Mariana Rodrigues

For countless organisms, we know their genomes as long sequences of A’s, C’s, G’s, and T’s. But what does this information – if it is information – mean? This is a question of semantics, while information theory, as introduced by Shannon (1948), explicitly is not concerned with meaning. This has led many scholars within theoretical biology and biosemiotics to disregard information theory as irrelevant. By discussing the case of molecular motifs from the points of view of bioinformatics and biosemiotics, we offer an interpretation of biological information that emphasizes the usefulness of Shannon’s theory of information to understand aspects of the generation and interpretation of meaning in living cells. Though the semantic aspects of information were not dealt with by Shannon, contributions to bioinformatics including the work of Thomas D. Schneider and colleagues have shown how the information content of a site, defined as the decrease in uncertainty upon binding, is often just enough to locate the sites in the genome. This provides a better understanding of the biosemiotics of sequence information and the interdependency of information transfer, memory, biochemical specificity, biofunction, and meaning. Thus, we argue that the quantitative approach to information by Schneider is compatible with biosemiotics and Bateson’s definition of information as “a difference that makes a difference”.

O objetivo deste artigo é analisar a relação entre informação e pensamento no contexto da Filosofia da Mente. A questão central que direciona o presente trabalho pode ser assim formulada: “Qual é o papel desempenhado pela informação no processo de geração e alteração de hábitos?”. Para atingir este objetivo, investigamos o conceito de informação, focalizando seu aspecto semiótico, tal como definido por Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914). Em seguida, analisamos a noção peirciana de Mente destacando o processo de pensamento que se instancia a partir de três tipos de raciocínios: abdução, dedução e indução. Duas hipóteses direcionam este trabalho: (H1) Informação sobre objetos indica suas características ou predicados, permitindo o ajuste da conduta de organismos situados em seus ambientes; (H2) O desvelar de informação, no contexto da Filosofia da Mente, é o combustível do pensamento e, por sua vez, da geração e alteração de hábitos. Em síntese, nosso objetivo é analisar o papel desempenhado pela informação no pensamento, a partir da semiótica peirciana no contexto da Filosofia da Mente.

In philosophy of science, the literature on abduction and the literature on styles of thinking have existed almost totally in parallel. Here, for the first time, we bring them together and explore their mutual relevance. What is the consequence of the existence of several styles of scientific thinking for abduction? Can abduction, as a general creative mode of inference, have distinct characteristic forms within each style? To investigate this, firstly, we present the concept of abduction; secondly we analyze what is understood by styles of thinking; thirdly, we give some comments on abduction and styles of thinking by analyzing examples of scientific discovery or innovation within each style. We develop a case-based comparative investigation of creative aspects of abductive reasoning with examples drawn from different styles of scientific thinking and doing as understood by the Crombie/hacking tradition. We argue that abduction, as a general mode of reasoning, can have a variety of specific expressions enabled and constrained by the styles of scientific thinking. Finally, we draw some conclusions on the relationship between abduction and styles of thinking suggesting that scientific discovery is a dynamical goal-directed activity within the scientific community that benefits from distinct styles of thinking and doing research.

The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between information and abductive reasoning in the context of problem-solving, focusing on non-human animals. Two questions guide our investigation: What is the relation between information and abductive reasoning in the context of human and non-human animals? Do non-human animals perform discovery based on inferential processes such as abductive reasoning? In order to answer these questions, we discuss the semiotic concept of information in relation to the concept of abductive reasoning and, more specifically, to the notion of manipulative abduction proposed by Magnani. Finally, we investigate a case study of corvids’ intelligence, namely, their capacity of causal cognition.

