentalist exemplars, emphasizing that these communities have a vital role to play in combatting our present ecological crisis.

This paper considers the environmental justice issues presented by the proposed open-pit lithium mine in Thacker Pass, Nevada (Peehee mm’huh). Unlike the environmental destruction wrought from fossil fuel extraction, lithium is used to create lithium-ion batteries for storing and using electricity from “green energy” sources. Can the potential reduction in carbon emissions resulting from the lithium mined morally and politically justify the destruction of the Pass’s sagebrush sea – a critical wildlife habitat and sacred land to the People of Red Mountain? Justice issues of this kind (e.g., clashes between the “renewable energy” industry and indigenous rights) are likely to become more prevalent as the industrial economy transitions from fossil fuels to vastly more spatially extensive forms of energy production (e.g., wind and solar farms, hydroelectric dams, and biofuels). I consider the case through the concept of ecocide and explore how liberal political respect for eco-relational pluralism offers grounds on which ecocide ought to be prohibited in a fair and just society. The goal of this paper is to ensure that states, in the pursuit of environmental justice, proceed in a manner aligned with their commitment to liberalism, by refraining from prioritizing economic growth and development at the expense of other reasonable conceptions of the good.

Rawls theorizes principles of justice as defining a ‘pact of reconciliation’ between diverse conceptions of the good. What does fulfillment of this pact entail when reasonable pluralism is recognized as having an environmental dimension? Fair acknowledgment of the plurality of citizens’ relationships with the natural world challenges the neutrality of aims conventionally used to justify ecocide, including the promotion of economic growth and development. This paper explores how ecocide constitutes a violation of equal basic liberties and state neutrality as per Rawlsian political liberalism. It further considers hard cases in which ecocide is enacted for meeting citizens’ basic needs.

According to an environmental application of Rawlsian principles of justice, the well-ordered society cannot tolerate the perpetration of certain environmental harms. This paper gives an account of those harms committed in the form of ecocide. The concept of ecocide is developed, as well as the ideal of eco-relational pluralism, as conceptual tools for defending citizens’ environmental interests. This paper aims to identify persuasive and reasonably acceptable justice claims for compelling states to curtail environmentally destructive activities through recourse to principles firmly established in the liberal tradition, while simultaneously exploring the limitations of such an approach.