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1Dualism about undercutting defeatRatio. forthcoming.Most philosophers agree that the distinction between rebutting and undercutting defeaters is sound. Recently, however, there has been much debate over the nature of and relationship between rebutting and undercutting defeaters. Among the things that have been argued about is whether undercutting defeat, in contrast to rebutting defeat, require higher-order commitment, i.e., a belief regarding the link between the source of justification and the target proposition. This paper examines the debate …Read more
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18Cognitivism and the argument from evidence non-responsivenessEthical Theory and Moral Practice 1-18. forthcoming.Several philosophers have recently challenged cognitivism, i.e., the view that moral judgments are beliefs, by arguing that moral judgments are evidence non-responsive in a way that beliefs are not. If you believe that P, but acquire (sufficiently strong) evidence against P, you will give up your belief that P. This does not seem true for moral judgments. Some subjects maintain their moral judgments despite believing that there is (sufficiently strong) evidence against the moral judgments. This …Read more
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368Explaining Higher-order DefeatActa Analytica 38 (3): 453-469. 2023.Higher-order evidence appears to have the ability to defeat rational belief. It is not obvious, however, why exactly the defeat happens. In this paper, I consider two competing explanations of higher-order defeat: the “Objective Higher-Order Defeat Explanation” and the “Subjective Higher-Order Defat Explanation.” According to the former explanation, possessing sufficiently strong higher-order evidence to indicate that one’s belief about p fails to be rational is necessary and sufficient for defe…Read more
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Digital Media Ethics: Benefits and Challenges in School EducationInternational Journal of Mobile and Blended Learning 2 (14). 2022.Digital media and connected technologies have brought about some new ethical challenges to the surface. Digital media ethics is the scientific and systematic study of ethical attitudes and problems in relation to the use of digital media. This paper discusses the role of digital media ethics in modern school education. First, it is argued that digital media ethics is best perceived as a dimension of digital competence more generally. Since the development of students’ digital competence is one o…Read more
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Om kunskapsteori: En introduktion till vetande, berättigande och sanning av Lars-Göran Johansson, Tomas Ekenberg, George Masterton och Pauliina Remes (review)Filosofisk Tidskrift 41 (1). 2021.
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40Richard Rowland: Moral Disagreement: New York, Routledge, 2021, Hardback (ISBN 978-1-138-58984-1). 258 pp (review)Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (4): 1053-1055. 2021.
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31Moral Judgments, Cognitivism and the Dispositional Nature of Belief: Why Moral Peer Intransigence is IntelligiblePhilosophia 49 (4): 1753-1766. 2021.Richard Rowland has recently argued that considerations based on moral disagreement between epistemic peers give us reason to think that cognitivism about moral judgments, i.e., the thesis that moral judgments are beliefs, is false. The novelty of Rowland’s argument is to tweak the problem descriptively, i.e., not focusing on what one ought to do, but on what disputants actually do in the light of peer disagreement. The basic idea is that moral peer disagreement is intelligible. However, if mora…Read more
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442Moral Peer Disagreement and the Limits of Higher-Order EvidenceIn Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology, Routledge. 2020.Abstract. This paper argues that the “Argument from Moral Peer Disagreement” fails to make a case for widespread moral skepticism. The main reason for this is that the argument rests on a too strong assumption about the normative significance of peer disagreement (and higher-order evidence more generally). In order to demonstrate this, I distinguish two competing ways in which one might explain higher-order defeat. According to what I call the “Objective Defeat Explanation” it is the mere posses…Read more
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74The Level-Splitting View and the Non-Akrasia ConstraintPhilosophia 47 (3): 917-923. 2019.Some philosophers have defended the idea that in cases of all-things-considered misleading higher-order evidence it is rational to take divergent doxastic attitudes to p and E supports p. In a recent paper, Sophie Horowitz has argued that such “Level-Splitting views” are implausible since they violate a rational requirement she calls the Non-Akrasia Constraint. In this paper, I argue that Horowitz’s objection is misguided since it conflates two distinct notions of epistemic rationality.
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203Matters of ambiguity: faultless disagreement, relativism and realismPhilosophical Studies 173 (6): 1517-1536. 2016.In some cases of disagreement it seems that neither party is at fault or making a mistake. This phenomenon, so-called faultless disagreement, has recently been invoked as a key motivation for relativist treatments of domains prone to such disagreements. The conceivability of faultless disagreement therefore appears incompatible with traditional realists semantics. This paper examines recent attempts to accommodate faultless disagreement without giving up on realism. We argue that the accommodati…Read more
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University of GothenburgOther (Part-time)
Gothenburg, Sweden
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Social Epistemology |
Epistemic Normativity |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Social Epistemology |
Epistemic Normativity |