Marcin Moskalewicz

This paper seeks to make a contribution to addiction research by introducing some key phenomenological concepts and discussing how they can illuminate the lived experience of people with addiction. We begin by briefly sketching the historical and philosophical background of phenomenology, highlighting its focus on subjective experience and its clinical relevance. In the second part of the paper we introduce some fundamental aspects of lived experience, for example, temporality, affectivity, embodiment and intersubjectivity, and explore alterations in these aspects that occur during addiction. We also discuss how an awareness of the socio-cultural dimension of such alterations has the potential of improving clinical encounters. In the third part of the paper, we focus on three articles on addiction published in Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology in 2024. We explore how phenomenology can add nuance to some of the ideas discussed in these pieces. Our key message is that phenomenological concepts and a critical phenomenological attitude can make a crucial contribution to current research initiatives.

Drawing on an online survey that combined closed-and open-ended questions analyzed in a grounded theory paradigm, this study explores the experiences of 155 families of autistic individuals assessed by the Polish Disability Assessment Board, a key institution responsible for issuing certificates necessary for receiving state support. The research presents a case for developing an empirically grounded, bottom-up epistemology of autism. The results indicate a pervasive lack of autism-specific expertise among Disability Assessment Board members, who are inadequately informed and influenced by stereotypes, resulting in often unfair decisions. Based on these results, we argue that the scarcity of transparent, standardized epistemic criteria and the asymmetrical power relations between service users and providers generate conditions where the credibility and authority to define autistic “disability” remain unevenly distributed. We thus call into question the legitimacy of the psychiatric knowledge acted upon by the case-study system and propose to build future disability assessment frameworks with the full and active participation of service users and their families. We argue it is essential to separate clinical diagnosis, disability evaluation, and support allocation. We thus provide factual and critical insights for policymakers and professionals beyond the Polish cultural context, where different normative and biased assumptions about the bodily and cognitive functioning of people on the autism spectrum might control the disability certification process.

This paper seeks to make a contribution to addiction research by introducing some key phenomenological concepts and discussing how they can illuminate the lived experience of people with addiction. We begin by briefly sketching the historical and philosophical background of phenomenology, highlighting its focus on subjective experience and its clinical relevance. In the second part of the paper we introduce some fundamental aspects of lived experience, for example, temporality, affectivity, embodiment and intersubjectivity, and explore alterations in these aspects that occur during addiction. We also discuss how an awareness of the socio-cultural dimension of such alterations has the potential of improving clinical encounters. In the third part of the paper, we focus on three articles on addiction published in Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology in 2024. We explore how phenomenology can add nuance to some of the ideas discussed in these pieces. Our key message is that phenomenological concepts and a critical phenomenological attitude can make a crucial contribution to current research initiatives.

Drawing on an online survey that combined closed- and open-ended questions analyzed in a grounded theory paradigm, this study explores the experiences of 155 families of autistic individuals assessed by the Polish Disability Assessment Board, a key institution responsible for issuing certificates necessary for receiving state support. The research presents a case for developing an empirically grounded, bottom-up epistemology of autism. The results indicate a pervasive lack of autism-specific expertise among Disability Assessment Board members, who are inadequately informed and influenced by stereotypes, resulting in often unfair decisions. Based on these results, we argue that the scarcity of transparent, standardized epistemic criteria and the asymmetrical power relations between service users and providers generate conditions where the credibility and authority to define autistic “disability” remain unevenly distributed. We thus call into question the legitimacy of the psychiatric knowledge acted upon by the case-study system and propose to build future disability assessment frameworks with the full and active participation of service users and their families. We argue it is essential to separate clinical diagnosis, disability evaluation, and support allocation. We thus provide factual and critical insights for policymakers and professionals beyond the Polish cultural context, where different normative and biased assumptions about the bodily and cognitive functioning of people on the autism spectrum might control the disability certification process.

