Marilyn Gaye Piety

This article argues that Kierkegaard subscribes to a view of belief formation very much like Hume’s in that, like Hume, Kierkegaard thinks we tend to form beliefs based on the uniformity of repeated experience. But while Hume concluded that this meant belief in miracles was inherently irrational in that miracles were by definition anomalous experiences, Kierkegaard has a more complex view of belief formation than Hume, a view that allows for belief in such anomalous experiences to be rational. That is, this article argues that “reason” (Fornuft) is not synonymous, according to Kierkegaard, with rationality (Fostaaelse), in that reason appears antithetical to the appreciation of the epistemological significance of the relative qualitative differences in experiences. Belief formation, for Kierkegaard, is not based entirely on the quantity of experiences of a certain sort, but also on their quality. Kierkegaard thus appears to reject Hume’s view that belief in miracles “subverts all the principles of [a person’s] understanding,” but appears to agree with Hume that such belief is “contrary to custom” and to much human experience and that hence it needs repeatedly to be renewed through “a continued miracle.”

Christian universalism, or the theory of universal salvation, is increasingly popular among religious thinkers. A small group of scholars has put forward the contentious claim that Kierkegaard was a universalist, despite that he refers in places to the idea of eternal damnation as essential to Christianity. This paper examines the evidence both for and against the view that Kierkegaard was a universalist and concludes that despite Kierkegaard’s occasional references to the importance of the idea of eternal damnation to Christianity, there is reason to believe that Kierkegaard may have been a universalist, both in terms of the substance of his thought, including two unequivocal statements in his journals that he believed everyone would eventually be saved and in terms of his rhetorical style which prioritizes the effect his writings would have on the reader over the literal truth of the views they present.

Almost no work has been done on the substance of Kierkegaard's epistemology. I argue, however, that knowledge plays a much more important role in Kierkegaard's thought than has traditionally been appreciated. ;There are two basic types of knowledge, according to Kierkegaard: "objective knowledge" and "subjective knowledge." I argue that both types of knowledge are associated by Kierkegaard with "certainty" and may be defined as justified true mental representation . I also argue, however, that the meaning of 'certainty,' 'justified' and 'true' is derivative of the object of knowledge. That is, I argue that Kierkegaard employs these expressions in both an objective and subjective sense and that the latter sense is not, as it has often been interpreted to be, subjectivist. ;Finally, I argue that an appreciation of the substance of Kierkegaard's epistemology reveals that the charges of irrationalism which have often been made against him, are without foundation

Kierkegaard is considered by many to be the father of existentialism because he is believed to have asserted that our interpretations of existence are the expression of absolutely free choices, or choices for which no rational criteria can be given. This paper argues that that view is false. It presents a sketch of Kierkegaard position on the nature of human rationality, and argues that according to Kierkegaard, there are rational criteria for choosing between competing interpretations of existence and that people make such choices only with reference to these criteria.

One of the most significant developments in the latter part of the 20th century and the first part of this new millennium has been the triumph of short-term over long-term thinking. We are increasingly a culture that looks neither to the past nor to the future, but only to the next “quarter,” or to the next Delphic pronouncement by Alan Greenspan. This cultural construction of time has given rise to social, political and personal problems of unprecedented magnitude. The short-term focus of contemporary American capitalism is causing us to behave, both individually and collectively, in an increasingly irrational and thus self-destructive manner. Ours is now the most violent, crime-ridden society in the industrialized world. Capitalism is sometimes blamed for this, yet there are other capitalist societies that do not suffer the same evils we suffer. I argue that we can learn from these societies how to correct some of the ills of our own system and in this way construct a new paradigm of the market, a paradigm for the new millennium, a more mature, rational version of capitalism that would focus on the long rather than the short term.

It occasionally happens that a book appears on the philosophical horizon that, despite its obvious virtuosity of style or form, has almost no substantial merit. Such is unfortunately the case with Stephen Dunning’s Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Inwardness. Some allowance should be made, of course, for the fact that, as Dunning himself admits, he is not a Kierkegaard scholar. It is not my intention to adopt what might be identified as a “trade union” perspective on scholarship, but it is important to appreciate that one always puts oneself, or one’s work, at some risk when one ventures into an area of scholarship that is not properly one’s own. Kierkegaard left a legacy of over thirty published works and twenty volumes of journals and papers. Hence the waters of this area of philosophical scholarship are deep indeed and not for one who is unused to swimming in them. Before I launch into any specific criticisms, however, I will provide a brief sketch of the book.