Maria Ruiz

Justo antes de la pandemia por COVID-19, la Organización Mundial de la Salud definió unas prioridades de trabajo para la década 2020-2030. Un grupo interdisciplinario de profesionales de la salud reflexiona sobre estas prioridades, determinando unas categorías de análisis y, desde una perspectiva bioética, analiza cada una de ellas, ve su pertinencia, algunos eventos causales, las implicaciones que pueden tener si no son enfrentadas adecuadamente y hace sugerencias sobre la forma de llevarlas a cabo. En esta primera entrega se analiza el primer grupo de prioridades estratégicas: “poblaciones más sanas”. En las conclusiones se destaca la conveniencia de acometer cada una de ellas de una manera colaborativa, gubernamental y privada; de reestructurar el sector salud con base en estas prioridades, aprovechando la experiencia obtenida en la lucha contra el COVID-19. La relación del ser humano con el medio ambiente también debe cambiar, apelando a la responsabilidad humana por el cuidado del planeta.

Natural selection is commonly seen not just as an explanation for adaptive evolution, but as the inevitable consequence of “heritable variation in fitness among individuals”. Although it remains embedded in biological concepts, such a formalisation makes it tempting to explore whether this precondition may be met not only in life as we know it, but also in other physical systems. This would imply that these systems are subject to natural selection and may perhaps be investigated in a biological framework, where properties are typically examined in light of their putative functions. Here we relate the major questions that were debated during a three-day workshop devoted to discussing whether natural selection may take place in non-living physical systems. We start this report with a brief overview of research fields dealing with “life-like” or “proto-biotic” systems, where mimicking evolution by natural selection in test tubes stands as a major objective. We contend the challenge may be as much conceptual as technical. Taking the problem from a physical angle, we then discuss the framework of dissipative structures. Although life is viewed in this context as a particular case within a larger ensemble of physical phenomena, this approach does not provide general principles from which natural selection can be derived. Turning back to evolutionary biology, we ask to what extent the most general formulations of the necessary conditions or signatures of natural selection may be applicable beyond biology. In our view, such a cross-disciplinary jump is impeded by reliance on individuality as a central yet implicit and loosely defined concept. Overall, these discussions thus lead us to conjecture that understanding, in physico-chemical terms, how individuality emerges and how it can be recognised, will be essential in the search for instances of evolution by natural selection outside of living systems.

The concept of causal specificity is drawing considerable attention from philosophers of biology. It became the rationale for rejecting (and occasionally, accepting) a thesis of causal parity of developmental factors. This literature assumes that attributing specificity to causal relations is at least in principle a straightforward (if not systematic) task. However, the parity debate in philosophy of biology seems to be stuck at a point where it is not the biological details that will help move forward. In this paper, I take a step back to reexamine the very idea of causal specificity and its intended role in the parity dispute in philosophy of biology. I contend that the idea of causal specificity across variations as currently discussed in the literature is irreducibly twofold in nature: it is about two independent components that are not mutually entailed. I show this to be the source of prior complications with the notion of specificity itself that ultimately affect the purposes for which it is often invoked, notably to settle the parity dispute.

Currently, there are almost as many conceptions of emergence as authors who address the issue. Most literature on the matter focuses either on discussing, evaluating and comparing particular contributions or accounts of emergence, or on assessing a particular case study. Our aim in this paper is rather different. We here set out to introduce a distinction that has not been sufficiently taken into account in previous discussions on this topic: the distinction between inter-domain emergence—a relation between items belonging to different ontic domains—and intra-domain emergence—a relation between items belonging to a same ontic domain. Our final purpose is not to assume and defend a definite stance on emergence, but to stress the relevance of such distinction when attempting to argue for or against emergence, in the first place. We will also address the connections between emergence so distinguished and more general philosophical perspectives, suggesting where would reductionists and pluralists stand with respect to intra- and inter-domain emergence.