This paper seeks to make a contribution to addiction research by introducing some key phenomenological concepts and discussing how they can illuminate the lived experience of people with addiction. We begin by briefly sketching the historical and philosophical background of phenomenology, highlighting its focus on subjective experience and its clinical relevance. In the second part of the paper we introduce some fundamental aspects of lived experience, for example, temporality, affectivity, embodiment and intersubjectivity, and explore alterations in these aspects that occur during addiction. We also discuss how an awareness of the socio-cultural dimension of such alterations has the potential of improving clinical encounters. In the third part of the paper, we focus on three articles on addiction published in Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology in 2024. We explore how phenomenology can add nuance to some of the ideas discussed in these pieces. Our key message is that phenomenological concepts and a critical phenomenological attitude can make a crucial contribution to current research initiatives.

In 1913 Karl Jaspers published the first edition of his Allgemeine Psychopathologie. The aim was to overcome the wealth of opinions and single schools of thought prevailing in psychiatry by creating a new systematic order of general psychopathology based on methodological considerations. To illustrate the intellectual horizon and the abundance of the book’s contents, this chapter presents Jaspers’ biographical background and unusual academic career. Phenomenology requires a vivid reproduction deprived of theoretical bias and personal prejudice of mental phenomena present in consciousness. Jaspers contrasted this cross-sectional approach he called “static understanding” with the longitudinal approach of genetic understanding. As a method of gaining insight through understanding, it reveals how mental phenomena evolve out of other mental phenomena. Jaspers assumed that the intrusion of something incomprehensible or the transition of a natural development into an incomprehensible process is accounted for by outer-conscious factors such as a causally explainable disorder. It will be described as a key hypothesis of Allgemeine Psychopathologie. Thanks to the methodology Jaspers created for psychopathology, the book represents the rational foundation of descriptive psychopathology. In addition, the collection of precisely defined and systematically classified symptoms, exemplified by the arsenal of abnormal perceptions, represents excellent tools in neuropsychiatry. It permits the generation of testable hypotheses about the associations between psychopathological phenomena and biological processes.

This book originates from the need to integrate a first-person perspective into mainstream academic research in psychiatry and its relation to neurology. First and foremost, it recognizes that psychiatric patients can offer unique viewpoints and insights, not only into their own pathology but into the broader and basic categories of being a person—the kinds of experiences associated with perception, emotion, action, selfhood, embodiment and communication—that may be disordered during mental illness. While conventional psychiatric paradigms predominantly emphasize empirical quantification and pathological categorization, the intricate weaving of human mental states presented by patient experience suggests the presence of a larger ontological tapestry than what is represented currently. For now, the complex patterns in this tapestry can only be imagined, but we know that whatever image they make must afford a more expansive view. An approach that incorporates the subtle variations of embodied lived experiences and emotional landscapes, in addition to neurocognitive processes. But how do we find this place? This is where philosophy, and phenomenology in particular, come in handy, as a bridge.

The “Praecox Feeling” (PF) is a classical concept referring to a characteristic feeling of bizarreness experienced by a psychiatrist while encountering a person with schizophrenia. Although the PF used to be considered a core symptom of the schizophrenia spectrum, it fell into disuse since the spread of operationalized diagnostic methods (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders/International Classification of Diseases systems). In contemporary research on schizophrenia, it remains largely unaddressed. This critical review investigates the evolution of the PF in historical and contemporary literature and presents an exhaustive overview of empirical evidence on its prevalence in clinical decision making, its reliability and validity. The review demonstrates that the PF is a real determinant of medical decision making in schizophrenia, although, without further research, there is not enough evidence to sustain its rehabilitation as a reliable and valid clinical criterion. PF-like experiences should not be opposed to any criteriological attitude in diagnosis and would be clinically useful if the conditions of descriptive precaution and rigorous epistemology are maintained. The aim of teaching clinical expertise is to transform this basic experience into a well-founded clinical judgment. Finally, the article discusses the possible relevance of the PF for basic science and clinical research according to a translational approach inspired by phenomenology.

Heidegger's fundamental ontology is a powerful weapon, but that power comes with a price. It carries a totalizing capacity within, including the extinguishing of all parties partaking in a philosophical dispute. After all, there are no longer any "parties" involved, no selves or objects or aspects or qualities or anything actually. We initiate a quest beyond things.In their work, "Boredom and Anorexia," Alexandre Chapy and Corinne Gal (2025) deliberately reach for that weapon to demonstrate that anorexia is a failed attempt at escaping the ontological condition. The weapon is more than accurate in its critical capacity and certainly much more effective than any conventional arsenal. It is no less than a tactical... Read More.

