Marilena Vlad

This article discusses the problem of the ineffable in Damascius’ treatises De principiis and In Parmenidem. I argue that the ineffable—which is the ultimate principle proposed by Damascius—is also the theme that underlies the whole frame of the reality, in his perspective. Each level of reality that he discusses comes into play on the background of the original attempt to suggest the ineffable principle. Each of them—One, unified, soul, material forms, matter and sensible realm—tries to approximate and suggest the previous level and thus, eventually, the ineffable itself. Consequently, each level of reality develops its own degree of ineffability, and therefore presents itself to our mind in an aporetical manner. It is impossible for our mind to reveal in an exhaustive and noncontradictory fashion even the levels closest to us. The aporiai that are specific for every part of reality are eventually consequences of the original aporia of an absolute and unique principle that governs everything.

Marilena Vlad Cet article se focalise sur le concept de lumière dans les traités du Pseudo-Denys l’Aréopagite Sur les noms divins et La théologie mystique. Le but de l’analyse est de montrer que la lumière n’est pas seulement un nom divin, mais qu’elle a un rôle beaucoup plus complexe dans la pensée de Denys. Premièrement, c’est la lumière qui rend possible le déploiement de tous les noms divins. En outre, elle explique le sens et le fonctionnement du nom divin de « bien ». La lumière est l’essence de ce nom, aussi que de tous les autres noms divins, qu’elle parcourt et unit en une structure originaire. Enfin, son ultime suppression — qui identifie la lumière à son contraire absolu, la ténèbre — engage la suppression de tous les autres noms divins et lumières théologiques, ce qui ouvre vers les plus hauts mystères de la théologie.

This article analyzes the concept of self-constitution in Damascius’ treatises De principiis and In Parmenidem. On the one hand, I try to see how self-constitution functions within the framework of reality. I identify the different levels of self-constituted reality, showing that each of these levels is also constituted by the absolute One, which is the cause of all things. Self-constitution is present throughout the process in which the One is slowly in labor towards plurality, starting from the highest level of intelligible being down to the level of the particular soul. On the other hand, I also try to show how self-constitution appears at a discursive level. In this context I discuss its crucial role in Damascius’ interpretation of the second and third hypotheses in Plato’s dialogue Parmenides.

This paper focuses on Socrates’ intention of examining the Delphic oracle that concerns him. I argue that Socrates does not start out by refuting an apparent meaning of the oracle, as it has been suggested, but rather reacts to the perplexing posture in which the divine message places him. In this sense, the message—which becomes a lifetime mission for Socrates—has a performative sense, even though it does not have an explicit, prescriptive form. I try to show that Socrates’ philosophical life can be understood as a constant attempt to examine, as well as to prove the oracle, and that Socrates’ defense is a final examination and proof of the oracle.

Această carte discută problema fundamentală a neoplatonismului – cea a unui principiu de dincolo de ființă și de gândire – în operele celor mai importanți reprezentanți ai acestui curent filozofic: Plotin, Porfir, Iamblichos, Proclus și Damascius. Este vorba despre una dintre cele mai pasionante înfruntări din istoria filozofiei, care pornește de la câteva indicații enigmatice din dialogurile lui Platon, referitoare la sursa cunoașterii și a ființei lucrurilor. Depășind distincția platonică dintre lumea sensibilă și cea inteligibilă, filozofii neoplatonici au căutat să înțeleagă principiul absolut, numit unu sau bine, care face posibilă lumea inteligibilă însăși și realitatea în ansamblul ei, dar care trece astfel dincolo de ființă și de gândire. Volumul de față urmăreşte modul în care evoluează căutarea principiului – cu intriga, desfăşurarea şi deznodământul ei –, dezvăluind disputele interpretative, directe sau indirecte, ce se ţes între filozofii neoplatonici. Miza analizei este aceea de a arăta că, departe de a reprezentaun „dat“ dogmatic inflexibil, problema principiului de dincolo de fiinţă nu încetează să se adâncească şi să se reformuleze, cu mereu alte dificultăţi, de-a lungul tradiţiei neoplatonice.

