Maria Ferreira

Durante las últimas décadas, la biología ha sido objeto de una considerable proliferación teórica y subdisciplinar, hecho que suscita la pregunta acerca de su unidad. Por ello, a partir del abandono del reduccionismo como estrategia unificadora, el interrogante filosófico es qué otras formas alternativas de relaciones subdisciplinares son posibles, y si dichas relaciones logran dar unidad a la biología. En el presente artículo, a partir de una breve consideración de algunos de los problemas que el programa reduccionista ha tenido en biología, analizaremos diferentes tipos de relaciones que se encuentran entre las subdisciplinas de la biología contemporánea. En particular, indagaremos cuatro de las principales propuestas que pueden encontrarse en la literatura filosófica especializada; ofrecemos entonces dos nuevas propuestas de relación interdisciplinar: el isomorfismo de la biología evolutiva, e la importación/exportación de cuerpos teóricos, propia de la relación entre la ecología y la fisiología. Finalmente, presentaremos algunas consideraciones en torno al objetivo de la unidad de la ciencia en general, como también acerca de la clase de cohesión que creemos posible para la biología a partir de nuestros análisis, defendiendo la idea de un pluralismo de las relaciones interdisciplinares y de la unidad como un fenómeno local. Over the last decades, in biology there has been a proliferation of subdisciplines and theories, and this poses a question about its unity. Consequently, after reductionism was abandoned as a unifying strategy, philosophical questions have been raised about the possibility of alternative forms of relations among the subdisciplines, and whether they can effectively accomplish a unity of biology. This article starts with a brief consideration of some of the problems that the reductionist program confronts in biology, and then analyzes different kind of relations that are present among the subdisciplines of contemporary biology. In particular, we investigate four of the main proposals that can be found in the specialized philosophical literature; and then we propose two models of inter-disciplinary relations: isomorphism in evolutionary biology, and import/export of theoretical corpus, present in the relation between ecology and physiology. Finally, we offer a few ideas on unity as a goal for science in general, and also about the kind of cohesion that we think to be possible for biology based on our analysis. Thus, we defend the idea of pluralism of inter-disciplinary relations and of unity as a local phenomenon

Potentialities are properties that can manifest. Many potentialities are instantiated in virtue of having causal bases that are possible causes for their manifestations. This chapter shows that a closer look at potentialities and their causal bases studied in the life sciences (from cell biology to psychiatry) gives us good reasons to revise our philosophical assumptions about causal bases. The investigation reveals that causal bases are often more dynamic and dependent on interactions with the environment than previously assumed. In particular, we argue that causal bases in the life sciences are regularly extrinsic and processual and that potentialities in the life sciences have causal bases at different levels.

Even though the talk of causal bases is commonplace in traditional and contemporary discussions about dispositions, the concept of causal bases has never been systematically investigated. This paper aims to fill this gap by developing the causal-grounding account. This account takes two roles as definitory for causal bases. First, causal bases are possible causes of disposition manifestations. Second, causal bases are metaphysical grounds of disposition instantiations. In this paper, we show that the causal-grounding account (CGA) achieves crucial distinctions (for example between causal bases and manifestation conditions), captures relevant traditional features of causal bases, and can be invoked to support the causal efficacy of disposition instantiations. At the same time, CGA does not require that causal bases have to be categorical or intrinsic. This, in turn, allows us to remain neutral concerning fundamental properties, the existence of dispositional or extrinsic causal bases, multi-track dispositions, and the reducibility of dispositions. This neutrality grants the suitability of our account for different philosophical projects and discussions.

Natural selection is commonly seen not just as an explanation for adaptive evolution, but as the inevitable consequence of “heritable variation in fitness among individuals”. Although it remains embedded in biological concepts, such a formalisation makes it tempting to explore whether this precondition may be met not only in life as we know it, but also in other physical systems. This would imply that these systems are subject to natural selection and may perhaps be investigated in a biological framework, where properties are typically examined in light of their putative functions. Here we relate the major questions that were debated during a three-day workshop devoted to discussing whether natural selection may take place in non-living physical systems. We start this report with a brief overview of research fields dealing with “life-like” or “proto-biotic” systems, where mimicking evolution by natural selection in test tubes stands as a major objective. We contend the challenge may be as much conceptual as technical. Taking the problem from a physical angle, we then discuss the framework of dissipative structures. Although life is viewed in this context as a particular case within a larger ensemble of physical phenomena, this approach does not provide general principles from which natural selection can be derived. Turning back to evolutionary biology, we ask to what extent the most general formulations of the necessary conditions or signatures of natural selection may be applicable beyond biology. In our view, such a cross-disciplinary jump is impeded by reliance on individuality as a central yet implicit and loosely defined concept. Overall, these discussions thus lead us to conjecture that understanding, in physico-chemical terms, how individuality emerges and how it can be recognised, will be essential in the search for instances of evolution by natural selection outside of living systems.

The concept of causal specificity is drawing considerable attention from philosophers of biology. It became the rationale for rejecting (and occasionally, accepting) a thesis of causal parity of developmental factors. This literature assumes that attributing specificity to causal relations is at least in principle a straightforward (if not systematic) task. However, the parity debate in philosophy of biology seems to be stuck at a point where it is not the biological details that will help move forward. In this paper, I take a step back to reexamine the very idea of causal specificity and its intended role in the parity dispute in philosophy of biology. I contend that the idea of causal specificity across variations as currently discussed in the literature is irreducibly twofold in nature: it is about two independent components that are not mutually entailed. I show this to be the source of prior complications with the notion of specificity itself that ultimately affect the purposes for which it is often invoked, notably to settle the parity dispute.