El mal ejercicio del poder suele llevar de la mano la falta de libertad de los otros, la lucha por la misma y el sufrimiento humano. Muchos salen mal parados de la experiencia, sufren patologías psicológicas durante años y no son ya capaces de amar y contribuir al bien común. La literatura y las artes ha ayudado siempre a sublimar el dolor y han proporcionado la expresión de la transmisión de los últimos pensamientos de las personas que vivieron las situaciones extremas a las que condice la sed de poder -como las guerras- o el autoritarismo sufrido bien en un espacio público, bien en el seno la propia familia. La lectura de Kafka y la muñeca viajera, de Jordi Sierra y Fabra nos ofrece un testimonio narrativo-poético de todo ello

Despite many attempts to achieve an adequate definition of living systems by means of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, the opinion that such an enterprise is inexorably destined to fail is increasingly gaining support. However, we believe options do not just come down to either having faith in a future success or endorsing skepticism. In this paper, we aim to redirect the discussion of the problem by shifting the focus of attention from strict definitions towards a philosophical framework that allows conceiving of living systems as a natural kind, but whereby natural kinds are not to be defined by fixed necessary and sufficient conditions. We argue for a property-cluster kind approach according to which living systems constitute a natural kind with vague boundaries, capable of changing, and whose members do not need to instantiate every property. We draw from Boyd’s homeostatic property-cluster theory and introduce two modifications, one regarding homeostatic mechanisms and another related to the scientific role of kinds. Thus, our view overcomes some difficulties of Boyd’s theory and we are able to account for the natural kindhood of living things. We also emphasize the most appealing features of our approach for specific research fields and address three objections to this sort of approach.

The philosophy of biology literature offers several arguments aimed at showing that information theory is conceptually unsuited to capture the informational talk in molecular biology. Such arguments led to the consensus that, if the informational talk in biology can be defended and explained at all, we need a different strategy. The debate, in fact, developed mostly along this line. However, recent contributions seem to (and even claim to) challenge the consensus and thus to vindicate the role and relevance of information theory to this particular debate. In this paper, I examine the main arguments leading to such a consensus and I analyze the extent to which those recent accounts actually succeed in vindicating the invocation of information theory. I argue that these attempts fail to vindicate the information-theoretic strategy and, therefore, the consensus remains unaffected by them.

Despite many attempts to achieve an adequate definition of living systems by means of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, the opinion that such an enterprise is inexorably destined to fail is increasingly gaining support. However, we believe options do not just come down to either having faith in a future success or endorsing skepticism. In this paper, we aim to redirect the discussion of the problem by shifting the focus of attention from strict definitions towards a philosophical framework that allows conceiving of living systems as a natural kind, but whereby natural kinds are not to be defined by fixed necessary and sufficient conditions. We argue for a property-cluster kind approach according to which living systems constitute a natural kind with vague boundaries, capable of changing, and whose members do not need to instantiate every property. We draw from Boyd’s homeostatic property-cluster theory and introduce two modifications, one regarding homeostatic mechanisms and another related to the scientific role of kinds. Thus, our view overcomes some difficulties of Boyd’s theory and we are able to account for the natural kindhood of living things. We also emphasize the most appealing features of our approach for specific research fields and address three objections to this sort of approach.

El objetivo del presente artículo es exponer los 21 años de experiencia que he desarrollado como psicóloga en el Athletic Club de Bilbao, proyecto que se ha ido construyendo para un club con una filosofía particular, donde no juegan jugadores extranjeros, la mayoría de los jugadores del primer equipo provienen de la cantera y el jugador representa el máximo valor del club, siendo este el único que puede hacer competitivo a la entidad. Se trabaja en un proceso de formación donde se propicie un jugador activo, pensante y responsable, que participe de su aprendizaje y sea protagonista de su desarrollo. Esto implica un cambio de rol en los técnicos, incluidos los psicólogos, quienes pasan a ser facilitadores, dinamizadores de contextos óptimos de aprendizaje y rendimiento. Desde una perspectiva humanista, el pilar de esta propuesta está orientada al desarrollo profesional de los técnicos como medio para la formación de jugadores conscientes, autónomos y maduros, claves de un jugador competitivo.

