Marc Applebaum

Within the Husserlian phenomenological philosophical tradition, description and interpretation co-exist. However, teaching the practice of phenomenological psychological research requires careful articulation of the differences between a descriptive and an interpretive relationship to what is provided by qualitative data. If as researchers we neglect the epistemological foundations of our work or avoid working through difficult methodological issues, then our work invites dismissal as inadequate science, undermining the effort to strongly establish psychology along qualitative lines. The first article in this two-part discussion provides a Husserlian investigation of the meaning of ‘method’ for psychology as a human science. This investigation is undertaken in the light of some researchers’ appropriations of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics in the service of non-methodical praxes. The second article will address some implications of the attempt to structure qualitative psychological research along ‘Gadamerian’ lines, taking seriously the references to Gadamer’s work made by researchers such as Van Manen and Smith. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 11, Edition 1 May 2011, 69-85.

According to Husserlian scholars such as Mohanty, description and interpretation coexist within Husserl’s work and are envisioned as complementary rather than mutually exclusive approaches to inquiry. This paper argues that exploring the implications of this philosophical complementarity for psychological research would require distinguishing between both the multiple meanings of “interpretation” and the differing modes of interpretation within qualitative data. Husserl’s model of passive and active intentionality and Ricoeur’s theory of narrativity are examined in order to explore their relevance for research. It is argued that interview data can demonstrate both actively and passively intended dimensions, and that the psychological meaningfulness of this complexity points to the relevance of not only Husserl’s static analysis but also his genetic analysis. Likewise, it is argued that Ricoeur’s work on narrativity and narrative identity is invaluable in grasping ways in which narrative data is intrinsically self-interpretive, expresses self-identity, and is both situated within and responsive to the larger social horizon of the ineluctably relational interview context within which it is given.

Part of teaching the descriptive phenomenological psychological method is to assist students in grasping their previously unrecognized assumptions regarding the meaning of “science.” This paper is intended to address a variety of assumptions that are encountered when introducing students to the descriptive phenomenological psychological method pioneered by Giorgi. These assumptions are: 1) That the meaning of “science” is exhausted by empirical science, and therefore qualitative research, even if termed “human science,” is more akin to literature or art than methodical, scientific inquiry; 2) That as a primarily aesthetic, poetic enterprise human scientific psychology need not attempt to achieve a degree of rigor and epistemological clarity analogous to that pursued by natural scientists; 3) That “objectivity” is a concept belonging to natural science, and therefore human science ought not to strive for objectivity because this would require “objectivizing” the human being; 4) That qualitative research must always adopt an “interpretive” approach, description being seen as merely a mode of interpretation. These assumptions are responded to from a perspective drawing primarily upon Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, but also upon Eagleton’s analysis of aestheticism.

Remembrance can be understood as “the primary meditative practice” within Islam ; as such, remembrance is most emphasized within the Islamic mystical traditions given the name Sufism by European scholars. Dhikr is centrally important in the initiatic mystical lineages linked to Muhyiddin Ibn al-’Arabi, known as Shaykh al-Akbar. My focus will be on the fruitional experience aimed at in dhikr—namely, turning from a condition of heedlessness and duality to a unitive experience of remembering God and being remembered by God. Remembrance will be framed not as a metaphysical doctrine but as a lived experience situated in the practice of classical Sufism...

“La filosofia è per me, nella sua idea, una scienza universale e ‘rigorosa’ nel senso più radicale. Come tale essa è una scienza che posa su una fondazione ultima o, che è lo stesso, su un’ultima responsabilità e garanzia di se stessa, una scienza, dunque in cui nessuna ovvietà predicativa o ante-predicativa può fungere da inindagato terreno conoscitivo. Si tratta, insisto, di realizzare nello stile dell’instaurazione di una serie di validità relative e temporanee, attraverso un infinito processo storico un’Idea – ma di realizzarla effettivamente”.Il precedente paragrafo sopra riportato illustra una serie di temi correlati che saranno familiari agli studiosi di Husserl. Egli si è dedicato alla scienza fondazionalista e pone una forte enfasi sulla responsabilità del ricercatore: sostiene che la conoscenza prodotta dalla pratica scientifica è prospettica e contestuale, un’intuizione legata alla sua visione di scienza come compito aperto, infinito. Se un metodo di ricerca psicologica deve essere genuinamente definito fenomenologico e husserliano, allora ognuno di questi temi, che rappresentano l’impegno da parte del ricercatore, devono essere presenti, in maniera implicita o esplicita.“For me, philosophy, as an idea, means universal, and in a radical sense, ‘rigorous’ science. As such, it is science built in on ultimate foundation, or, what comes down to the same thing, a science based on ultimate self-responsibility, in which, hence, nothing held to be obvious, either predicatively or pre-predicatively, can pass, unquestioned, as a basis for knowledge. It is, I emphasize, an idea, which, as the further meditative interpretation will show, is to be realized only by way of relative and temporary validities and in an infinite historical process—but in this way it is, in fact, realizable.” The preceding passage illustrates a number of interrelated themes which will be familiar to students of Husserl. He is dedicated to foundational science and places strong emphasis on the researcher’s self-responsibility. He asserts that the knowledge yielded by scientific praxis is perspectival and contextual, an insight linked to his vision of science as an open-ended, infinite task. If a psychological research method is to be genuinely termed phenomenological and Husserlian, then each of these themes, which also represent commitments on the part of the practitioner, must be present, implicitly or explicitly.