Cet ouvrage part d’une question simple dans son énoncé et pourtant complexe dans sa solution : c’est la question du principe unique et absolu du tout. Pourquoi et comment en parler? En quoi résident sa nécessité, son importance et son sens pour la pensée? Cette question trouve une réponse radicale à la fin de la tradition néoplatonicienne, notamment chez Damascius, dans son Traité des premiers principes. Bien que ce problème ait toujours été présent sous le calame des philosophes héritiers de Platon (à commencer par Plotin), ce n’est qu’à la fin de cette tradition – et dans sa phase éminemment critique – que le principe premier a été abordé frontalement, par l’entremise du doute radical, afin d’en acquérir une certitude ultime et d’identifier sa présence subtile dans la réalité, ainsi que dans la pensée elle-même.

_ Source: _Volume 11, Issue 1, pp 46 - 70 In this article, I analyze the idea of “stepping into the void”, which can be traced in the thinking of both Proclus and Damascius, but which sets their perspectives apart. Thus, I show how Proclus warns us that to speak about the absolute principle, taking it as an object of thought, is a negative “stepping into the void” that should be avoided. On the contrary, I show that Damascius starts from this warning and tries to prove that the only adequate manner in which we can trace the absolute principle and approach it is precisely through “stepping into the void,” yet, this time, in a positive sense, as a constant attempt to understand that the principle is an absolute void which reverses our discourse.

One of the major difficulties that the Neoplatonic tradition had to face concerns the relationship between the transcendence and the causality of the first principle. As transcendent, the One – or the absolute Good – must be above the intelligible being, completely different from its nature. As the first cause of the whole reality, the One is still conceived in a certain connection to the intellect. In this article, I discuss the philosophical background of this problem and Proclus’ attempt to solve the apparent contradiction between causality and transcendence. Proclus puts these two aspects in agreement, by stressing the superiority of the principle and by making of it a non-being par excellence.

One of the major difficulties that the Neoplatonic tradition had to face concerns the relationship between the transcendence and the causality of the first principle. As transcendent, the One – or the absolute Good – must be above the intelligible being, completely different from its nature. As the first cause of the whole reality, the One is still conceived in a certain connection to the intellect. In this article, I discuss the philosophical background of this problem and Proclus’ attempt to solve the apparent contradiction between causality and transcendence. Proclus puts these two aspects in agreement, by stressing the superiority of the principle and by making of it a non-being par excellence.

Dans cet article, nous nous concentrons sur le problème du principe premier chez Damascius. La question est celle de savoir dans quelle mesure la discursivité – le fait d’en parler – affecte ce problème et l’accès de notre pensée. Bien que le principe premier se veut indicible, toute tentative de le suggérer ne nous rend qu’une image discursive et donc inadéquate de lui. Toute tentative de raffiner notre perspective sur le principe ne fait que nous en éloigner d’avantage. Quelle est alors la solution de Damascius? Comment peut‑on toujours parler du principe, tout en le reconnaissant indicible? Quel est le rôle du discours dans la saisie du principe? Peut‑il devenir plus qu’une entrave? Nous analysons la manière dont Damascius comprend son propre discours sur le principe et comment il transforme ce discours inévitablement inadéquat, en une manière de produire la conscience du principe. Le principe n’est pas décrit, mais plutôt rendu manifeste par un véritable “travail d’enfantement” de la pensée. Nous analysons les manières de ce travail d’enfantement, afin de montrer comment l’indicible se manifeste à travers lui, sans recevoir une expression concrète, qui risquerait de le transformer en objet de notre pensée. Nous montrerons que le travail d’enfantement n’est pas le signe de l’impossibilité de saisir le principe et d’un indépassable tourment qui accablerait la pensée à cause de cette incapacité. Au contraire, il représente une manière indirecte, non‑descriptive, mais très technique et rigoureuse, dont on peut obtenir la conscience de l’indicible, dans le cadre du discours et par sa médiation.

