Marina Christodoulou

This essay explores the emotional and philosophical arc of indignation, which begins as a generative force in both ethics and politics, and has come to be understood as a condition, and as both a symptom and an outcome of exhaustion. Beginning with the premise that indignation is both a symptom and a precursor of moral action, my analysis draws on a variety of thinkers, including Stéphane Hessel, Jean-François Mattéi, Alexandre Matheron, and Don Watson. It examines how both individual and collective indignation operate affectively, and how indignation is gradually depleted by repeated exposure to systemic injustice. The essay introduces the concepts of passive indignation, exhausted indignation, and ultimately ontological indignation, culminating in the notion of ontological–existential exhaustion: a condition in which the human being is no longer simply fatigued, but existentially depleted. In this state of utter exhaustion, one lacks not only the will to act but even the horizon within which action is possible, and consequently lacks the will even to be or to live. This essay offers a philosophical diagnosis of a late modern malaise, through the interweaving of classical sources, including Plato and Spinoza, with contemporary critiques of political and affective life. It argues that even in its most diminished state, indignation may persist as a silent ethical residue, pointing not to the end of resistance, but to its transformation.

This paper discusses the concepts of effort, resistance, action-reaction, sense of life, death, and habit as explored by philosophers such as Xavier Bichat, Maine de Biran, and Félix Ravaisson. It highlights the idea that habit is formed as a result of the alternation between external forces and internal resistance. The paper also touches on the role of sensation and tonality in habituation, as well as the individuality of each living being’s vital force. Additionally, it mentions the connection between different “frequency profiles” and the perception of time. Overall the paper at first explores the complex relationship between life, habit, and the human experience, as a preamble in order to then discuss the concept of burnout in contemporary society, particularly in relation to the pressure to achieve and perform.

In this paper, I propose to bring forward the symptom of fatigue, and/ or exhaustion and burnout, brought up by the social-cultural speeds, rhythms, and acceleration, that manifests not only as quotidian tiredness and fatigue but also as what I will call an ontological burnout, that is, as an exhaustion of being as being. I will also refer to the concept of irritability and how I associate it with need, and to the concept of an-irritability (the absence of irritability) and how I associate it with fatigue. In other words, how over-irritability or excessive irritability, mostly as encountered in humans, is a disorder of (bio)-rhythms, and how the constant, intensive satisfaction of need(s) leads to fatigue.

Citation: Marina Christodoulou, “I Own therefore I Am. The Ontology of Property”, In Why Does What Exists Exist? Some Hypotheses on the Ultimate “Why” Question, edited by Mariano L. Bianca,Paolo Piccari. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2021, pp. 169-182. Contributors: Mariano L. Bianca, Konstantinos Boultzis, Marina Christodoulou, Maurizio Ferraris, Marco G. Giammarchi, Enrico Guglielminetti, Roberta Lanfredini, Fabio Minazzi, Crister Nyberg, Paolo Piccari, Paolo Rossi. ISBN (10): 1-5275-6294-8; ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-6294-3 -------------- The concept of Property is what attaches us to Existence, Property, and Life, instead of non-existence, non-Being and Non-life (or Death). I occupy, I possess, I own, therefore I am, therefore I exist. I own a body, therefore, I am a being; I also own a self, therefore I am. What exists exists because we have the notion, the concept, the idea, the habit of property and of ownership. There is something rather than nothing because we own it. Why private property? Because we have the notion, the concept, the idea, the habit of property and of ownership. There is private property because we need to own things, including ourselves, and we need to own because we need to sign and vice versa.

Citation: Christodoulou, Marina. “Philosophical An(n)ales: Laideur Abject Dégoût...comme une allergie à l’Autre (féminin),” (trans. Bertrand Naivin) in Sur la laideur. [Actes du symposium On Ugliness, organizé par Lars Aagaard- Mogensen au Wassard Elea (Ascea, Italie) en juin 2016], edited by d Bertrand Naivin and Lars Aagaard-Mogensen (Paris: Editions Complicités, 20178, 97-109. ISSN: 9782351201435 -------------------- Laideur Abject Dégoût... comme une allergie à l’Autre (féminin) Sur l’art et l’esthétique sexués. Pourquoi le dégoût est-il (ou peut-il être considéré) comme sexiste (phallocratique et misogyne): Une allergie à l’Autre.

