Marianne van Panhuys

In this paper, we present technical review practices in High-Energy Physics (HEP) as a collaborative mechanism for managing epistemic risks in the design and upgrade of large-scale detectors. Building on the concept of phronetic risk, which encompasses the epistemic consequences of practical decisions in science-engineering contexts, and drawing on empirical research conducted at the ATLAS collaboration at CERN, we show that technical review facilitates collective deliberation over non-epistemic values, thereby shaping which experimental directions are deemed pursuitworthy. Our analysis highlights an organizational approach to risk management in scientific practice, challenging the predominant focus on individual decision making in the philosophical literature on values in science.

In this paper, we present technical review practices in High-Energy Physics (HEP) as a collaborative mechanism for managing epistemic risks in the design and upgrade of large-scale detectors. Building on the concept of phronetic risk, which encompasses the epistemic consequences of practical decisions in science-engineering contexts, and drawing on empirical research conducted at the ATLAS collaboration at CERN, we show that technical review facilitates collective deliberation over non-epistemic values, thereby shaping which experimental directions are deemed pursuitworthy. Our analysis highlights an organizational approach to risk management in scientific practice, challenging the predominant focus on individual decision-making in the philosophical literature on values in science.

In present-day particle physics, empirical reasoning is highly inferential as experiments rely on complex instruments and an intensive use of computer-based methods. This paper investigates how these methods impact the evidential status of the data produced, using an expanded epistemic risk framework. Based on a case study from a top-quark physics experiment, we clarify the relationship between inductive and other epistemic risks. We argue that various epistemic risks that arise ahead of evidence affect the inductive risk of the experimental results, and propose an understanding of epistemic risk in relation to different epistemic goals. Specifically, the case study shows how experimental tasks and their associated goals relate to the epistemic aim of the experiment, by revealing modalities of risk and risk dynamics throughout the experimental process.