Marie Laplante-Anfossi

In this article, we analyse how coherence should be addressed in critical thinking courses. Our starting point is the fact that, while coherence seems important for rationality and critical thinking, several studies now suggest that thinkers with conspiracy world-views give more importance to coherence than other criteria. However, conspiracy world-views do not (fully) embrace the ideals of rationality and critical thinking. This suggests that some desiderata of rationality or critical thinking can, in isolation, be counterproductive. In response to this puzzle, we first argue that coherence cannot be separated from other desiderata of critical thinking. Becoming more coherent does not necessarily matter if one is unresponsive to the evidence, fails to reason on the basis of justified attitudes, and so forth. Then, we turn to consider the concrete actions that can be implemented in critical thinking courses which would reflect this. Articulating the relationships between the various desiderata of rationality can be difficult in introductory critical thinking courses, since they usually carry different objectives. Still, simple measures can be put in place to give students some guidance. We illustrate our point with marking grids.

In this paper, we analyze how coherence should be addressed in critical thinking courses. Our starting point is the fact that, while coherence seems important for rationality and critical thinking, several studies now suggest that thinkers with conspiracy worldviews give more importance to coherence than other criteria. However, conspiracy worldviews do not (fully) embrace the ideals of rationality and critical thinking. This suggests that some desiderata of rationality or critical thinking can, in isolation, be counterproductive. In response to this puzzle, we first argue that coherence can’t be separated from other desiderata of critical thinking. Becoming more coherent doesn’t necessarily matter if one is unresponsive to the evidence, fails to reason on the basis of justified attitudes, and so forth. Then, we turn to the concrete actions that can be implemented in critical thinking courses that would reflect this. Articulating the relationships between the various desiderata of rationality can be difficult in introductory critical thinking courses, since they usually carry different objectives. Still, simple measures can be put in place to give students some guidance regarding this. We illustrate our point with marking grids.

Recent discussions on the relationship between science and society have led to a political imperative for disseminating knowledge to the lay public that transcends disciplines. I argue that one argument for knowledge dissemination in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) disciplines would also apply to the humanities and social sciences (HSS). I explain the consequences of this transposition by taking the example of research in philosophy. I conclude that the main obstacle to its dissemination is the recognition of a philosophical expertise.