The Argument from Inductive Risk (AIR) explicitly calls for the consideration of non-epistemic values whenever significant non-epistemic consequences, usually understood as harms towards individuals, groups or society at large, are foreseeable. In current philosophical literature, the AIR is often assumed to have limited relevance to fundamental research, particularly in fields like particle physics which has received little attention. This paper aims to address this gap by developing experiment…
Read moreThe Argument from Inductive Risk (AIR) explicitly calls for the consideration of non-epistemic values whenever significant non-epistemic consequences, usually understood as harms towards individuals, groups or society at large, are foreseeable. In current philosophical literature, the AIR is often assumed to have limited relevance to fundamental research, particularly in fields like particle physics which has received little attention. This paper aims to address this gap by developing experimental particle physics as a problem case for standard formulations of the AIR. I argue that, although errors in particle physics do not consistently give rise to direct socio-ethical consequences of the kind emphasized in the literature, the field nevertheless involves significant forms of epistemic responsibility arising from its technological embeddedness and broader social entanglements. Moreover, I show that the scope of the AIR depends crucially on how risk is conceptualized. While a strictly decision-theoretic framework tends to exclude particle physics by narrowing the notion of risk, alternative approaches from the ethics of technology help capture indirect and uncertain consequences. The paper therefore argues for further refinement of the AIR, rather than its simple extension, and calls for a more explicit and pluralistic account of risk in the assessment of values in science.