Dans cet article, nous discutons la première partie de l’aporie du principe premier énoncée par Damascius dans son Traité des premiers principes. La question qui se pose est de savoir quelle est la source de cette aporie qui met face à face le principe et le « tout » de la pensée et de la réalité. L’hypothèse que nous allons argumenter consiste à dire que c’est précisément le sens spécifique du « tout » chez Damascius qui est responsable pour cette aporie. Nous allons discuter la dynamique interne de ce « tout » qui empêche que le principe soit situé « au-delà du tout ».In this article, we discuss the first part of the aporia of the first principle formulated by Damascius in his treatise De principiis. We are trying to identify the source of this aporia that opposes the principle and “all things”. The hypothesis that we are going to argue is that it is precisely the specific sense of the ‘all’ in Damascius’ thought that is responsible for this aporia. We will discuss the inherent dynamics of this ‘all’, which prevents that the principle be situated “above the all”

One of the major difficulties that the Neoplatonic tradition had to face concerns the relationship between the transcendence and the causality of the first principle. As transcendent, the One – or the absolute Good – must be above the intelligible being, completely different from its nature. As the first cause of the whole reality, the One is still conceived in a certain connection to the intellect. In this article, I discuss the philosophical background of this problem and Proclus’ attempt to solve the apparent contradiction between causality and transcendence. Proclus puts these two aspects in agreement, by stressing the superiority of the principle and by making of it a non-being par excellence

Dans cet article, nous nous concentrons sur le problème du principe premier chez Damascius. La question est celle de savoir dans quelle mesure la discursivité – le fait d’en parler – affecte ce problème et l’accès de notre pensée. Bien que le principe premier se veut indicible, toute tentative de le suggérer ne nous rend qu’une image discursive et donc inadéquate de lui. Toute tentative de raffiner notre perspective sur le principe ne fait que nous en éloigner d’avantage. Quelle est alors la solution de Damascius? Comment peut‑on toujours parler du principe, tout en le reconnaissant indicible? Quel est le rôle du discours dans la saisie du principe? Peut‑il devenir plus qu’une entrave? Nous analysons la manière dont Damascius comprend son propre discours sur le principe et comment il transforme ce discours inévitablement inadéquat, en une manière de produire la conscience du principe. Le principe n’est pas décrit, mais plutôt rendu manifeste par un véritable “travail d’enfantement” (ὠδίς) de la pensée. Nous analysons les manières de ce travail d’enfantement, afin de montrer comment l’indicible se manifeste à travers lui, sans recevoir une expression concrète, qui risquerait de le transformer en objet de notre pensée. Nous montrerons que le travail d’enfantement n’est pas le signe de l’impossibilité de saisir le principe et d’un indépassable tourment qui accablerait la pensée à cause de cette incapacité. Au contraire, il représente une manière indirecte, non‑descriptive, mais très technique et rigoureuse, dont on peut obtenir la conscience de l’indicible, dans le cadre du discours et par sa médiation.

One of the major difficulties that the Neoplatonic tradition had to face concerns the relationship between the transcendence and the causality of the first principle. As transcendent, the One – or the absolute Good – must be above the intelligible being, completely different from its nature. As the first cause of the whole reality, the One is still conceived in a certain connection to the intellect. In this article, I discuss the philosophical background of this problem and Proclus’ attempt to solve the apparent contradiction between causality and transcendence. Proclus puts these two aspects in agreement, by stressing the superiority of the principle and by making of it a non-being par excellence.

In this article, I discuss Plotinus. critique of the peripatetic idea of the divine intellect as first principle. As I am trying to show, Plotinus accepts the unity of the intellect as self-thinking, and, even more than Aristotle, he emphasizes this unity. Yet, he insists on the necessity of a principle that is even higher and simpler than the intellect. Eventually, intellect proves to be the unity of a plurality, though it is the most unitary being. I discuss the dual nature of the intellect: both as thinking and as being, intellect is both unitary and plural. Starting from this, I analyze Plotinus' arguments of the absolute one as first principle, above intellect.

In this article, I discuss Plotinus. critique of the peripatetic idea of the divine intellect as first principle. As I am trying to show, Plotinus accepts the unity of the intellect as self-thinking, and, even more than Aristotle, he emphasizes this unity. Yet, he insists on the necessity of a principle that is even higher and simpler than the intellect. Eventually, intellect proves to be the unity of a plurality, though it is the most unitary being. I discuss the dual nature of the intellect: both as thinking and as being, intellect is both unitary and plural. Starting from this, I analyze Plotinus' arguments of the absolute one as first principle, above intellect.