Marco Solinas

The paper takes up Amy Allen’s challenge to contemporary German critical theory from the perspective of post- and de-colonial studies, focusing on the role played by Hegel’s legacy. More precisely, it takes up the neo-Hegelian method of normative reconstruction adopted by Axel Honneth and, in some respects, by Habermas. This perspective led Honneth to adopt a teleology of history, in the strict sense of a Geschichtsteleologie, although certainly in a post-metaphysical form, which represents an obstacle to Allen’s challenge. The teleological conception of the progressive realization of reason, especially during modernity, leads in fact to difficulties in developing a theory of history able to deal with the themes of coloniality, and more generally to discuss from this perspective the correlations between normativity, history and power relations. Finally, from the point of view of the opportunity to establish an organic connection between social critic and subaltern subjects and cultures, this conception is very problematic, especially considering the neo-Hegelian model of immanent critique.

Starting with Aristotle and moving on to Darwin, Marco Solinas outlines the basic steps from the birth, establishment and later rebirth of the traditional view of living beings, and its overturning by evolutionary revolution. The classic framework devised by Aristotle was still dominant in the 17th Century world of Galileo, Harvey and Ray, and remained hegemonic until the time of Lamarck and Cuvier in the 19th Century. Darwin's breakthrough thus takes on the dimensions of an abandonment of the traditional finalistic theory. It was a transition exemplified in the morphological analysis of useless parts, such as the sightless eyes of moles, already discussed by Aristotle, which Darwin used as a crowbar to unhinge the systematic recourse to final causes. With many excerpts, a chronological sequence and an analytical approach, this book follows the course of the two conceptions that have shaped the destiny of living beings in western culture.

The article is focused on Honneth’s teleology of history, presented as a historical process of gradual realization of an immanent normative ‘telos’, and not only as a form of axiological evaluation of events and social institutions. The author aims to show that this teleology implies a series of problems both on the level of historical analysis and with respect to the theoretical-political and critical-social outcomes of the new Hegelian critical theory. Particularly, it seems to marginalize the contingent character of historical-political conflicts and the related possibility of regressive implications and consequences of such conflicts, leading to a de-politicization of the immanent theoretical framework at stake.

The paper aims to clarify the interpretation of Kantian morality and Hegelian ethical life given by Honneth and Habermas; it try in particularly to explain the several meanings and forms of Honneth’s relaunch of Hegel’s conception of Sitt- lichkeit. The Author aims at the same time to show some structural limits of this neo-Hegelian ethical perspective from a political point of view, also in relation to the concept of «immanent critique» adopted by Honneth, and differentiated by him from the concept of «internal criticism» developed by Michael Walzer. The Author observes that the immanent approach of Honneth’s normative reconstruction and social critique seems to have some problems to take in account the plurality of different and con icting ethical-political orientations.

The aim of this paper is to show that Honneth’s philosophy of history is teleological in a narrow sense. This teleological character is problematic for the theory of the struggle for recognition, for the conception of history as such, and for the methodology of the normative reconstruction. In particular, the teleological conception gives to the theory of recognition a historical form that points out a unilateral character. Furthermore, the teleological neo-Hegelian methodology of normative reconstruction seems to adopt a too stark trust in the progress of human societies faced with the problem of social, political and cultural regressions.

The paper presents a critique of Marcuse’s theory of “false needs”. It aims to clear the theoretical ground necessary to sketch out an immanent critique of the socio-economical dynamics that dictate the exhausting, and oft endless postponement of the satisfaction of a multiplicity of mass needs and desires. The paper focuses its attention on some paradoxes produced by Marcuse’s theory, correlated in particular with the critique of the wellbeing of the masses, and with the manipulative superpower ascribed to ideology. These paradoxes are interpreted as expressions of a radical distance between critic and the social reality and of a paternalistic drift, which can both be overcome by the introduction of a immanent critique. Il contributo presenta una critica della teoria dei “falsi bisogni” di Marcuse. Tale critica è volta a liberare lo spazio teorico necessario per impostare una critica immanente delle dinamiche socio-economiche che impongono un estenuante e spesso infinito differimento della soddisfazione di una molteplicità di desideri e bisogni di massa. Ci si sofferma su alcuni paradossi generati dalla teoria di Marcuse, correlati in particolare alla critica rivolta al benessere raggiunto dalle masse, ed allo strapotere manipolatorio attribuito all’ideologia. Tali paradossi vengono interpretati come espressione di un radicale distacco tra il critico e la realtà sociale, e di una sua deriva paternalistica, che possono essere superati attraverso l’adozione di una critica di tipo immanente

