Mara McGuire

Philosophers of science have overlooked the role of theory in neuroscience, resulting in a somewhat surprising naïveté regarding the nature and function of neuroscientific theories. Here I provide a framework that identifies and begins to characterize what we need to know about neuroscientific theories so as to improve our epistemic standing. I argue that we need an account of the structural, interpretive, and functional aspects of neuroscientific theories, using the neuron doctrine as an illustrative case study. I introduce the novel metaphor of theoretical infrastructure as a guide for making sense of neuroscientific theories and their place within neuroscientific practice.

In this paper, I consider a philosophical model of self-control recently developed by Chandra Sripada and inspired by current dual-process models in both the sciences of the mind and philosophy. Sripada argues that the mind is bifurcated into two motivational systems that correspond to Emotion and Reason and that to exercise self-control is to act in accordance with reason when it comes into conflict with emotion. I argue that Sripada’s model rests on two false assumptions, that emotions are cognitively impenetrable and that self-control is always about taming our emotions. Based on these arguments, I conclude that our capacity for self-control cannot be understood in terms of a divided-mind and consider a structural model of self-control recently developed by Kentaro Fujita.