Mariela Aguilera

A great number of investigations suggest that cognition involves both linguistic and cartographic representations. These researches have motivated a pluralist conception of cognition; also, they have been used to clarify how maps differ from linguistic representations. However, the computational processes underlying the interphase between both kinds of representations deserve further attention. In this paper, I argue that, despite their differences, cartographic representations coexist and interact with linguistic representations in interesting ways.

Resumen De acuerdo con Barceló, la posibilidad de la negación pictórica constituye una prueba a favor del externismo lógico porque no depende de encontrar elementos internos en las imágenes que expresan la negación. Propongo analizar la negación pictórica en contextos de razonamiento para mostrar cómo el contenido de una imagen se determina por relaciones lógicas externas. Para ello, propongo restringir el análisis del dominio completo de relaciones lógicas externas a contextos específicos de razonamiento. Lejos de rechazar la variante externista de Barceló, espero de esta forma poner a trabajar sus ideas.Since pictorial negation does not depend on internal elements, it can be conceived as an existential proof for logical externalism. This paper proposes to analyze pictorial negation in the context of reasoning by showing how external logical relations determine the content of images. I suggest for this a local externalism which narrows the analysis to specific reasoning contexts instead of the complete domain of logical relations. Far from rejecting Barceló's externalist alternative, my proposal aims to put his ideas to work.

Since Tolman’s paper in 1948, psychologists and neuroscientists have argued that cartographic representations play an important role in cognition. These empirical findings align with some theoretical works developed by philosophers who promote a pluralist view of representational vehicles, stating that cognitive processes involve representations with different formats. However, the inferential relations between maps and representations with different formats have not been sufficiently explored. Thus, this paper is focused on the inferential relations between cartographic and linguistic representations. To that effect, we appeal to heterogeneous inference with ordinary maps and sentences. In doing so, we aim to build a model to bridge the gap between cartographic and linguistic thought.

To make the case for non-conceptualism, Heck draws on an apparent dichotomy between linguistic and iconic representations. According to Heck, whereas linguistic representations have conceptual content, the content of iconic representations is non-conceptual. Based on the case of cartographic systems, the authors criticize Heck’s dichotomous distinction. They argue that maps are composed of semantically arbitrary elements that play different syntactic roles. Based on this, they claim that maps have a predicative structure and convey conceptual content. Finally, the authors argue that, despite their differences, maps and sentences can logically interact with each other through heterogeneous inferences. These considerations not only challenge the view that conceptual content and inferential processes necessarily involve linguistic representations; furthermore, they provide a new perspective for thinking about maps, their semantics and syntax, and their interaction with linguistic systems.

In “Steps toward Origins of Propositional Thought”, Burge claims that animals of different species are capable of making deductive inferences. According to Burge, that is why propositional thought is extended beyond the human mind to the minds of other kinds of creatures. But, as I argue here, the inferential capacities of animals do not guarantee a propositional structure. According to my argument, propositional content has predicates that might involve a quantificational structure. And the absence of this structure in animal thought might explain some of the differences with the propositional content of human thought.

A great number of investigations suggest that cognition involves both linguistic and cartographic representations. These researches have motivated a pluralist conception of cognition; also, they have been used to clarify how maps differ from linguistic representations. However, the computational processes underlying the interphase between both kinds of representations deserve further attention. In this paper, I argue that, despite their differences, cartographic representations coexist and interact with linguistic representations in interesting ways.

Uno de los argumentos en favor de la dependencia entre lenguaje y conceptos descansa en la premisa de que la posesión de conceptos involucra pensamientos de segundo orden y éstos, a su vez, requieren lenguaje. Este trabajo se centra en una variante de este argumento formulada por José Luis Bermúdez. Sostendré que aun cuando el pensamiento de segundo orden suponga competencia lingüística, no es necesario aceptar esa premisa. Propondré, en cambio, dos condiciones alternativas para la posesión de conceptos, la identificación y la generalidad. Si bien ninguna de ellas conlleva el pensamiento de segundo orden, en forma conjunta reflejan importantes aspectos del pensamiento conceptual

It is often assumed that the capability to make inferences requires language. Against this assumption, I claim that inferential abilities do not necessarily require a language. On the contrary, certain cartographic systems could be used to explain some forms of inferences, and they are capable of warranting rational relations between contents they represent. By arguing that certain maps, as well as sentences, are adequate for inferential processes, I do not mean to neglect that there are important differences between maps and sentences. Instead, the purpose of this paper is to highlight interesting distinctions that might affect the way that cartographic thinking works