Maria Leon

A general assumption embedded in different approaches to musical expressiveness has been to accept that ordinary expression is the paradigm or the reference phenomenon for explaining other forms of (artistic) expression and in particular musical expressiveness. This has led to an attempt to find a relationship between ordinary expression and musical expressiveness that can account for why we find expressive features or content in things such as symphonies, sonatas and other forms of musical composition. In this paper I argue for the idea that musical expressiveness does not necessarily have to be understood in terms of, or by drawing an analogy to, ordinary expression. Rather, I will try, first, to defend the idea that musical expressiveness could be conceived on a continuum with ordinary expression. Secondly, I will try to show that this understanding of musical expressiveness can make more sense of the way in which some features of musical expressiveness may pass on ordinary expressiveness and enrich its repertoire.

In this commentary, I address two aspects of Benenti’s approach to the problem of expressive experience. First, I examine her characterization of response-dependent account of expressive properties, and I contend that her concern with the possible relativistic consequences of this approach could be appeased if she would have taken into account some versions of this account à la McDowell. Secondly, I question the need to ground expressive experience in the presence of inherently expressive features of the music eliciting expressive experiences. After a particular understanding of the possible representational contents afforded by the duck-rabbit figure, I propose that the multiple representational capacity ascribable to the figure does not require that the features grounding those representational contents possess any inherent representational character. Similarly, I contend, we can make sense of the normative character of expressive experiences without endorsing a particular commitment with the existence of inherently expressive features grounding those experiences.

Considerations of an artist’s identity, such as class, genre, or race, often influence assessments of their capacity or authority to represent experiences beyond their own. To what extent does an artist’s identity (as an outsider) limit their ability to convey aspects of another group’s experience? Criticisms of Dana Schutz’s Open Casket at the 2017 Whitney Biennial highlight concerns about her authority to engage with a subject matter that is significant to the Black community. Some argue that due to her social positioning, she lacks the capability to engage adequately with this subject. These commentators draw on what we might call "capability" reasons. Others argue that her involvement is at least inappropriate and invoke norms that would explain such inappropriateness. I will focus specifically on those criticisms that are based on capability reasons, showing that they are often dilucidated from a pragmatic perspective or a speech-act account of artistic activity. I challenge these arguments by emphasizing some of the limitations of primarily invoking Schutz’s authority and her possible illocutionary intentions to address her work, and suggest a shift from a speech-act framework to one that emphasizes art’s capacity to generate distinctive forms of experience. This approach invites an alternative view of art’s potential contribution, suggesting that while Schutz’s work has failed, its failure lies in her inability to produce an insightful artistic experience, rather than in her possible lack of illocutionary authority.

Nas reflexões sobre percepção, voltando-se às coisas mesmas, a filosofia de Merleau-Ponty busca compreender o percebido em seu ser desde o instante primeiro, isento de qualquer cognição possível. Esse movimento metodológico é marcadamente inspirado na Fenomenologia, tal como preconizada por Edmund Husserl, ao anunciar a consciência intencional. Esta não é mais um predicamento egocêntrico, como concebido pela tradição filosófica, mas sim a consciência da percepção enquanto intencionalidade, movimento, verbo, que se constitui no instante do voltar-se noético para o objeto intuído. Isso nos proporciona uma ampla compreensão dos diversos modos de ser do ente que somos nós, em nossa cotidianidade mediana e contemporânea. Além disso, compreendem-se os modos como percebemos os outros, humanos como nós, em sua alteridade e corporeidade. Os corpos se movimentam em estéticas, impressões e expressões, ritmos, danças, poesia, sendo percebidos de diferentes maneiras, ganhando diversas conotações significativas, marcadas pela historicidade e linguisticidade vividas. Considerando a filosofia merleau-pontyana à luz de um viés estético, como poderiam ser compreendidos os corpos dromomaníacos, aqueles que se deslocam incessantemente, sempre impulsionados a estarem onde não estão? Este estudo tem como objetivo instigar a reflexão filosófica sobre o que poderia estruturar esses afetos, buscando vislumbrar outros sentidos além da descrição de existências malogradas, reduzidas a meros objetos de pesquisa psicopatológica. O que poderiam dizer esteticamente os corpos em seus movimentos e fixações, em suas impressões e expressões, em sua capacidade infinita de suscitar novos sentidos e significados?

Recent debates on the validity of Aesthetic Testimony and the centrality of the so-called Acquaintance Principle suggest that there is more to the proper exercise of aesthetic judgement than mere endorsement of allegedly correct aesthetic judgements. For example, although it is reasonable to follow experts’ judgements in certain matters of fact, it seems less acceptable to simply endorse or adopt experts’ judgements in the aesthetic domain. That reliance on testimony, by contrast to some other areas of judgement, is not sufficient for aesthetic judgement has encouraged scholars to focus in turn on the importance of the personal involvement and autonomy of the aesthetic agent. This special issue focuses on phenomena related to failed exercises of aesthetic judgement. The choice of the theme is motivated by the belief that a careful analysis of failures in aesthetic judgement can reveal significant aspects of the nature of aesthetic experience itself as well as the roles that perception, imagination, and learning have in its proper exercise.

