Maria Seim

Traditional conceptual analysis is the most common method used when accounting for the nature of blame. The method of traditional conceptual analysis fails in this endeavor, however, when met with particular counterexamples that present false positives and negatives. Recently this problem in accounting for the nature of blame has led philosophers to explore new methods. The newcomers are functional theories of blame, and paradigm-based explanations of blame. In this paper I explore whether these theories fare better in accounting for the full nature of our blaming practices. I argue that the extant accounts face a problem when determining the paradigm-example and the function of blame: They either end up with a circular explanation, or they revert to traditional conceptual analysis. To avoid circularity and reliance on necessary or sufficient conditions, I argue that a functional account must start by determining the function of blame. To determine the function I look closer at what happens if we fail to blame. Situations where we fail to blame, I argue, show us the functional role of blame. I conclude that we blame someone for wronging us because we need to protect our understanding of moral worth against the threat implicit in this wrongdoing.

It is generally agreed that for blame to be appropriate the wrongdoer must be blameworthy. However, blameworthiness is not sufficient for appropriate blame. It has been argued that for blame to be appropriate the blamer must have standing to blame. Philosophers writing on the topic have distinguished several considerations that might defeat someone’s standing to blame. This paper examines the underexplored consideration of how personal relationships can influence who has the standing to express blame. We seem to assume that if we do not stand in the right relation to the wrongdoer, it is not our business to blame them. I identify three challenges to this view. First, we do not know what is wrong with meddling (whether it is morally or prudentially wrong). Second, there are cases where we have no close relation to the wrongdoer, but where we seem to have standing nonetheless – murder and other serious moral offences are examples of this. Third, we don’t seem to have a clear conception of what ‘standing’ means, and this makes it hard to see how discussion on standing can help us determine the propriety of blame. This paper defends the notion of standing as a propriety condition on blame in cases of meddling. I argue that personal relationships influence who has the standing to blame through constitution of relationship-specific norms; and that the role these norms play in developing and regulating our relationships can explain why meddlesome blame is morally wrong.

The philosophical literature on the standing to forgive is divided. The majority view holds that only victims have the standing to forgive (Murphy and Hampton 1988, Owens 2012, Zaragoza 2012, Walker 2013), while recent contributions challenge the majority view and argue that third parties also have the standing to forgive (MacLachlan 2008, Norlock 2009, Pettigrove 2009, Chaplin 2019). This chapter defends the victim’s unique standing to forgive by way of a specific account of the nature of forgiveness. The standard account of forgiveness says that forgiveness is the overcoming of resentment for the right reasons. The standard account can explain how forgiveness differs from similar responses, like excusing and condoning, but falls short of explaining how forgiveness can be a voluntary action. A satisfactory account of forgiveness should be able to explain how forgiveness can be separate from excusing and condoning, as well as how forgiveness can be voluntary. To account for all the desiderata, this chapter suggests an account of forgiveness that depends on the wrongdoer’s repentance and the victim’s decision to absorb the cost of the wrongdoing. On this account, forgiveness is necessarily the prerogative of the victim.