This paper synthesises heterogenic literature on temporal experience in borderline personality disorder (BPD) from a phenomenologically grounded perspective into core categories and structures. Utilising a variant of indirect phenomenology, it adopts insights into temporality to integrate data from phenomenological psychopathology, cognitive sciences, chronobiology and psychoanalysis. Theoretical, qualitative and quantitative inputs expressed through different vocabularies were reduced, analysed and integrated to detect the key overlaps and thus grasp the essential, invariant aspects of BPD temporality. This meta-synthesis reveals that the way experience unfolds in BPD is conditioned and mediated by (1) a dense yet disorganised past, which is recreated by current affective stimuli, which are currently (2) immediate and immersive, which truncates the horizon of the future, now experienced as (3) blurred and with a limited sense of ownership. Altogether, the temporal dialectics at play contribute to the feeling of being stuck and disoriented. One lives in disturbing cycles between a negativity-biased past and a narrow present, which hinders self-transcendence and thus the process of personal development. The present shifts into flashbacks and ruminations which also affect intersubjectivity and may be seen in terms of dissociative symptoms. The article advocates for a closer integration of phenomenology with empirical research results bridging the gap between theoretical and evidence-based understanding of the lived experience of BPD.

Currently, anomalous lived temporality is not included in the main diagnostic criteria or standard symptom checklists. In this article, we present the Transdiagnostic Assessment of Temporal Experience, a structured interview that can be used by researchers and clinicians without a comprehensive phenomenological background to explore abnormal time experiences in persons with abnormal mental conditions regardless of their diagnosis. When extensive data gathered by this scale are available, it will be possible to delineate well-defined anomalous lived temporality profiles for each psychopathological disorder. This instrument may also prove useful for clinicians by providing a more refined assessment of relevant psychopathological symptoms and an in-depth understanding of the patient’s abnormal behaviour as related to specific types of time experience. In the first part of the article, we provide a brief overview of the phenomenological concept of temporality, including pre-phenomenal and phenomenal time, synthesis, conation and synchronization, and of abnormal time experiences in persons affected by psychopathological conditions. In the following part, we describe the basic structure of the interview that comprises seven categories corresponding to the abnormal features of lived temporality: anomalies of synchrony, of time structure, of implicit time flow, of explicit time flow, and anomalous experiences of the past, the present and the future. The paper also includes a section on administration and scoring of the TATE scale, the complete interview and a Likert table for quantifying the frequency, intensity and interference with daily life of the phenomena explored.

This paper argues in favor of two related theses. First, due to a fundamental, biologically grounded world-openness, human culture is a biological imperative. As both biology and culture evolve historically, cultures rise and fall and the diversity of the human species develops. Second, in this historical process of rise and fall, abnormality plays a crucial role. From the perspective of a broader context traditionally addressed by speculative philosophies of history, the so-called mental disorders may be seen as entailing particular functional advantages, and thus have a great impact on the course of human history. Nowadays, however, we live under a threat of cultural uniformity. While the diversity of the human species is cherished at the political level, it is being slowly eradicated through medical means. This paradox is a dangerous feature of contemporary globalized society that can lead to highly problematic consequences.

