Marcello Di Massa

This paper proposes a resolute reading of Thomas Bernhard’s prose in analogy with the resolute readings of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Drawing on the interpretive framework developed by Diamond and Conant, it argues that Bernhard’s obsessive monologues and strategies of nonsense operate performatively, compelling the reader to undergo a process analogous to the Tractarian dissolution of the illusion of sense. Bernhard’s fiction enacts a literary dialectic in which exaggerated, self-effacing discourse exposes its own nonsensicality, leading the reader to a transformation of perspective. Reading Bernhard resolutely thus coheres with critical accounts of Bernhard’s performative and theatrical prose, in which self-destructive patterns of thought are staged rather than endorsed.

In recent years, Wittgenstein scholarship has renewed its focus on the relationship between Wittgenstein, modernism, and the arts, with particular emphasis on the aesthetic and modernist value of his early work, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Specifically, the paper aims to explore the aesthetic significance of Wittgenstein’s notion of nonsense (Unsinn) and how it can be applied to understanding literary language. The central thesis is that the interpretation of the relationship between nonsense and literary language, as well as its broader implications, shifts depending on the interpretive approach one adopts when reading the Tractatus. Three primary readings have emerged: the ineffability approach, where nonsense is a necessary byproduct of the attempt to speak about what lies beyond the limits of language; the resolute program, which translates the insights of the resolute reading into the aesthetic domain; and the grammatical approach, which considers ‘grammatical’ nonsense as having a fundamentally positive function—insofar as it creatively displays the criteria governing the grammar of our language. Each of these interpretations allows us to understand in different ways how the concept of nonsense can be transformed from a logical limit into an aesthetic resource, significantly affecting our understanding of literary practice. In particular, it will be the insights of the resolute program that will be favored to point to its possible developments in the literary field.

The relationship between literature and morality, as experienced by Wittgenstein during his life, brings to the forefront the ethical dimension of engaging with reading. Wittgenstein’s appreciation for literature stemmed not only from its ability to illuminate significant themes of life and morality, but also from his view of reading as a deeply spiritual activity that was integral to his ethical and existential commitment. For him, reading was not a passive activity but an ethical engagement that could reveal transformative insights. I argue that it is both useful and coherent to consider the perspective offered by Iris Murdoch, which can be seen as expanding Wittgenstein’s point of view. As Murdoch claims, both philosophy and literature seek an ethical sense by fostering moral and conceptual clarity. In particular, great literature offers a disciplined vision that challenges inhibitions and preconceived notions, involving readers in a morally active and imaginative effort. Through attentive engagement, literature educates us in understanding human situations and the intricate moral and conceptual texture of life. Scholars such as Cora Diamond and Toril Moi further develop these ideas, emphasizing the moral significance of focusing on the particular in literature and life. Such attention reflects an ethical attitude that transcends individual reflection, extending to social life and diverse moral landscapes. This approach underscores the continuity between life, philosophy, and literature, encouraging an open, responsive, and ethically engaged reading practice, in the authentic Wittgensteinian spirit.