In this article, we discuss the ubiquity of Big Data and machine learning in society and propose that it evinces the need of further investigation of their fundamental limitations. We extend the “too much information tends to behave like very little information” phenomenon to formal knowledge about lawlike universes and arbitrary collections of computably generated datasets. This gives rise to the simplicity bubble problem, which refers to a learning algorithm equipped with a formal theory that can be deceived by a dataset to find a locally optimal model which it deems to be the global one. In the context of lawlike (computable) universes and formal learning systems, we show that there is a ceiling above which formal knowledge cannot further decrease the probability of zemblanitous findings, should the randomly generated data made available to the formal learning system be sufficiently large in comparison to their joint complexity. Zemblanity, the opposite of serendipity, is defined by an undesirable but expected finding that reveals an underlying problem or negative consequence in a given model or theory, which is in principle predictable in case the formal theory contains sufficient information. We also argue that this is an epistemological limitation that may generate unpredictable problems in digitally intermediated societies.

O objetivo deste artigo é investigar em que medida a inferência abdutiva pode ser automatizada. Para isso, apresentamos a noção peirceana de abdução, segundo a qual a abdução é o processo de geração e seleção de hipóteses explicativas que orientam a investigação científica (CP 5.171; 1903). Em seguida, apresentamos o conceito contemporâneo de abdução, caracterizado como Inferência à Melhor Explicação (IME), cujo objetivo é selecionar uma hipótese, entre um conjunto de hipóteses disponíveis, considerando seu potencial explicativo em termos de probabilidade e uberdade (Lipton, 2004). Subsequentemente, discutimos IME em relação ao Bayesianismo, segundo o qual agentes racionais atualizam seus graus de crença em uma proposição com base em novas evidências e considerações explicativas. Para ilustrar nossa análise, apresentamos o software denominado AI-Descartes, um sistema de Inteligência Artificial de código aberto que combina raciocínio lógico com regressão simbólica, projetado para derivar descobertas científicas a partir de conhecimento axiomático e dados experimentais (Cornelio et al., 2023). Por fim, apresentamos considerações sobre a relevância do estudo da abdução no contexto da Inteligência Artificial.

Recently, approach-avoidance tendencies and visual perception biases have been increasingly studied using bistable point-light walkers (PLWs). Prior studies have found a facing-the-viewer bias when one is primed with general threat stimuli (e.g. angry faces), explained by the “error management theory”, as failing to detect a threat as approaching is riskier than the opposite. Importantly, no study has explored how disease threat – linked to the behavioural immune system – might affect this bias. This study aimed to explore whether disease-signalling cues can alter how we perceive the motion direction of ambiguous PLWs. Throughout 3 experiments, participants indicated the motion direction of a bistable PLW previously primed with a control or disease-signalling stimuli – that is, face with a surgical mask (Experiment 1), sickness sound (Experiment 2), or face with a disease cue (Experiment 3). Results showed that sickness cues do not significantly modulate the perception of approach-avoidance behaviours. However, a pattern emerged in Experiments 2 and 3, suggesting that sickness stimuli led to more facing away percepts. Unlike other types of threat, this implies that disease-related threat stimuli might trigger a distinct perceptual bias, indicating a preference to avoid a possible infection source. Nonetheless, this finding warrants future investigations.

This paper investigates epistemological and ethical implications of the growingavailability of direct-to-consumer genetic testing for the science and society. Direct-toconsumer genetic testing is characterized as the genetic testing sold directly to consumerswithout any assistance from professionals. By offering empowerment and control, companiesconvince consumers to sequence their genome by granting the company access to theirgenetic data in exchange to results that are not always accurate. To which extent doconsumers properly understand the results of their genetic testing? Are consumers aware ofthe possible implications for disclosing genetic information to private companies? I addressthese questions in two steps: firstly, I discuss epistemological implications of thedevelopment of Genomics, understood as a data-intensive science, by delving into thetheoretical commitments of the concept of gene and the notion of circular causality.Secondly, I reflect upon the privacy risks of taking direct-to-consumer genetic testing in adata-rich world. Finally, I draw some conclusions on the possible consequences of direct-toconsumer genetic testing by suggesting key-concepts that may help to clarify the limits andscope of genetic testing.