María Celeste Vecino

Dans cet article, je propose d'explorer la base naturelle du réalisme de l'attitude naturelle d'un point de vue transcendantal, dans le but d'explorer une possible lecture non-réductiviste du continuum animal-humain. Dans la première section, j'aborde la notion d'attitude et la définition de l'attitude naturelle dans l'œuvre de Husserl. Contrairement aux attitudes spécifiques, l'attitude naturelle ne découle pas d'un acte du moi actif, mais est "innée". Dans la deuxième section, j'analyse la base instinctive de cette attitude, en me concentrant sur l'instinct d'objectivation (Instinkt der Objektivierung). La troisième section traite du point de rupture entre l'histoire naturelle et l'institution transcendantale de l'humain, rendu possible par le processus de sédimentation inauguré par le langage. Enfin, la quatrième section traite de l'oubli de notre base naturelle et de la possibilité de retrouver un sens de la nature qui évite de tomber dans un "zoocentrisme", c'est-à-dire la réactivation d'un naturalisme réductiviste tel qu'interprété par E. Bimbenet.

This review essay examines Mariana Larison's Vers une nouvelle phénoménologie de l'institution. Avec et au-delà de Merleau-Ponty, which reconstructs the central role of institution in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological project. Larison traces how Merleau-Ponty's translation of Husserl's Stiftung as Institution opens phenomenology to interdisciplinary dialogue with anthropology, sociology, and legal theory. The book demonstrates how institution operates as a transpersonal and transtemporal structure that challenges ego-centred models of constitution, revealing a plastic organization between actual and habitual dimensions of embodied experience. Through analysis of political, biological, and social dimensions, Larison shows the potentialities of what she terms a phenomenology of institution. The review evaluates Larison's claim that such a phenomenology represents “a third possibility between generativity and genesis,” while noting tensions around the scope of instituted events and the relationship between institution and Merleau-Ponty's later ontological investigations.

This article deals with the relationship between Spirit (Geist) and Nature (Natur) in Husserl’s phenomenology and the potentially religious motifs involved in its treatment. I begin by outlining two different approaches that can be found in Husserl’s work regarding the dyad Nature-Spirit: firstly, a schematic opposition between the two, and secondly, the recognition of their fundamental intertwinement. I claim that, even in this second approach, there remains a sense of subordination of Nature to Spirit that is due to the transcendental character of Husserl’s phenomenology. I analyze this primacy in the context of Husserl’s monadological theory, bringing forward certain religious elements of his account in order to connect this notion of spirit to a more contemporary idea of spirituality.

El presente trabajo aborda la interpretación de la fenomenología generativa de Anthony Steinbock, y las consecuencias metodológicas de una reconfiguración de la relación entre fenomenología genética y Generatividad. Para ello se analiza el modelo de “constitución territorial” presente en su obra Home and Beyond, abordando la tensión entre la comprensión clásica de la fenomenología husserliana y su reinterpretación. Se discute cómo la fenomenología no fundacional propuesta por Steinbock podría transformar la teoría fenomenológica, examinando críticas y preocupaciones metodológicas en la literatura especializada. A partir del modelo de relación liminal, que Steinbock aplica a la relación entre mundo familiar y mundo ajeno, se sugiere considerar la relación entre la fenomenología genética clásica y la generativa como liminal, entendiendo esta relación como una en que ambos enfoques se necesitan y se desafían mutuamente.

Se analiza el tratamiento que da Husserl en sus escritos tardíos al fenómeno-límite de la muerte, así como a la problemática que surge en la relación entre el hombre mundano y el sujeto trascendental. El acceso a la dimensión última de la subjetividad constituyente, que la reflexión sobre la muerte exige y motiva, revela una anonimia fundamental del yo, que pone en cuestión la posibilidad de la fenomenología de auto-fundamentarse siguiendo sus propios principios metodológicos: la ausencia de presupuestos y la búsqueda de conocimiento a través de la intuición.

In this paper, we examine the metaphilosophical relevance of the phenomenon of sleep, suggesting that it has the potential to not only enrich the analysis of limit cases but also to test some of the ideas concerning the possibility of naturalizing phenomenology and its limits. Insofar as sleeping allows for both a first personal and a third personal description and challenges the usual primacy of the first-person point of view, exploring sleeping under the prism of its import for the phenomenological method allows to illuminate the relationships between a first personal transcendental phenomenology and a third personal naturalized one. We do this by examining Husserl’s treatment of sleep as a limit-case, and the problem of accounting for deep sleep from a first-personal perspective. Drawing from a Heidegger-inspired account of sleep, we argue that sleep demands for a type of approach that can be fairly described as ontological, and which reveals a new understanding of subjectivity as a dynamic unity of different modes of being. Although this approach challenges a first-personal based approach, it does not, however support the naturalization of phenomenology or undermine the project of a transcendental philosophy of experience.

In this paper I examine the paradox of human subjectivity in light of the tension between two forms of approaching subjectivity (as transcendental subject or as empirical being) along with two other paradoxes that, I will argue, are also the expression of the larger tension between first-personal and third-personal accounts of experience. One is the “crazy paradox” Merleau-Ponty points to in his analyses of Husserl’s reflection on the notion of Earth as ground in the text “The originary ark, the Earth, does not move”. The other is the paradox of death, that consists of the contradictory understanding of my own death as being certain yet unconstitutable. I present a brief description of Husserl’s developments on death and argue that its peculiarities present a challenge for the phenomenological method as a whole, and for the distinction between transcendental subjectivity and the empirical human being; then I offer a preliminary analysis of the Merleau-Pontian diagnosis of Husserl’s philosophy as well as Merleau-Ponty’s own way out of the paradox, and point out some of its insufficiencies.