In biology and philosophy of biology, discussing the notion of interaction leads to an examination of interactionism, which is, broadly speaking, the view that rejects gene-centrism and gene determinism and instead emphasizes the fact that traits of organisms are always the result of genes and environments. It has long been asserted that the nature-nurture problem requires an interactionist solution of sorts, the so-called interactionist consensus. This consensus, however, has been deemed insufficient and challenged by several authors triggering an extension of the debate among contestants and defenders. Unfortunately, part of the problem is that the views on causation that would ground claims about interactionism are not always made explicit in this debate, which renders those views somewhat complicated to assess. Moreover, it seems to be assumed that causal complexity excludes the possibility of characterizing, distinguishing, or comparing among causal contributions. By turning to a detailed survey of the origin of the debate and to some developments in the philosophy of causation, we will contend that this view is unwarranted, and that much of the debate around interactionism is based on the drawing of this conclusion. We also examine implications of this analysis for the project to develop a framework based on the notion of inter-identities.

Currently, there are almost as many conceptions of emergence as authors who address the issue. Most literature on the matter focuses either on discussing, evaluating and comparing particular contributions or accounts of emergence, or on assessing a particular case study. Our aim in this paper is rather different. We here set out to introduce a distinction that has not been sufficiently taken into account in previous discussions on this topic: the distinction between inter-domain emergence—a relation between items belonging to different ontic domains—and intra-domain emergence—a relation between items belonging to a same ontic domain. Our final purpose is not to assume and defend a definite stance on emergence, but to stress the relevance of such distinction when attempting to argue for or against emergence, in the first place. We will also address the connections between emergence so distinguished and more general philosophical perspectives, suggesting where would reductionists and pluralists stand with respect to intra- and inter-domain emergence.

Despite many attempts to achieve an adequate definition of living systems by means of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, the opinion that such an enterprise is inexorably destined to fail is increasingly gaining support. However, we believe options do not just come down to either having faith in a future success or endorsing skepticism. In this paper, we aim to redirect the discussion of the problem by shifting the focus of attention from strict definitions towards a philosophical framework that allows conceiving of living systems as a natural kind, but whereby natural kinds are not to be defined by fixed necessary and sufficient conditions. We argue for a property-cluster kind approach according to which living systems constitute a natural kind with vague boundaries, capable of changing, and whose members do not need to instantiate every property. We draw from Boyd’s homeostatic property-cluster theory and introduce two modifications, one regarding homeostatic mechanisms and another related to the scientific role of kinds. Thus, our view overcomes some difficulties of Boyd’s theory and we are able to account for the natural kindhood of living things. We also emphasize the most appealing features of our approach for specific research fields and address three objections to this sort of approach.

RESUMO A partir da perspetiva de uma análise crítica do discurso, este artigo analisa a questão da autenticidade nos atos discursivos de expiação política. O objetivo é estudar de que forma a autenticidade dos atos discursivos de expiação política pode ser avaliada através de estratégias de reelaboração do passado empregadas em discursos de penitência. O artigo enfrenta a seguinte pergunta de pesquisa: de que forma estratégias de reelaboração do passado influenciam na autenticidade de um ato discursivo de expiação política? O artigo analisa uma declaração de 2015 proferida por Shinzo Abe, antigo primeiro-ministro do Japão, e argumenta que, no seu ato discursivo de expiação política de 2015, ele desenvolveu uma estratégia de cancelamento da memória histórica nipónica. Tal estratégia impediu que a declaração de 2015 de Shinzo Abe fosse considerada um genuíno ato discursivo de expiação política.

This paper analyzes how, during the Juncker Presidency, the European Commission employed argumentative strategies to address the question of member-states’ compliance with European Union law. There is a literature gap regarding how European leaders employ argumentative strategies to coax member-states to comply with EU legislation and how those strategies can be associated with multilevel governance designs and problem-solving approaches. Building on van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation, the paper explores what dialectical and rhetorical strategies were employed by the Juncker European Commission to build an argumentative regime where the question of compliance with European Union law is articulated with the representation of the European Union as an efficient multilevel governance system. Starting from the distinction between procedural and operational concepts of problem-solving in multilevel governance polities, the paper questions whether the Juncker Commission’s arguments on the need to ensure European Union law compliance favor a particular conception of problem-solving in multilevel governance systems. The paper argues that the argumentative strategies employed by the Juncker European Commission in the field of compliance reveal a preference for an operational notion of problem-solving combined with some aspects of a more procedural perspective of problem-solving in multilevel governance polities. The background of this paper is associated with the growing impact that European legislation has on member-states and also with the efforts developed by the Juncker European Commission in discussing how to improve EU regulation to increase compliance with EU law.

RESUMO A partir da perspetiva de uma análise crítica do discurso, este artigo analisa a questão da autenticidade nos atos discursivos de expiação política. O objetivo é estudar de que forma a autenticidade dos atos discursivos de expiação política pode ser avaliada através de estratégias de reelaboração do passado empregadas em discursos de penitência. O artigo enfrenta a seguinte pergunta de pesquisa: de que forma estratégias de reelaboração do passado influenciam na autenticidade de um ato discursivo de expiação política? O artigo analisa uma declaração de 2015 proferida por Shinzo Abe, antigo primeiro-ministro do Japão, e argumenta que, no seu ato discursivo de expiação política de 2015, ele desenvolveu uma estratégia de cancelamento da memória histórica nipónica. Tal estratégia impediu que a declaração de 2015 de Shinzo Abe fosse considerada um genuíno ato discursivo de expiação política.