Daniel Ciunajcis Marcin Moskalewicz Time-Space of History. Transcendental Conditions of Practicing History as PoliticsThe article deals with the issue of time-space in modern historiography, and the main thesis is that time-space is a transcendental condition of the possibility of the practice of history and that modern victory of time over space has various negative implications that are underscored and analyzed. In the first part of the article, the authors present classical asymmetric concepts – Greeks vs. Barbarians and Christians vs. Pagans – as analyzed by Reinhardt Koselleck. In the second part of the article, the advent of a new Christian temporality is being examined via Karl Barth’s interpretation (as presented in his Dogmatics in Outline) of Pontius Pilate’s last judgment over Jesus Christ. In this context three aspects of temporality are being discerned: the horizon of expectation represented by Jesus Christ, the space of experience represented by the Jewish community and eternity represented by Pontius Pilate. Pilate is recognized as taking the place of God in the political order: himself an embodiment of state, a symbol of its transcendence, and a transcendental condition of possibility of modern political life. In the third part the authors defend the thesis that thinking is an embodied phenomenon. While applying and criticizing Hannah Arendt, they indicate that thinking should be taken as an original source of human temporality and as a condition of possibility of organizing external space. The authors emphasize Arendt’s conception of a metaphor as a bridge between the sensible and the supersensible, with due attention to both differences and similarities between thinking and acting. Next, the authors analyze some consequences of their thesis for storytelling and political history being organized today mostly according to mere chronological paradigm. In the fourth part of the article, the authors pay attention to spatial organization of politics, arguing against Karl Schlögel, who claims that in late modern times national historiography was responsible for the dominance of the spatial paradigm. The argument defended is that even in the case of seemingly spatial organization of politics and history – as for example in a map – the temporal order is playing a predominant, even if hidden, role, and that space is being analyzed and valued according to temporal criteria. The predominantly temporal dynamics of modernization and modern supremacy of the future – as presented in the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe Lexicon by Bielefeld School – is interpreted as a sign of loss and a symptom of narrowing our image of history. Keywords: time-space in modern historiography, transcendental condition of possibility of the practice of history, Reinhardt Koselleck, Hannah Arendt, Michel Foucault, Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

The article presents Erwin W. Straus’ unpublished manuscript “Temporal Horizons” from 1952. In the paper, in addition to an extensive philosophical discussion with St. Augustine, Henri Bergson and Sigmund Freud, Straus elaborates on his idea of a unified view of temporal experience, comprising both the personal and the impersonal dimensions of time. The manuscript also contains an interview with a psychotic patient, which is supposed to exemplify Straus' core idea on the psychotic temporal experience, according to which the break of the invisible bond between immanent or personal, and clock or impersonal time leads to a loss of a sense of reality.

This paper argues that intuition plays a role in the diagnosis of schizophrenia and presents its phenomenological rationale. A discussion of self-assessment questionnaires and empirical studies in the clinical setting provides evidence that despite the prevalence of operational diagnosis, the intuitive judgment of schizophrenia continues to take place. Two related notions of intuitive diagnosis are presented: Minkowski’s diagnostic by penetration and Rümke’s praecox feeling. Further on, the paper explores and clarifies the phenomenology behind the praecox feeling. First, it is argued, intuitive diagnosis is neither a feeling nor an experience, but a typification operating at an implicit level. Second, it is not simply subjective as spatially it takes place in the in-between of the clinical interaction. Finally, it is not just momentary, but temporally extended, and, hence, partly reflective. The paper suggests that intuitive diagnosis requires critical testing on the side of the psychiatrist to either confirm or falsify it through reflective operations. In conclusion, the merits and shortcomings of intuitive vs. operational diagnosis are presented.

The paper examines both the phenomenology of the manic self as well as critical aspects of manic neurobiology, focusing, with respect to both domains, on manic temporality. We argue that the distortions of lived time in mania exceed mere acceleration and are fundamental for manic affectivity. Mania involves radical acceleration and radical asynchronicity, which result in an instantaneous existence. People with mania rebel against the facticity of reality and suffer from an existential leap towards the future, in which the self abandons normal temporal boundaries. Excerpts from the interviews with persons with mania who experienced psychosis illustrate this phenomenon. Commenting upon disrupted circadian rhythms in mania and the role of lithium in its treatment the paper posits manic temporality as the link through which manic phenomenology and manic neurobiology intertwine.

The paper examines both the phenomenology of the manic self as well as critical aspects of manic neurobiology, focusing, with respect to both domains, on manic temporality. We argue that the distortions of lived time in mania exceed mere acceleration and are fundamental for manic affectivity. Mania involves radical acceleration and radical asynchronicity, which result in an instantaneous existence. People with mania rebel against the facticity of reality and suffer from an existential leap towards the future, in which the self abandons normal temporal boundaries. Excerpts from the interviews with persons with mania who experienced psychosis illustrate this phenomenon. Commenting upon disrupted circadian rhythms in mania and the role of lithium in its treatment the paper posits manic temporality as the link through which manic phenomenology and manic neurobiology intertwine.

