María Manzano

This study examines the role that chatbots, an application of AI in e-commerce customer service, play in increasing online trust in brands and how, from this trust, interaction with chatbots can impact brand preference and purchase intention A conceptual model based on the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) and Information System Success Model (IS) is proposed to understand the relationships between the utility, ease-of-use, and responsiveness of a chatbot, online trust, brand preference, and purchase intention. Based on a sample of Spanish consumers, this study provides a better understanding of how to build trust online and how this can strengthen the relationship with the consumer and lead to a purchase. At the same time, it alerts professionals to the need to design chatbots that are useful and respond efficiently and quickly in their customer service. The results of our study aim to help brands in designing chatbots to provide e-services that consolidate customer relationships and foster sales.

Geographic information systems (GIS) have emerged as a valuable technology for marketing management. Its relevance emanates from the distinct importance of establishment location in hospitality and restaurant industries, the continued availability and depth of geospatial data continuously generated by the consumer and generating maps as visual elements. Assuming that strategies involving group-level customer customization are optimal, this paper aims to understand how geographical location is related to certain hotel and marketing variables. After reviewing the relevant literature on the use of GIS in the hospitality and restaurant industries, spatial and hotspot analyses of the hotel sector in Madrid are carried out to identify spatial clusters of hotels and to determine what can explain the possible agglomeration of hotels in certain areas.

Equational hybrid propositional type theory ) is a combination of propositional type theory, equational logic and hybrid modal logic. The structures used to interpret the language contain a hierarchy of propositional types, an algebra and a Kripke frame. The main result in this paper is the proof of completeness of a calculus specifically defined for this logic. The completeness proof is based on the three proofs Henkin published last century: Completeness in type theory, The completeness of the first-order functional calculus and Completeness in propositional type theory. More precisely, from and we take the idea of building the model described by the maximal consistent set; in our case the maximal consistent set has to be named, \-saturated and extensionally algebraic-saturated due to the hybrid and equational nature of \. From, we use the result that any element in the hierarchy has a name. The challenge was to deal with all the heterogeneous components in an integrated system.

The aim of this paper is to define a partial Propositional Type Theory. Our system is partial in a double sense: the hierarchy of (propositional) types contains partial functions and some expressions of the language, including formulas, may be undefined. The specific interpretation we give to the undefined value is that of Kleene’s strong logic of indeterminacy. We present a semantics for the new system and prove that every element of any domain of the hierarchy has a name in the object language. Finally, we provide a proof system and a (constructive) proof of completeness.

In this article we define a logical system called Hybrid Partial Type Theory ( $\mathcal {HPTT}$ ). The system is obtained by combining William Farmer’s partial type theory with a strong form of hybrid logic. William Farmer’s system is a version of Church’s theory of types which allows terms to be non-denoting; hybrid logic is a version of modal logic in which it is possible to name worlds and evaluate expressions with respect to particular worlds. We motivate this combination of ideas in the introduction, and devote the rest of the article to defining, axiomatising, and proving a completeness result for $\mathcal {HPTT}$.

This chapter examines Bunge’s distinction between the logical concept of existence and the ontological one. We introduce a new conceptual existence predicate in an intensional environment that depends on the evaluation world. So that we can investigate restricted areas where the different kinds of concepts might exist. We hope this new predicate would encompass Bunge’s philosophical position which he designates as conceptualist and fictional materialism. The basic hybridization acts as a bridge between intensions and extensions because @ works as a useful rigidifier. In hybrid logic, the accessibility relation and many properties this relation might have can be easily expressed in the formal language. The initial hypothesis is that hybridization and intensionality can serve as unifying tools in the areas involved in this research; namely, Logic, Philosophy of Science and Linguistics.

This article is a continuation of our promenade along the winding roads of identity, equality, nameability and completeness. We continue looking for a place where all these concepts converge. We assume that identity is a binary relation between objects while equality is a symbolic relation between terms. Identity plays a central role in logic and we have looked at it from two different points of view. In one case, identity is a notion which has to be defined and, in the other case, identity is a notion used to define other logical concepts. In our previous paper, [16], we investigated whether identity can be introduced by definition arriving to the conclusion that only in full higher-order logic with standard semantics a reliable definition of identity is possible. In the present study we have moved to modal logic and realized that here we can distinguish in the formal language between two different equality symbols, the first one shall be interpreted as extensional genuine identity and only applies for objects, the second one applies for non rigid terms and has the characteristic of synonymy. We have also analyzed the hybrid modal logic where we can introduce rigid terms by definition and can express that two worlds are identical by using the nominals and the @ operator. We finish our paper in the kingdom of identity where the only primitives are lambda and equality. Here we show how other logical concepts can be defined in terms of the identity relation. We have found at the end of our walk a possible point of convergence in the logic Equational Hybrid Propositional Type Theory, [14] and [15].

