• Entretien avec Claude Piché
    Con-Textos Kantianos 2 11-19. 2015.
  •  24
    Cet article cherche à élucider l’analyse de l’Esthétique transcendantale au sein de l’interprétation heideggérienne de la Critique de la raison pure. Cette élucidation apparaît comme étant secondaire, voire absente, chez les commentateurs qui s'intéressent à la lecture heideggérienne de Kant. Or, tout en concédant que la pièce centrale de la Critique est, pour Heidegger lui-même, le chapitre sur le schématisme, nous voulons ici montrer que l'Esthétique transcendantale constitue une part tout aus…Read more
  •  71
    Criticisme et chose en soi chez Kant et Fichte
    Horizon Sociologique 6 01-26. 2012.
    In 1797, subsequent to Jacobi’s (1787) and Schulze’s (1792) objections against Kantian criticism, Fichte intends to “save” critical philosophy by evacuating the thing in itself of theoretical discourse. By doing this, Fichte sets out to develop a coherent – and definitive – version of critical philosophy, which amounts to a radicalised account of transcendental idealism. Yet, two years later (1799), Kant publicly dismisses Fichte’s project, refusing to characterise it as “critical.” What Fichte’…Read more
  •  596
    Du chien au philosophe : L'analogie du chien chez Diogène et Platon
    Revue de Philosophie Ancienne 32 (1): 03-33. 2014.
    In this article, the author examines how Diogenes of Sinope and Plato employed the analogy of the dog in order to illustrate two very different conceptions of the philosopher. Although in both cases the analogy of the dog is used to exemplify and explain certain moral or psychological characteristics of the philosopher, the author argues that the differences between Diogenes’ and Plato’s usages of the analogy are both more essential and more philosophically significant. Thus, against those schol…Read more
  •  331
    In the following thesis, we will claim that Kant’s concept of a thing-in-itself is both a metaphysical and a critical concept. Accordingly, the thing-in-itself must be understood as a real transcendental object that grounds phenomena. Thus, we maintain – contrary to F.H. Jacobi’s and G.E. Schulze’s harsh objections – that this assertion does not violate the structures of critical philosophy. Indeed, this particular claim is arrived at through analogical cognition, which does not transgress the b…Read more