The article covers Erwin W. Straus’ views on the problem of time and temporal experience in the context of psychopathology. Beside Straus’ published scholarship, including his papers dealing exclusively with the subject of time, the sources utilized in this essay comprise several of Straus’ unpublished manuscripts on temporality, with the primary focus on the 1952 manuscript Temporal Horizons, which is discussed in greater detail and subsequently published for the first time in this journal. In the first part of the article, the author introduces what he considers to be the central tension of the whole of Straus’ work on the issue of time, namely, the tension stemming from a dualistic account of time with its personal and impersonal dimensions. Interpretative developments of this tension are followed covering Straus’ early German works and his late American scholarship. The author presents Straus’ way of overcoming the dualistic account of time and his arguments in favour of what is termed here the “unified view of time”. Of critical importance for the unified view is Straus’ concept of “today”, which is extensively commented upon. In the second part of the article, the author focuses on the psychopathological consequences of the unified view as seen by Straus. A clear-cut boundary between a normal and a psychotic experience of time is supposed to lie in breaking the bond between the personal and the impersonal orders of time, leading to a fundamental estrangement. This view, it is claimed, is already present in a nutshell in Straus’ earliest work, and is elaborated upon later. In conclusion, both the merits and the weaknesses of Straus’ account of temporality are presented. A major advantage is that Straus abstains from a dualistic conception of time and reappraises the often-devalued clock time. A fundamental drawback is that Straus does not venture to explore the pathological varieties of temporal experience and fails to specify the acknowledged differences between, on the one hand, psychotic elements in depressive disorders, and, on the other hand, such elements in schizophrenic disturbances.

This paper argues that 'duality' accounts of time, as exemplified by Henri Bergson's, Edmund Husserl's, and John McTaggart's ideas, parallel the decomposition of temporal experience in depressive psychosis into objective and subjective dimensions of time. The paper also proposes to comprehend the full-fledged depressive temporal delusion, in which the subjective flow of time comes to a standstill, via the idea of a double orientation to reality characteristic of schizophrenic delusions. In the depressive temporal delusion a person claims that time is not moving while simultaneously her cognitive orientation in temporal surroundings remains largely unaffected, hence the double orientation. The juxtaposition of temporal experience in depression with the temporal disorientation in dementia enables us to situate the depressive delusion regarding the flow of time in the middle of a proposed scale of the disintegration of normal temporal experience.

The goal of this paper is to introduce Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences’ thematic issue on disordered temporalities. The authors begin by discussing the main reason for the neglect of temporal experience in present-day psychiatric nosologies, mainly, its reduction to clock time. Methodological challenges facing research on temporal experience include addressing the felt sense of time, its structure, and its pre-reflective aspects in the life-world setting. In the second part, the paper covers the contributions to the thematic issue concerning temporal experience in anxiety, depression, mania, addiction, post-traumatic stress disorder, autism, and in recovery from psychosis. The authors argue in favor of integrative and cross-disciplinary approaches. In conclusion, they present time as a significant aspect of human suffering.

Author: Moskalewicz Marcin Title: AESTHETIZATION OF POLITICS ACCORDING TO HANNAH ARENDT (Estetyzacja polityki w ujęciu Hannah Arendt) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2005, vol:.5, number: 2005/1, pages: 203-220 Keywords: ARENDT, AESTHETIZATION OF POLITICS, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The article reflects on the problem of aesthetization of politics in Hannah Arendt’s work. It starts with the reconstruction of Arendt’s concept of the human condition, with the intention of placing the political within it. Then, by exploring the theatrical metaphor of political life the author attempts to show in what sense can we say that the political and the aesthetical intertwine in Arendt’s thought. The author also discusses the reproach of the aesthetization of politics and its link to fascism, arguing that paying a closer attention to the distinction between creative and performative arts may help to avoid it. In conclusion, Arendt’s reading of Kant’s Critique of Judgment serves as a basis for a more sympathetic interpretation of her aesthetization of politics, in which the gap between the moral and the aesthetical is reduced