As aesthetic appreciators of the environment, we often encounter cases where our environmental commitments and our aesthetic responses do not seem to match. Some highly altered or contaminated environments may occasion powerful and insightful aesthetic experiences. In this article, I discuss some arguments that have been offered in favor of the view that this mismatch is not possible when we appreciate a particular environment with full awareness of its damaged or altered condition. I show that these arguments are not conclusive and that there is room for valuable experiences of damaged or highly altered environments. Our knowledge of the damaged condition of an environment, while perceptually significant, does not necessarily make the resulting aesthetic experience to be negative. Finally, I show that these cases do not necessarily diminish the role that aesthetics can play in shaping our environmental sensibility and commitments.

Emotional response to artworks as a source of moral training or experimentation has long been disputed in the history of aesthetics. In this article I address the matter by focusing upon a kind of specimen that may by especially troublesome for an advocate of art’s capacity to educate our sentiments. The cases I focus upon – which I place under the label of the asymmetry problem – are those in which our emotional or evaluative response seems contrary to the one we would have expected when the represented contents are real. I critically review some of the main arguments offered to explain these cases and to challenge the role of art in improving morals. I seek to explain why these responses are not as problematic as one may initially think and to consider in a new light art’s capacity to shape our sensibilities. AbstraktIn der Geschichte der Ästhetik wurde das emotionale Reagieren auf Kunstwerke lange Zeit als eine Übungs- und Experimentierfeld moralischer Verbesserung diskutiert. Der Artikel behandelt dieses Thema, indem er seine Aufmerksamkeit auf ein Phänomen richtet, das für jene besonders beunruhigend sein könnte, die die Fähigkeit der Kunst zur Erziehung unserer Gefühle verteidigen. Die hier in den Blick genommenen Fälle – die der Autor dem „Problem der Asymmetrie“ zuordnet – sind solche, in denen unsere emotionale bzw. evaluative Reaktion jener entgegen gesetzt scheint, die wir erwarten würden, wenn die vorgestellten Inhalte real wären. Zunächst werden die Hauptargumente kritisch gewürdigt, die vorgebracht wurden, um solche Fälle zu erklären und die Rolle der Kunst für die moralische Erbauung in Frage zu stellen. Dann werden Gründe dafür vorgebracht, warum diese Argumente gar nicht so problematisch sind, wie man zunächst annehmen würde, und dafür die Fähigkeit der Kunst, unser ethisches Empfindungsvermögen zu fördern, in einem neuen Licht zu betrachten.

In this article I start by assuming that positive aesthetic experiences of damaged nature are possible and I argue for the idea that the aesthetic pleasure derived from that contemplation might reveal something of the environment’s overall character. I hope to show that positive aesthetic experiences sometimes help to promote emotional attitudes that can lead to insight into the configuration of other non-aesthetic attitudes. In order to do so, I critically appeal to some of the thoughts Kant articulated about the notion of aesthetic experience and its relationship to cognition and morality. I think that the sort of experience I am after in this article cannot be easily accommodated within a Kantian framework and that the possibility of positive aesthetic experience of damaged nature will show that the relationships between the aesthetic and the cognitive or the moral are more complex and enriching than they have so far been acknowledged to be.

Reflection on the nature and value of fiction has often paid attention to the possibility of acquiring knowledge through engaging with fictional works. The alleged imaginative character of fiction appreciation and the sort of emotional responses that fiction is able to prompt in the viewer have been frequently invoked in order to explain the peculiar cognitive value that fictions may possess. In this paper, I would like to question whether fiction as such possesses a specific kind of value. Although I agree that fictional works can convey certain kinds of knowledge, I think that the cognitive virtues that we attribute to fictional works do not have much to do with their fictional character as such. Rather, these values are grounded upon the various properties that the different representational artifacts that can serve to produce fictional works possess. Thus while I think fictional works can deliver various sorts of cognitive value, this value is not intrinsically connected with the fictional nature of these works.

The relationship between aesthetic value and other moral and cognitive values has been a key theme within contemporary aesthetic discussion. In this article, I explore once again the implications of this relationship, but from what I think might be a different angle. With few exceptions, notably Dominic Lopes, most of the contributions to this issue have dealt with the impact that moral or cognitive values could possibly have on the overall aesthetic value of a work of art. In this article, I explore instead how aesthetic properties or merits could play a role in explaining moral and cognitive properties. To do so, I first offer some examples that I think may reasonably exemplify the phenomenon we are considering. Second, I argue that a proper account of interactionism should meet at least two constraints: the relevance constraint and the autonomy constraint. Finally, I try to clarify how it is possible that aesthetic properties substantially contribute to other values by appealing to the notions of expression and the affective character of aesthetic properties.

El artículo tiene como objetivo fundamental presentar el concepto de repetición bajo tres aspectos. El primero es su ubicación en el contexto de la existencia individual; el segundo, su carácter de exigencia de búsqueda de la libertad; y, finalmente, la consideración de la repetición como acontecimiento de la existencia. El recorrido del artículo revela así el tránsito que se emprende desde la importancia de la figura del lector en su profunda soledad; lector de la vida, de la prueba, de la circunstancia, de lo ineludible; hasta la revelación de la existencia revestida en un acto mimético. Este recorrido aparece evidenciado porque se pone de relieve la preocupación humana no sólo por la existencia, sino por el sentido que ella adquiere frente a la posibilidad del mal desde lo particular, desde lo individual. En este orden de ideas, tras un seguimiento del concepto de repetición se pretende hacer evidente un interés que puede llamarse interés existencial y por ello filosófico: volver la cara hacia el individuo