"Patterns of psychoanalysis and theory of recognition. Axel Honneth’s intersubjective psyche". An overview of the several scopes and patterns used over time by Axel Honneth in his “theory of recognition” is presented. After a discussion of the use of object relations theory (especially with reference to D.W. Winnicott’s contributions) in Honneth’s 1992 book Struggle for Recognition, the theoretical revision of psychoanalysis in light of his theory of recognition is examined. Finally, Honneth’s suggestion of a new alliance between a renewed “critical theory” and psychoanalysis, which concerns also the dimension of political psychology, is discussed. Viene offerta una panoramica sui differenti usi e le diverse forme di psicoanalisi utilizzate da Axel Honneth in relazione alla sua “teoria del riconoscimento” nel corso del tempo. Dopo una discussione dell’uso della teoria delle relazioni oggettuali (soprattutto nella concezione di D.W. Winnicott) in Lotta per il riconoscimento, del 1992, si prende in esame la revisione della psicoanalisi operata in termini di teoria del riconoscimento. Infine viene discussa la proposta di una nuova alleanza tra una “teoria critica” rinnovata e la psicoanalisi, che contempla anche il versante della psicologia politica.

The book aims to offer a contribution to the historiographical and conceptual reconfiguration of the evolutionary revolution in the light of the centuries-old tenets of the Aristotelian biological tradition. Darwin’s breakthrough constitutes a thorough overturning of the fixist, essentialist and teleological framework created by Aristotle, a framework still dominant in the 17th Century world of Harvey and Ray, as well as Galileo, and then hegemonic until Linnaeus and Cuvier. This change is exemplified in the morphological analysis of useless parts, such as the sightless eyes of moles, already discussed by Aristotle, and which Darwin used almost like a crowbar to unhinge the systematic recourse to final causes. This is an ancient teleological heritage present in various forms in the concept of natural selection, but by then confined within an eminently historical framework open to randomness. Un contributo alla riconfigurazione storiografica e concettuale della rivoluzione evoluzionistica alla luce della tenuta plurisecolare della tradizione biologica aristotelica. La svolta di Darwin si delinea quale puntuale rovesciamento dell'impianto fissista, essenzialista e teleologico coniato da Aristotele, ancora dominante nel Seicento di Harvey e di Ray, nonostante Galileo, e poi egemone fino a Linneo e Cuvier. Svolta esemplificata dall'analisi morfologica delle parti inutili, come gli occhi ciechi della talpa, tematizzate già da Aristotele, e che Darwin usò quale grimaldello per scardinare il ricorso sistematico alle cause finali. Antica eredità teleologica presente in varie forme nel concetto di selezione naturale, ma ormai calata entro una griglia eminentemente storica e aperta alla casualità.

The essay concerns the reconstruction of the repression of desires, with reference to the analysis of their oneiric emersions expounded in the Republic, in comparison with Freud’s conception. Plato’s concept of suppression according to which specific desires are enslaved, so that they can find satisfaction usually only in dreams seems consistent with Freud’s concept of remotion; therefore both the condition of the suppressed desires and the intrapsychic place of their enslavement seem to be interpretable in the light of Freud’s concept of the unconscious. Das Thema des vorliegenden Beitrags ist die Rekonstruktion der Repression von Wünschen in Bezug auf die Analyse ihres Auftauchens im Traum, wie sie in der Politeia ausgeführt wird, im Vergleich mit der Konzeption bei Freud. Die besondere Form von Platonischer Unterdrückung – durch die bestimmte Wünsche in Sklaverei gehalten werden, so dass sie ihre Befriedigung normalerweise nur im Traum erreichen -, scheint mit dem Freudschen Konzept der Verdrängung vereinbar, insofern sowohl der Zustand der unterdrückten Wünsche als auch der intrapsychische Ort ihrer Versklavung unter Anwendung von Freuds Konzept des Unbewussten deutbar ist.