This article is an extended promenade strolling along the winding roads of identity, equality, nameability and completeness, looking for places where they converge. We have distinguished between identity and equality; the first is a binary relation between objects while the second is a symbolic relation between terms. Owing to the central role the notion of identity plays in logic, you can be interested either in how to define it using other logical concepts or in the opposite scheme. In the first case, one investigates what kind of logic is required. In the second case, one is interested in the definition of the other logical concepts in terms of the identity relation, using also abstraction. The present paper investigates whether identity can be introduced by definition arriving to the conclusion that only in full higher-order logic a reliable definition of identity is possible. However, the definition needs the standard semantics and we know that with this semantics completeness is lost. We have also studied the relationship of equality with comprehension and extensionality and pointed out the relevant role played by these two axioms in Henkin’s completeness method. We finish our paper with a section devoted to general semantics, where the role played by the nameable hierarchy of types is the key in Henkin’s completeness method.

En la España del siglo que agoniza se han dado tres generaciones de mujeres bien definidas: las madres de la posguerra, sacrificadas y abnegadas, que dejaron, en muchos casos, su profesión por el matrimonio, que entendían como un deber sagrado; mi generación, que es la puente e incomprendida por todos: padres, hermanos, compañeros y amigos, y hasta por la generación actual difícilmente puede entender cómo era la vida de las mujeres hace apenas cuarenta años, y la juventud de nuestros días, resuelta y decidida a compatibilizar su profesión, como primera condición, con el matrimonio. Si, además se tiene en cuenta la pobre consideración social que la música ha tenido hasta hace bien poco tiempo, es fácil imaginar lo difícil que resultaba esta profesión para las mujer de la España reciente.

We show that basic hybridization makes it possible to give straightforward Henkin-style completeness proofs even when the modal logic being hybridized is higher-order. The key ideas are to add nominals as expressions of type t, and to extend to arbitrary types the way we interpret \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$@_i$\end{document} in propositional and first-order hybrid logic. This means: interpret \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$@_i\alpha _a$\end{document}, where \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$\alpha _a$\end{document} is an expression of any type \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$a$\end{document}, as an expression of type \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$a$\end{document} that rigidly returns the value that \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$\alpha_a$\end{document} receives at the i-world. The axiomatization and completeness proofs are generalizations of those found in propositional and first-order hybrid logic, and we automatically obtain a wide range of completeness results for stronger logics and languages. Our approach is deliberately low-tech. We don’t, for example, make use of Montague’s intensional type s, or Fitting-style intensional models; we build, as simply as we can, hybrid logicover Henkin’s logic.

Professor Bunge makes the distinction between the logical concept of existence and the ontological one. I agree with him and in this paper I am formalizing his existence predicate into the powerful language of type theory.I am also proving the logical equivalence of this for mulation with a briefer one, which says that to exist conceptually is the same as to be a conceptual object. Accordingly, from this point on I investigate what conceptual objects are. I reach the conclusion that it is better to study a restricted area each time, where existence could even be assigned in different degrees. For instance, in set theory -like in Animal Farm of Orwell every set exists but so me “exist more” than others. Of course, in relating degrees of existence to degrees of definability I am not following Bunge.

In this paper we will discuss the active part played by certain diagonal arguments in the genesis of computability theory. 1 In some cases it is enough to assume the enumerability of Y while in others the effective enumerability is a substantial demand. These enigmatical words by Kleene were our point of departure: When Church proposed this thesis, I sat down to disprove it by diagonalizing out of the class of the λ–definable functions. But, quickly realizing that the diagonalization cannot be done effectively, I became overnight a supporter of the thesis. (1981, p. 59) The title of our paper alludes to this very work, a task on which Kleene claims to have set out after hearing such a remarkable statement from Church, who was his teacher at the time. There are quite a few points made in this extract that may be surprising. First, it talks about a proof by diagonalization in order to test—in fact to try to falsify—a hypothesis that is not strictly formal. Second, it states that such a proof or diagonal construction fails. Third, it seems to use the failure as a support for the thesis. Finally, the episode we have just described took place at a time, autumn 1933, in which many of the results that characterize Computability Theory had not yet materialized. The aim of this paper is to show that Church and Kleene discovered a way to block a very particular instance of a diagonal construction: one that is closely related to the content of Church's thesis. We will start by analysing the logical structure of a diagonal construction. Then we will introduce the historical context in order to analyse the reasons that might have led Kleene to think that the failure of this very specific diagonal proof could support the thesis. This is a joint paper. We have both attempted to add a small piece to an amazing historical jigsaw puzzle at a juncture we feel to be appropiate. In the paper by Manzano 1997 the aforementioned words by Kleene were quoted, and since then several logicians, Enrique Alonso first and foremost, have questioned her on this issue. Here we both submit our reply. (1999, pp. 249--273)

