Maria Alvarez

La historia del cristianismo en Corea se remonta al siglo XVIII, sin embargo, no fue hasta los años 60 y 70 del siglo pasado que los profesores de teología coreanos elaboraron formulaciones originales de una teología autónoma que tuvo un gran impacto no sólo en el cristianismo sino también en los movimientos por la democracia. A diferencia de Corea, el origen del catolicismo en la Argentina se remonta a la conquista española durante el siglo XVI, mucho antes de la existencia del estado argentino. Pero, al igual que Corea, recién en la década del 60 aparecen por primera vez discusiones teológicas nativistas. Este revisionismo cristiano dio origen a la Teología Minjung coreana y a la Teología del Pueblo argentina que comparten similitudes significativas en sus categorías de pueblo y de cultura popular como principios claves para comprender la historia de las luchas y el sufrimiento del pueblo en sus respectivos contextos. A pesar de estas semejanzas, no hay trabajos comparativos sobre ambos movimientos teológicos. Recuperando los debates sobre la indigenización teológica desde la metodología comparativa propuesta por Geertz para el estudio de las creencias, la hipótesis que guía este artículo sostiene que, en las antípodas del mundo, en dos contextos religiosos disímiles y sin contacto entre sí, surgen en la misma época dos teologías contextuales similares en sus principios teológicos claves. Este estudio se basa en una metodología cualitativa con triangulación de fuentes y trabajo de campo realizado en Argentina y en Corea del Sur entre 2022 y 2024.

Understanding human beings and their distinctive rational and volitional capacities is one of the central tasks of philosophy. The task requires a clear account of such things as reasons, desires, emotions and motives, and of how they combine to produce and explain human behaviour. In Kinds of Reasons, Maria Alvarez offers a fresh and incisive treatment of these issues, focusing in particular on reasons as they feature in contexts of agency. Her account builds on some important recent work in the area; but she takes her main inspiration from the tradition that receives its seminal contemporary expression in the writings of G.E.M. Anscombe, a tradition that runs counter to the broadly Humean orthodoxy that has dominated the theory of action for the past forty years. Alvarez's conclusions are therefore likely to be controversial; and her bold and painstaking arguments will be found provocative by participants on every side of the debates with which she engages. Clear and directly written, Kinds of Reasons aims to stake out a distinctive position within one of the most hotly contested areas of contemporary philosophy.

A number of recent writers have expressed scepticism about the viability of a specifically moral concept of obligation, and some of the considerations offered have been interesting and persuasive. This is a scepticism that has its roots in Nietzsche, even if he is mentioned only rather rarely in the debate. More proximately, the scepticism in question receives seminal expression in Elizabeth Anscombe's 1958 essay, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, a piece that is often paid lip-service to, but—like Nietzsche's work—has only rarely been taken seriously by those wishing to defend the conception of obligation under attack. This is regrettable. Anscombe's essay is powerful and direct, and it makes a forthright case for the claim that, in the absence of a divine law conception of ethics, any specifically moral concept of obligation must be redundant, and that the best that can be hoped for in a secular age is some sort of neo-Aristotelianism. Anscombe is right about this, we think. And, among those who disagree, one of the very few to have taken her on at all explicitly is Christine Korsgaard, whose Kantianism of course commits her to the view that the concept of moral obligation is central, with or without God. Here, we try to show that Korsgaard loses the argument.

Chapter four of Glock’s wide-ranging and incisive book ‘What is Analytic Philosophy?’, which is entitled ‘History and Historiography’, explores the relationship between analytic philosophy and history. The chapter is presented as a critical examination of the idea that ‘analytic philosophy can be conceived by reference to time’ (89) since, the suggestion goes, ‘what sets analytic philosophy apart is its attitude to history’ (88). But the chapter is also a detailed exploration of a more general (philosophical) question: What attitude should philosophers take towards the history of philosophy, towards the history of ideas, and towards history in general? The answer favoured by Glock to that question is what he calls ‘weak historicism’ which, he claims, happens to be the attitude taken by most analytic philosophers.

Las células madre embrionarias humanas son células pluripotentes con potenciales aplicaciones en medicina regenerativa e interés considerable en investigación y biotecnología. Sin embargo, dada la estrecha relación con principios morales y bioéticos, ha existido una considerable discusión sobre la posibilidad de patentar o no este tipo de células madre. En el presente artículo, se revisa la legislación europea en materia de propiedad industrial, y la tradición del sistema jurídico continental en el reconocimiento de la dignidad humana como principio fundamental y su relación con la protección de invenciones biotecnológicas, centrados en la reciente sentencia del caso Brüstle v. Greenpeace e.V.

Silence is reserved for what cannot be verbally expressed. The well-known Wittgensteinian quote summarizes an established understanding of the relationship between language and silence: because language is not enough to account for reality and thinking, it must be transcended by other means of expression, like music or silence. But what if the opposite is the case and silence is not the extension but the precondition of language, the ultimate source of meaning? This paper explores how this is the phenomenological and Derridean philosophical framework of Coetzee’s novels, a literary universe created from the will to signify and build singular meanings.

Wittgenstein's views on action and the will changed throughout his philosophical writings, although there are common themes to be found within this evolution. This chapter concerns his later views on action and the will, as expressed in remarks on these topics mainly in Philosophical Investigations. It explores some core themes in those remarks and examines how some of these were taken up and developed by Wittgenstein's student Elizabeth Anscombe, in her influential monograph Intention. Wittgenstein was concerned with offering a characterization of the concepts of voluntary and intentional action that escaped certain familiar philosophical temptations. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein wrote: “When people talk about the possibility of foreknowledge of the future they always forget the fact of the prediction of one's own voluntary movements”. A common thread in their discussion is a conviction in “the uselessness of an introspective explanation of intention”, of the idea that an intention is “a particular feeling, an inner experience”.

It seems natural to think that there are aesthetic reasons for action and that an artist must be guided by such reasons as he or she begins work on the canvas or poem or symphony or marble. This latter supposition seems at odds, however, not only with classical inspiration theory but also with the views of one of the last century’s most important philosophers of art, R. G. Collingwood. We propose an account of acting for an aesthetic reason inspired by G. E. M. Anscombe’s Intention, specifically by her concept of ‘practical knowledge’, which we believe can accommodate Collingwood’s reservations about the sort of knowledge of their ends, and of the means to those ends, which artists have as they engage in their creative activity.

Hintikka considers that the “Transcendental Deduction” includes finding the role that concepts in the effort is meant by human activities of acquiring knowledge; and it affirms that the principles governing human activities of knowledge can be objective rules that can become transcendental conditions of experience and no conditions contingent product of nature of human agents involved in the know. In his opinion, intuition as it is used by Kant not be understood in the traditional way, ie as producer of mental images, but rather as that which the mind represents an individual. To support this interpretation refers to the lessons of Kant´s Logics, to individuality space time and the thesis, submitted the winning essay in 1764, characterizing the mathematical method by the use of particular representatives of general concepts. Thus, his exegesis considers the Kantian conceptions of the “Doctrine of Method” not later conceptions, as traditionally interpreted, but prior conceptions to the processing of “Transcendental Aesthetic”. This article reconstructs some of their arguments that eventually will equal the Kantian intuition with the Euclidean ecthesis.