Marc Bobro

"In this paper, I shall consider the several ways in which interpreters, since 1976, have attempted to challenge the premises of Wilson's argument, and so have tried to rescue Leibniz's theory from Wilson's charge of incoherence. I shall argue that only one of these ways stands any chance of being successful." (S. 117/118)\nDiskussion zu Margaret Wilson: Leibniz : self-consciousness and immortality in the Paris notes and after. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 58 (1976), S. 335 - 352 (vgl. M 2, Nr. 3171)

Leibniz defends concurrentism, the view that both God and created substances are causally responsible for changes in the states of created substances. Interpretive problems, however, arise in determining just what causal role each plays. Some recent work has been revisionist, greatly downplaying the causal role played by created substances—arguing instead that according to Leibniz only God has productive causal power. Though bearing some causal responsibility for changes in their perceptual states, created substances are not efficient causes of such changes. This paper argues against such revisionism; not only was Leibniz a consistent advocate of concurrentism (at least in his “mature” years), but also his account of concurrentism involves both God and created substances asefficient causes of the changes in the states of created substances

Like many other Christian philosophers, past and present, Descartes envisions an "afterlife" for the soul after bodily death. Some, both Christian and non-Christian, including Geach, Strawson and Williams, have argued that the afterlife Descartes envisions is far from the attractive state heaven is supposed to be. Others, including Leibniz, Russier, and Cottingham, have argued that a Cartesian afterlife represents a state of existence that cannot even be rationally desired. But I shall argue in this paper that both criticisms fail to appreciate fully the details of Descartes' doctrine of immortality.

In this paper I present a novel view of the ontological status of possible objects for Descartes. Specifically, I claim that possible objects just are innate ideas considered objectively. In the act of creation, God creates possibilities—in all its richness—in the form of innate ideas. Thus, in acts of thinking, one may clearly and distinctly perceive, via one’s innate ideas, that such and such is possible. To argue this, I first analyze and critique two competing views—one from Calvin Normore who claims that innate ideas represent an independent realm of possibilia, and another from David Cunning and Alan Nelson who claim that Descartes had no theory of modality. I then move on to the defense of my view, both giving a positive account of my argument and noting how my interpretation enjoys certain advantages over my interlocutors.

In this paper I present a novel view of the ontological status of possible objects for Descartes. Specifically, I claim that possible objects just are innate ideas considered objectively. In the act of creation, God creates possibilities—in all its richness—in the form of innate ideas. Thus, in acts of thinking, one may clearly and distinctly perceive, via one’s innate ideas, that such and such is possible. To argue this, I first analyze and critique two competing views—one from Calvin Normore who claims that innate ideas represent an independent realm of possibilia, and another from David Cunning and Alan Nelson who claim that Descartes had no theory of modality. I then move on to the defense of my view, both giving a positive account of my argument and noting how my interpretation enjoys certain advantages over my interlocutors.

Leibniz defends concurrentism, the view that both God and created substances are causally responsible for changes in the states of created substances. Interpretive problems, however, arise in determining just what causal role each plays. Some recent work has been revisionist, greatly downplaying the causal role played by created substances—arguing instead that according to Leibniz only God has productive causal power. Though bearing some causal responsibility for changes in their perceptual states, created substances are not efficient causes of such changes. This paper argues against such revisionism; not only was Leibniz a consistent advocate of concurrentism (at least in his “mature” years), but also his account of concurrentism involves both God and created substances as efficient causes of the changes in the states of created substances.

"We are omniscient but confused," says Leibniz. He also says that we live in the best of all possible worlds, yet do not causally interact. So what are we? Leibniz is known for many things, including the ideality of space and time, calculus, plans for a universal language, theodicy, and ecumenism. But he is not known for his ideas on the self and personal identity. This book shows that Leibniz offers an original, internally coherent theory of personal identity, a theory that stands on its own even next to Locke's contemporaneous and more famous version. This book will appeal not only to students of Leibniz's thought but also to philosophers and psychologists interested in methodological problems in understanding or formulating theories of self and personal identity.

This dissertation covers a sadly neglected area of Leibniz's thought--his account of personhood and its concomitant doctrines of moral agency and meaningful immortality. It defends an interpretation of Leibniz's philosophy that is unique in the following respects. Some scholars have worried that Leibniz wavers as to whether sameness of substance is necessary for personal identity. Leibnizian persons, they wonder aloud, might therefore be more appropriately thought of as Lockean unities of consciousness. This dissertation seeks to allay this worry: we just are monads. Scholars, too, have worried that Leibniz's account of the psychological component of personal identity is inconsistent: Leibniz says both that memory is necessary and that it is not. Again, there is little reason for worry since Leibniz distinguishes between what is necessary for being a person from what is necessary for being the same person over time. The former requires the power of memory, the latter requires continuity of memories. Another worry is evident in the literature on Leibniz's account of personhood, this time concerning the moral agency of persons. Leibniz appears to concede to Locke that if there existed thinking, conscious "machines," they could nevertheless be genuine moral agents. This would be a very significant concession considering the fact that for Leibniz "machines" are not genuine substances at all. This dissertation argues that Leibniz's "concession" to Locke amounts to the rather different, albeit interesting, claim that we ought to treat thinking machines as if they were morally responsible. The thesis of monadic embodiment has long been vexing for Leibniz scholars: Why does a material world, or a material element in a possible world, exist at all? Is embodiment only the condition of the "imperfection" of all substances inferior to God, since sense-perception is necessarily confused? This dissertation argues that Leibniz has in mind a further reason for embodiment, at least when it comes to persons. A disembodied person would be unable to live and participate in a moral community. Finally, scholars have generally underestimated the success of Leibniz's attack against other philosophical doctrines of immortality. Not only does Leibniz attack the proofs offered in defense of Platonic, Averroistic, Cartesian, and Spinozistic doctrines, but also he charges that the doctrines themselves are insidious. Ultimately, they are meaningless to us because what they promise by way of survival is something that we rationally could not desire, least of all anticipate

Leibniz dit souvent que toutes les substances individuelles et seulement les substances individuelles peuvent être agents moraux authentiques. Mais, dans un passage fascinant des "Nouveaux essais", Leibniz semble concéder à John Locke que si les machines pensantes existaient, elles pourraient être des agents moraux authentiques. Ce serait une concession très significative considérant le fait que pour Leibniz les machines ne sont pas du tout des substances authentiques, mais de simple agrégats de matière. En général, les érudits ont interprété ce passage comme un moyen pour Leibniz d'affirmer que l'identité métaphysique à long terme n'est pas une condition nécessaire pour l'identité morale à long terme. Mais, dans cette étude, je vais soutenir que Leibniz ne concède réellement pas à Locke que les machines pensantes pourraient être des agents moraux