Maria Leon

Recent debates on the validity of Aesthetic Testimony and the centrality of the so-called Acquaintance Principle suggest that there is more to the proper exercise of aesthetic judgement than mere endorsement of allegedly correct aesthetic judgements. For example, although it is reasonable to follow experts’ judgements in certain matters of fact, it seems less acceptable to simply endorse or adopt experts’ judgements in the aesthetic domain. That reliance on testimony, by contrast to some other areas of judgement, is not sufficient for aesthetic judgement has encouraged scholars to focus in turn on the importance of the personal involvement and autonomy of the aesthetic agent. This special issue focuses on phenomena related to failed exercises of aesthetic judgement. The choice of the theme is motivated by the belief that a careful analysis of failures in aesthetic judgement can reveal significant aspects of the nature of aesthetic experience itself as well as the roles that perception, imagination, and learning have in its proper exercise.

As aesthetic appreciators of the environment, we often encounter cases where our environmental commitments and our aesthetic responses do not seem to match. Some highly altered or contaminated environments may occasion powerful and insightful aesthetic experiences. In this article, I discuss some arguments that have been offered in favor of the view that this mismatch is not possible when we appreciate a particular environment with full awareness of its damaged or altered condition. I show that these arguments are not conclusive and that there is room for valuable experiences of damaged or highly altered environments. Our knowledge of the damaged condition of an environment, while perceptually significant, does not necessarily make the resulting aesthetic experience to be negative. Finally, I show that these cases do not necessarily diminish the role that aesthetics can play in shaping our environmental sensibility and commitments.

Reflection on the nature and value of fiction has often paid attention to the possibility of acquiring knowledge through engaging with fictional works. The alleged imaginative character of fiction appreciation and the sort of emotional responses that fiction is able to prompt in the viewer have been frequently invoked in order to explain the peculiar cognitive value that fictions may possess. In this paper, I would like to question whether fiction as such possesses a specific kind of value. Although I agree that fictional works can convey certain kinds of knowledge, I think that the cognitive virtues that we attribute to fictional works do not have much to do with their fictional character as such. Rather, these values are grounded upon the various properties that the different representational artifacts that can serve to produce fictional works possess. Thus while I think fictional works can deliver various sorts of cognitive value, this value is not intrinsically connected with the fictional nature of these works.

The relationship between aesthetic value and other moral and cognitive values has been a key theme within contemporary aesthetic discussion. In this article, I explore once again the implications of this relationship, but from what I think might be a different angle. With few exceptions, notably Dominic Lopes, most of the contributions to this issue have dealt with the impact that moral or cognitive values could possibly have on the overall aesthetic value of a work of art. In this article, I explore instead how aesthetic properties or merits could play a role in explaining moral and cognitive properties. To do so, I first offer some examples that I think may reasonably exemplify the phenomenon we are considering. Second, I argue that a proper account of interactionism should meet at least two constraints: the relevance constraint and the autonomy constraint. Finally, I try to clarify how it is possible that aesthetic properties substantially contribute to other values by appealing to the notions of expression and the affective character of aesthetic properties.

El artículo tiene como objetivo fundamental presentar el concepto de repetición bajo tres aspectos. El primero es su ubicación en el contexto de la existencia individual; el segundo, su carácter de exigencia de búsqueda de la libertad; y, finalmente, la consideración de la repetición como acontecimiento de la existencia. El recorrido del artículo revela así el tránsito que se emprende desde la importancia de la figura del lector en su profunda soledad; lector de la vida, de la prueba, de la circunstancia, de lo ineludible; hasta la revelación de la existencia revestida en un acto mimético. Este recorrido aparece evidenciado porque se pone de relieve la preocupación humana no sólo por la existencia, sino por el sentido que ella adquiere frente a la posibilidad del mal desde lo particular, desde lo individual. En este orden de ideas, tras un seguimiento del concepto de repetición se pretende hacer evidente un interés que puede llamarse interés existencial y por ello filosófico: volver la cara hacia el individuo