Maria Borges

In this paper I ask whether sympathy, solidarity, and empathy are hard wired in our human brain. I will discuss one the thesis of evolutionary ethics, that is, that empathy and sympathy are innate. I ask whether these are natural /innate features of human beings and other animals, such as primates. I investigate whether there is a natural altruistic behavior and a natural tendency to solidarity. I claim that we have already sufficient empirical data to accept one aspect of an evolutionary ethics, which claims that at least some features of our morality, comes to us naturally.

In this paper, I analyze the place of the Metaphysics of morals in the Kantian system. I claim that this work is the passage between a pure part of ethics and a practical anthropology. Although this book was first conceived to be a pure moral theory - moralia pura-, it ended up dealing with principle of applications of the moral law to sensible moral beings- philosophia moralis applicata. I also hold that the Doctrine of Virtue presents some sensible elements that are important to understand how morality affects us.

I intend to present Kant's refutation of the ontological argument as confronted by Hegel's critique of Kant's refutation. The ontological argument can be exposed in a syllogistic way: everything I conceive as belonging clearly and distinctly to the nature or essence of something can be asserted as true of something. I perceive clearly and distinctly that existence belongs to the nature or essence of a perfect being; therefore, existence can be stated as true of a supremely perfect being, that is, perfect being exists. I intend to argue that Kant criticizes both the major and minor premises. To the major premise, he objects that there is an unqualified passage from the logical to the ontological level. To the minor premise, he objects that existence is not a concept predicate. Finally, I will show how Hegel criticizes Kant's refutation. To the former, Kant's critique is naïve as he could prove that existence is not inherent to a finite being's concept, which is not the concept of God.

Neste artigo pretendo mostrar que o desenvolvimento temporal da política na história mundial deve ser considerado como uma encenação da dialética hegeliana. Encenação deve ser aqui tomado como uma apresentação na efetividade de um texto pressuposto. Tal texto é a Ciência da Lógica. Minha intenção é mostrar a utilização, não deste texto na sua totalidade, mas de algumas sequências preferenciais da lógica. Tal será mostrado: 1) na figura do senhor/servo; 2) na relação eticidade e moralidade. Neste segundo momento, procurarei mostrar como a política e seu julgamento encenam essas categorias. Por fim, indicarei em que medida a ideia de encenação resolve algumas aporias referentes a necessidade e acaso da filosofia hegeliana.

Este artigo propõe-se a determinar o sentido da morte na figura do senhor e do servo da Fenomenologia do Espírito de Hegel. Para tal propósito, o texto será dividido em três partes. Na primeira, exporei o pano de fundo no qual se encontra a figura - a seção 'Autoconsciência da Fenomenologia do Espírito - bem como a importância desta no desenvolvimento da obra em questão. Num segundo momento, exporei o desenvolvimento da figura numa análise interna de sua estrutura, ressaltando o papel que aí cumpre a luta de vida e morte. Por fim, farei uma analogia entre a figura e a História, mais especificamente, com o período do Terror da Revolução Francesa.

In this paper, I aim at relating passions to evil in Kant's philosophy. I begin by explaining the difference between affects and passions in the text Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Kant claims that both affects and passions are illnesses of the mind, because both affect and passion hinder the sovereignty of reason. I show that passions are worse than affects for the purpose of pure reason. Second, I relate affects and passions to the degrees of the propensity to evil in the Religion. I analyze the idea of an ethical community as a way to overcome the evil, which goes beyond political and anthropological solutions suggested by Kant.

In this paper, I aim at explaining the difference Kant makes between emotion, the beautiful and the sublime. I begin by explaining what an emotion is, showing that it refers to feelings that are related to desire. In contrast, I show that the feeling of beautiful and the sublime give us an inactive delight, that is not related to an interest in the object. The feeling of beautiful is related to the judgment of taste, and it has a universal validity for everyone. I ask then if we can judge art without any emotion at all. According to Kant, not only one can, but one should, since pure judgment of taste is independent from charm and commotion. At the end, I ask if it is possible to enjoy music without emotion. For a lover of music, perhaps the emotion it provokes is the main reason to like it. I show that this is probably the reason why music is considered to have the last place in the beautiful arts for Kant.

In this paper I analyze Kant’s ideas about eating and drinking. First, I show that gluttony and drunkenness are considered ways to oppose to the duty to oneself as an animal being. Second, I claim that for Kant there is a healthy way of having meals, which consists in eating together with friends. Then I indicate that Kant accepts that one can drink at dinner parties but has to avoid drinks that lead to drunkenness and unsocial behavior. In this sense, he draws a classification of the various kinds of alcoholic drinks, according to their potential harm. Afterwards, I illustrate how Kant’s own intimate life was a daily practice of his thoughts on dietetic conceptions and on what is better for digestion and health. To conclude, I mention the idea of a philosopher’s medicine of the body and why a strict diet should be avoided.

