Mariana Almeida Pereira

This paper argues that ascetic vegetarianism remains sacrificial toward animality—specifically, human animality—insofar as it constitutes a modality of what Jacques Derrida has named “zoophobia.” I begin by showing that a component of carnophallogocentrism is zoophobia, a concept that accounts for the human phobia (a hatred and a fear) of human animality since, within the Western tradition, humans have generally sought to define themselves as non-animal and, therefore, as closer to divinity than to animality. I then argue that ascetic vegetarianism is a modality of zoophobia, since the arguments advanced by its proponents (such as Plutarch and Porphyry) prove unhelpful for rethinking the carnophallogocentric structure, precisely because they conceive vegetarianism as a means of purifying human life from its animal condition. Fundamentally, I argue that ascetic vegetarianism is symbolically sacrificial toward human animality, thus reinforcing the carnophallogocentric structure that justifies (real or literal) violence against non-human animals.

Jeremy Bentham's question (“Can they suffer?”), and its centralization of suffering, remains a notorious contribution to animal ethics. In this article, I begin by problematizing Peter Singer's interpretation of Bentham's question—an interpretation that remains hegemonic in contemporary animal ethics—and highlight its latent anthropocentrism. Then, I reread Bentham's question through Jacques Derrida, arguing for Derrida's interpretation's force in deconstructing anthropocentrism. Despite the advancements in animal welfare that Singer's thought has propelled, his interpretation of Bentham's question contributes to a reaffirmation of anthropocentrism/carnophallogocentrism, since the “capacity to suffer” is interpreted as a power tout court, indexing it, consequently, to several powers or capacities, resulting in a hierarchy of human and animal suffering and in a disregard for the philosophical problem of putting another animal to death. Derrida's reading of Bentham's centralization of suffering requires the affirmation of a fundamental vulnerability that amounts to a fundamental nonpower, common to all finite, mortal beings. I demonstrate that Bentham's legacy gains a revolutionary impulse, which should inform animal philosophy today, when read through Derrida, because, by decentralizing power, it questions the anthropo-carnophallogocentric subject (the human, male, powerful, carnivorous subject), thus aiding in delineating a compassionate ethical relation with other animals.

In this paper I draw together the notion of the absent referent as proposed by Carol J. Adams, and the notions of literal and symbolical sacrifice by eating the other — or ingestion — advanced by Jacques Derrida, to characterize how animals are commonly perceived, which ultimately forbids productive arguments for vegetarianism. I discuss animals as being literally and definitionally absent referents, and I argue, informed by Derrida’s philosophy, that it is impossible to aim at turning them into present referents without reinforcing symbolic ingestion by linking symbolic ingestion to epistemic appropriation or conceptualization. With this, I highlight the ethical importance of discussing symbolic ingestion in animal philosophy.

Pretende-se auscultar a possibilidade de instrução moral pela literatura. Defender-se-á que a arte narrativa é capaz de instruir moralmente pois 1) proporciona um tipo de conhecimento não-proposicional que permite o acesso a novas perspetivas, e 2) é capaz de cultivar e refinar os valores e as práticas morais dos leitores, através do engajamento emocional. Tentar-se-á mostrar que o poder inverso — o poder de corromper moralmente — não se verifica (ou não se verifica tão facilmente): apelar-se-á à resistência imaginativa humana que parece impedir que o Homem exporte perspetivas morais que violentam o seu próprio posicionamento axiológico.

In Beyond the Anthropological Difference, Matthew Calarco aims both at exposing and interpreting the current theoretical situation regarding animals and at proposing a new way of conceiving human-animal relations, advancing what he calls an ‘ontology of indistinction’. Mimicking Jacques Derrida’s project of decentring philosophy, here Calarco aims at decentring ethics appealing to a serious consideration of the relations between beings as opposed to a search for a ‘primary locus of ethical consideration’ (41).

In Beyond the Anthropological Difference, Matthew Calarco aims both at exposing and interpreting the current theoretical situation regarding animals and at proposing a new way of conceiving human-animal relations, advancing what he calls an ‘ontology of indistinction’. Mimicking Jacques Derrida’s project of decentring philosophy, here Calarco aims at decentring ethics appealing to a serious consideration of the relations between beings as opposed to a search for a ‘primary locus of ethical consideration’ (41).