Leon Henkin (1921–2006) was not only an extraordinary logician, but also an excellent teacher, a dedicated professor and an exceptional person. The first two sections of this paper are biographical, discussing both his personal and academic life. In the last section we present three aspects of Henkin’s work. First we comment part of his work fruit of his emphasis on teaching. In a personal communication he affirms that On mathematical induction, published in 1969, was the favourite among his articles with a somewhat panoramic nature and not meant exclusively to specialists. This subject is covered in the first subsection. Needless to say that we also analyse Henkin’s better known contribution: his completeness method. His renowned results on completeness for both type theory and first order logic were part of his thesis, The Completeness of Formal Systems, presented at Princeton in 1947 under the advise of Alonzo Church. It is interesting to note that he obtained the proof of completeness for first order logic readapting the argument for the theory of types. The last subsection is devoted to philosophy. The work most directly related to philosophy is an article entitled: Some Notes on Nominalism which appeared in the Journal of Symbolic Logic in 1953. Unfortunately, we are not covering his contribution to the field of cylindric algebras. As a matter of fact, Henkin spent many years investigating algebraic structures with Alfred Tarski and Donald Monk, among others

We show that basic hybridization (adding nominals and @ operators) makes it possible to give straightforward Henkin-style completeness proofs even when the modal logic being hybridized is higher-order. The key ideas are to add nominals as expressions of type t, and to extend to arbitrary types the way we interpret $@_i$ in propositional and first-order hybrid logic. This means: interpret $@_i\alpha _a$, where $\alpha _a$ is an expression of any type $a$, as an expression of type $a$ that rigidly returns the value that $\alpha_a$ receives at the i-world. The axiomatization and completeness proofs are generalizations of those found in propositional and first-order hybrid logic, and (as is usual inhybrid logic) we automatically obtain a wide range of completeness results for stronger logics and languages. Our approach is deliberately low-tech. We don’t, for example, make use of Montague’s intensional type s, or Fitting-style intensional models; we build, as simply as we can, hybrid logicover Henkin’s logic.

This paper focuses on the evolution of the notion of completeness in contemporary logic. We discuss the differences between the notions of completeness of a theory, the completeness of a calculus, and the completeness of a logic in the light of Gödel's and Tarski's crucial contributions.We place special emphasis on understanding the differences in how these concepts were used then and now, as well as on the role they play in logic. Nevertheless, we can still observe a certain ambiguity in the use of the close notions of completeness of a calculus and completeness of a logic. We analyze the state of the art under which Gödel's proof of completeness was developed, particularly when dealing with the decision problem for first-order logic. We believe that Gödel had to face the following dilemma: either semantics is decidable, in which case the completeness of the logic is trivial or, completeness is a critical property but in this case it cannot be obtained as a corollary of a previous decidability result. As far as first-order logic is concerned, our thesis is that the contemporary understanding of completeness of a calculus was born as a generalization of the concept of completeness of a theory. The last part of this study is devoted to Henkin's work concerning the generalization of his completeness proof to any logic from his initial work in type theory

This paper sings a song — a song created by bringing together the work of four great names in the history of logic: Hans Reichenbach, Arthur Prior, Richard Montague, and Leon Henkin. Although the work of the first three of these authors have previously been combined, adding the ideas of Leon Henkin is the addition required to make the combination work at the logical level. But the present paper does not focus on the underlying technicalities rather it focusses on the underlying instruments, and the way they work together. We hope the reader will be tempted to sing a long.

Classical logic has proved inadequate in various areas of computer science, artificial intelligence, mathematics, philosopy and linguistics. This is an introduction to extensions of first-order logic, based on the principle that many-sorted logic (MSL) provides a unifying framework in which to place, for example, second-order logic, type theory, modal and dynamic logics and MSL itself. The aim is two fold: only one theorem-prover is needed; proofs of the metaproperties of the different existing calculi can be avoided by borrowing them from MSL. To make the book accessible to readers from different disciplines, whilst maintaining precision, the author has supplied detailed step-by-step proofs, avoiding difficult arguments, and continually motivating the material with examples. Consequently this can be used as a reference, for self-teaching or for first-year graduate courses.