Nesse artigo, eu apresento a teoria kantiana do mal. Mostrarei que Kant divide o mal em três níveis: fraqueza, impureza e perversidade, relacionando-os com afetos e paixões. Eu defendo que Kant apresenta várias formas de curar o mal nos diversos textos, tais como Doutrina da Virtude, Antropologia, Ideia para uma história universal do ponto de vista cosmopolita e Religião nos limites da simples razão. Eu tentarei mostrar que a virtude é impotente para curar o mal e que Kant apresenta uma comunidade ética para esse fim. Por fim, eu compararei a construção de comunidade ética com o estabelecimento de uma sociedade civil jurídica.

The paper compares the views of two classical authors about the possibility of peace and the inevitability of war: Kant and Hegel. The paper will argue that the main lines of these two schools are still alive today in our contemporary international politics. The Kantian school, with the possibility of peace, based on a league of nations, has inspired the creation of the United Nations. The Hegelian way of thinking (there is no judge above the national states, besides the history of the world) has proven to be as contemporary as ever, once one analyzes some recent events of the international politics. Both Kantian and Hegelian views have weak and strong points, and it is a difficult task to reconcile both of them in a reasonable international politics. At the end, the paper will present JohnRawls´ doctrine of international politics, as stated in The Laws of Peoples, arguing that this doctrine follows the Kantian tradition of a foedus pacificum, while giving room to some Hegelian philosophical conceptions.

Relativism has usually been presented as linked to the limits of translation and understanding. The Principle of Charity was developed to decide the reference of words or the best translation of a sentence. However, the principle has been defined in, at least, two different ways: a naturalistic one, as a pragmatic maxim that guides the interpreter generally; or a transcendental one, as an a priori, necessary condition for someone to be understood. In this paper I will focus on the latter approach, taking Donald Davidson's arguments and his transcendental interpretation of the Principle of Charity as a representative case. Although different versions of the principle can be found in Davidson's writings, and some of them would seem flexible enough to give an account of how interpreter and speaker have different beliefs, all of these versions put understanding and intelligibility at risk. The reason is that the Principle of Charity has a wide scope: to conceive a person as rational, as having beliefs and desires, or as saying something, we have to interpret his/her utterances as revealing a set of beliefs consistent and true, and that maxim is applied to the whole system of sentences. So charity is necessary, we cannot choose it and if we spell out the Principle of Charity in sociological or psychological terms, that is, in empirical terms, we are changing the subject. The transcendental character of the principle has received criticism from various authors who understand it in a naturalistic way. I will conclude that an empirical description of how we use the Principle of Charity when we interpret a speaker's utterance would show the psychological and sociological relevance of relativism.

Relativism has usually been presented as linked to the limits of translation and understanding. The Principle of Charity was developed to decide the reference of words or the best translation of a sentence. However, the principle has been defined in, at least, two different ways: a naturalistic one, as a pragmatic maxim that guides the interpreter generally; or a transcendental one, as an a priori, necessary condition for someone to be understood. In this paper I will focus on the latter approach, taking Donald Davidson's arguments and his transcendental interpretation of the Principle of Charity as a representative case. Although different versions of the principle can be found in Davidson's writings, and some of them would seem flexible enough to give an account of how interpreter and speaker have different beliefs, all of these versions put understanding and intelligibility at risk. The reason is that the Principle of Charity has a wide scope: to conceive a person as rational, as having beliefs and desires, or as saying something, we have to interpret his/her utterances as revealing a set of beliefs consistent and true, and that maxim is applied to the whole system of sentences. So charity is necessary, we cannot choose it and if we spell out the Principle of Charity in sociological or psychological terms, that is, in empirical terms, we are changing the subject. The transcendental character of the principle has received criticism from various authors who understand it in a naturalistic way. I will conclude that an empirical description of how we use the Principle of Charity when we interpret a speaker's utterance would show the psychological and sociological relevance of relativism.

Kant has often been criticized for holding a very negative vision of women, according to which they are less rational and less morally valuable than men. In this paper, I shall argue quite the opposite. I will show that, in spite of some minor pejorative comments, Kant held that women fit better the ideal of a moral person than men. This is due to some qualities of the female sex, mainly the women capacity for self-control and the capacity for having moral feelings like sympathy and compassion. Moreover, women show their master of emotions and passions when they are able to use their emotional sensitivity and self-control to master thefeelings and passions of men.

Kant is categorical about the relation between virtue and the controlling of inclinations:Since virtue is based on inner freedom it contains a positive command to a human being, namely to bring all his capacities and inclinations under his reason's control and so to rule over himself. Virtue presupposes apathy, in the sense of absence of affects. Kant revives the stoic ideal of tranquilitas as a necessary condition for virtue: ‘The true strength of virtue is a tranquil mind’ . In the Anthropology and the Doctrine of Virtue, apathy is taken in the sense of freedom from affects. In these texts, Kant maintains that we must strive toward a state in which affects are absent

In this paper, I shall discuss the relation between practical reason and emotions in Kant. First, I begin by explaining why knowledge of emotions is important for the transcendental project in the moral domain, understood as the claim that reason can determine our actions, in spite of our inclinations. Second, I explain the definition of affects and passions in Kant's philosophy and relate the two to feelings and the faculty of desire. I then question the possibility of controlling emotions, showing that it is, if not an altogether impossible task, at least a difficult one. I show that while affects present a momentary loss of control, they can still coexist with practical reason. Passions, however, may ground principles for actions, and represent a serious danger for rational mastery over inclinations