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Marcus Marr

Georgia Institute of Technology
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  •  Publications
    6
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 More details
  • Georgia Institute of Technology
    Regular Faculty
Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind
General Philosophy of Science
  • All publications (6)
  •  16
    Preface
    Behavior and Philosophy 36. 2008.
    Philosophy of MindMental States and ProcessesBelief
  •  99
    The pragmatics of survival and the nobility of defeat
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4): 709-710. 1986.
  •  94
    Philosophy and the future of behaviorism
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4): 636. 1984.
  •  28
    The What, the How, and the Why: The Explanation of Ernst Mach
    Behavior and Philosophy 31. 2003.
    Putative distinctions between explanation and description constitute a very old issue in the sciences. Behavior analysts commonly call their science "descriptive" as opposed to "explanatory." One obvious difficulty here is to achieve any agreement on the meaning or use of these terms. Without some agreement, debate is pointless. I examine various uses of these terms and consider whether they have any clearly distinctive meanings in the actual conduct of a science. Many behaviorists are inspired …Read more
    Putative distinctions between explanation and description constitute a very old issue in the sciences. Behavior analysts commonly call their science "descriptive" as opposed to "explanatory." One obvious difficulty here is to achieve any agreement on the meaning or use of these terms. Without some agreement, debate is pointless. I examine various uses of these terms and consider whether they have any clearly distinctive meanings in the actual conduct of a science. Many behaviorists are inspired (via Skinner) by Ernst Mach to view science as discription, but I will argue that Mach's use of the term "description" corresponds to what most scientists would call "explanation." Thus, on this basis at least, behaviorists are unjustified in their opposition to science as "explanation.".
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceBehaviorismTheories of Consciousness, MiscPanpsychism
  •  8
    Preface: Bridging Two Cultures
    Behavior and Philosophy 35. 2007.
  •  39
    The Abdication of Belief: A Comment on Foxall's Replies to His Critics
    Behavior and Philosophy 36. 2008.
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of Psychology
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