EDUCERE is a government funded research and development project. EDUCERE objectives are to investigate, develop, and evaluate innovative solutions for society to detect changes in psychomotor development through the natural interaction of children with toys and everyday objects, and perform stimulation and early attention activities in real environments such as home and school. In the EDUCERE project, an ethical impact assessment is carried out linked to a minors’ data protection rights. Using a specific methodology, the project has achieved some promising results. These include use of a prototype of smart toys to detect development difficulties in children. In addition, privacy protection measures which take into account the security concerns of health data, have been proposed and applied. This latter security framework could be useful in other Internet of Things related projects. It consists of legal and technical measures. Special attention has been placed in the transformation of bulk data such as acceleration and jitter of toys into health data when patterns of atypical development are found. The article describes the different security profiles in which users are classified.

La escritura constituye una destreza compleja, puesto que demanda un profundo proceso de madurez cognitiva y, a su vez, por su carácter comunicativo necesita ser divulgativo. Igualmente, a través de la expresión escrita los estudiantes adquieren saberes y conocimientos académicos y personales; por tanto, posibilita el desarrollo cognitivo de estos. Escribir no es solo una mera habilidad motriz, implica destrezas como la organización, la expresividad y la creatividad. Podemos afirmar que el taller de escritura representa un aprendizaje significativo, de cooperación y diversión que tiende un puente hacia la literatura.

In biology and philosophy of biology, discussing the notion of interaction leads to an examination of interactionism, which is, broadly speaking, the view that rejects gene-centrism and gene determinism and instead emphasizes the fact that traits of organisms are always the result of genes and environments. It has long been asserted that the nature-nurture problem requires an interactionist solution of sorts, the so-called interactionist consensus. This consensus, however, has been deemed insufficient and challenged by several authors triggering an extension of the debate among contestants and defenders. Unfortunately, part of the problem is that the views on causation that would ground claims about interactionism are not always made explicit in this debate, which renders those views somewhat complicated to assess. Moreover, it seems to be assumed that causal complexity excludes the possibility of characterizing, distinguishing, or comparing among causal contributions. By turning to a detailed survey of the origin of the debate and to some developments in the philosophy of causation, we will contend that this view is unwarranted, and that much of the debate around interactionism is based on the drawing of this conclusion. We also examine implications of this analysis for the project to develop a framework based on the notion of inter-identities.

Currently, there are almost as many conceptions of emergence as authors who address the issue. Most literature on the matter focuses either on discussing, evaluating and comparing particular contributions or accounts of emergence, or on assessing a particular case study. Our aim in this paper is rather different. We here set out to introduce a distinction that has not been sufficiently taken into account in previous discussions on this topic: the distinction between inter-domain emergence—a relation between items belonging to different ontic domains—and intra-domain emergence—a relation between items belonging to a same ontic domain. Our final purpose is not to assume and defend a definite stance on emergence, but to stress the relevance of such distinction when attempting to argue for or against emergence, in the first place. We will also address the connections between emergence so distinguished and more general philosophical perspectives, suggesting where would reductionists and pluralists stand with respect to intra- and inter-domain emergence.

The health crisis caused by COVID-19 has resulted in the physical and emotional deterioration of health personnel, especially nurses, whose emotional state is affected by the high risk of contagion, the high demands of health services, and the exhausting working hours. The objective of this research was to determine the relationship between fear, anxiety, and fatigue of nurses caring for patients with COVID-19 in a second level public hospital in Peru. This study presents a quantitative approach and correlational level, cross-sectional, and non-experimental design. The sample consisted of 145 nurses who attended patients with COVID-19 in health care areas. The results show a significant relationship between fear of contagion and physical-cognitive fatigue and a significant relationship between generalized anxiety and physical-cognitive fatigue. It is concluded that in this context, both fear of contagion and generalized anxiety are related to physical-cognitive fatigue.

In this paper we will briefly explain the context in which the appropriation of 500 children occurred during the most recent Argentinian dictatorship, in order to analyze the political demand of identity restitution of these people. We will describe the phenomenon of restitution that took place thanks to the strategy of Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, and we will analyze both the role of genetics on the restitution as well as some criticisms to a notion of biological identity considered to emerge from it. We will situate those criticisms in the philosophical debate over personal identity. The main purpose of this paper is to offer two arguments against an alleged genetic notion of personal identity. Firstly, a theoretical argument presents reasons on the basis of contemporary biological knowledge and, secondly, a practical argument refers to the productive role of biotechnologies. Finally, we will discuss some problems that arise from the criticisms themselves in order to give reasons for a defense of the restitution demand.