Marian Ambrozy

This book discusses the economic, philosophical, social and pedagogical aspects of the knowledge society. The theoretical part of the work is elaborated based on a number of theoretical approaches of renowned theorists of the knowledge economy, as well as issues closely related to it. The authors introduce the topic of the knowledge economy in the context of Industry 4.0. These are, for example, contexts related to lean production and new technologies. The authors also mention the risks that the latest industrial revolution may bring. The authors compare the views of the various experts dealing with the issue of education. The authors try to find an answer to the question of whether there is a discipline that can play an integrative role in knowledge. The authors consider philosophy to be such a discipline. It also attempts to elaborate on selected inspirational ideas of Peter Drucker. The authors seek to postulate a line of building a knowledge society in such a way that this development avoids the shortcomings pointed out, for example, by Liessmann and Adorno, the authors confront the applicability of modern pedagogical approaches in the sense of transforming a society into a knowledge society. The authors do so also with the intent of informatics realities. The authors critically reflect on selected settings of educational assessment criteria in the European Union. The authors also suggest measures that would help to improve the quality of education. The analytical part is an analysis of questions about the knowledge society and economy with renowned scholars. Among them, the applied physicist Boris Evgenevich Paton stands out. Respondents answered questions concerning the role of marketing in the knowledge economy, structural changes in society, human resource management, the education system, and other contexts. The summary and analysis of the answers focus on the agreement and differences in the respondents' answers.

The contemporary scientific and technological progress builds on the accomplishments of classical mechanics from the 19th century when the so-called ‘European scientific method and values’ were accepted practically by the whole educated world. Most scientific results and conclusions were reached based on the causal ontological approach proposed in principle already by Plato’s Socrates and developed further by Aristotle. Despite the late-modern paradigm shift in science (Galilei, Newton, etc.), the topicality of the ontological approach proposed by Aristotle (II. Analytics) remains. On the other hand, 19th and 20th century philosophers, mainly positivists such as Mach and Avenarius but also Schlick and Carnap, attempted to change this approach to unify scientific knowledge in accordance with an ideological, i.e. positivist outlook on reality. The authors place a special emphasis on the contribution of Rudolf Carnap and his interaction with Martin Heidegger. Three very different theories are applied to physical reality in the present: classical mechanics in the standard macroscopic realm, Copenhagen quantum mechanics in the microscopic realm, and special theory of reality in both realms in the case of systems consisting of objects having higher velocity values. Any explanation or description of transitions between different realms and theories had not been provided until now. Our paper describes the corresponding evolution in the modern period and identifies the underlying false philosophical assumptions and statements existing in today’s scientific systems. We will then demonstrate that one common theory for all realms of reality may exist; one that will be based fully on Hamilton equations (only the law of force of Newton is to be generalized). Only time change of particle impulse (not directly acceleration) is to be determined by a corresponding force. All necessary characteristics of physical reality may be derived in such a case. Direct correlations of such physical approach to philosophy (ontology) will be drawn.

The present paper discusses selected issues of evaluation in the teaching of philosophy. It deals with the issue under consideration on a general level since we do not differentiate between high school and college study performance assessment. Critical reflection focuses on the proper mode of evaluation in teaching the history of philosophy as and in the disciplines of systematic philosophy. In doing so, the close interrelation between the history of philosophy and its disciplines is considered. Three basic evaluative approaches are distinguished. These vary depending on whether the assessment is of the history of philosophy, logic, or other philosophical disciplines. The question of whether a philosopher or a philosophy teacher not directly involved in discussing philosophical issues is better as an evaluator is also investigated. Furthermore, the paper also articulates the reasons for preferring the first option.

The topic of science was one of the most significant topics in the work of Martin Heidegger. Heidegger was not primarily a science methodologist; he could be considered a significant philosopher of science. Heidegger’s philosophy of science is often labeled supertemporal. Although Heidegger was interested in reflecting several stages of science, the present article only deals with his philosophical view of modern science. The article does not analyze how Heidegger reflects on particular sciences; it analyses how he reflects on science as a whole, specifically the individual stages of Heidegger’s philosophy of science. The basic question of the research is whether his philosophy of science before the “Turn” is in any way different from his philosophy of science after the “Turn,” i.e., whether we can speak of two completely different approaches to science, or whether it is possible to find some continuity between them. Besides Heidegger’s published works, the paper also reflects on the discovery of an original, unpublished version of his text and looks critically at some interpreters of Heidegger’s philosophy of science. The study concludes that despite numerous differences in his reflection on science before and after the Turn, it can be stated that there is substantial continuity between the stages of Heidegger´s philosophy of science.