Citation: Christodoulou, Marina. “‘To be dead is an unthinkable anomaly’ Reversed Necropolitics and the Death Imaginary.” Lo Sguardo - rivista di filosofia N. 23, 2017 (I) - Reinventare il reale. Jean Baudrillard (2007-2017) a cura di Eleonora de Conciliis, Enrico Schirò, Daniela Angelucci, pp. 127-137. Articolo sottoposto a peer review. Ricevuto il 14/10/2016. Accettato il 12/01/2017. ISSN: 2036-6558 --------- The concept or the theory of Death in the thought of Jean Baudrillard is not given the particular attention it needs. When one speaks of the thought of Baudrillard, one rarely will mention ‘death’ as one of the keywords of his corpus. I think, though, that it deserves such a key place, for three reasons. Firstly, because the theme of Death is a gargantuan concept in the history of Philosophy and it even emerges with the definition of Philosophy itself, since, at least, Plato. Every philosopher, more or less is preoccupied with it, as an archetypical necessity of both human culture and of philosophy in particular. It is always interesting to see how each philosopher or each person thinks on it, as their thoughts on Death are a departure point and an indication of their whole philosophical system or, for non-philosophers, of their whole way of life. Secondly, it is important to examine this theme in Baudrillard because it inseparably interconnects, explains, and is explained by all the other, key, and the less prominent themes in his philosophy. Baudrillard’s thinking might take new dimensions when viewed through his thoughts on Death. Finally, Baudrillard is considered a difficult thinker, because, unlike other philosophers, he grasps themes which people are used to seeing as the pre-occupation or within the realm of fiction, even science-fiction. I would like to show, using simple language, that his philosophy, especially surrounding the subject of Death, is completely naked of any metaphysical, romanticised, fantastic, or fiction-like properties; it is realistic and political.

Stoic philosophers had to face the accusation of incoherence, self-contradiction and Paradoxes since ancient times. Plutarch in his Moralia writes against them; Cicero devotes a separate work on stoic paradoxes. Even in contemporary Literature there are still discussions on the possibility of such an incoherence and existence of paradoxes in the stoic theory. At first glance, stoic Cosmology gives the impression to both accept a kind of Determinism, and at the same time it undoubtedly argues for the moral agent’s freedom of the Will. In pre-stoic or even other contemporary to Stoicism Philosophical Traditions, the definitions that these two terms/concepts are given, fairly accuse as incoherent any Theory that does not set them as “contraries”. Under these types of accusations, the stoic Cosmology and Theory of the Freedom of the Will is often to be included. This phenomenal self-contradiction inside the Principles of Stoicism becomes even more obvious in Epictetus, a philosopher of the Late Stoa. He is interested in practical ethics, thus the phenomenal contradiction gets more lucid. This would have augmented the criticism of the Stoic philosophy for incoherence, if Epictetus had not made his main philosophical aim/target : the clarification of how an agent’s Will can be Free inside a Universe ruled by Fate/Destiny ; namely, a Universe merely Determined by Nature’s/God’s Will. Epictetus’ originality appears in the way he interrelates the concept of Freedom of the Will with the concept of Destiny and Determinism, in order to accomplish their simultaneous co-existence. This approach guards him against being easily accused for incoherence and self-contradiction. Through the unique way he understands and defines the Moral Agency, which is the agent’s internal state/condition/disposition, he steers towards an integrated, accomplished, strong and coherent line of argument. This sturdy declaration is able to support the weight of the Consent to a Free Will, and thus a certain kind Freedom of the moral agent. The excellence of this line of argument is that it can bear also the burden of the Consent to the phenomenally contrary concept of Determinism and Destiny. The elements used to the construction of this argument, which is stretched throughout the whole epictetean corpus can be summarised to a few key concepts, which are: the things which are in our power and the things which are not in our power, the concept of Freedom. These concepts work towards his philosophical targeting, because of the special definition he gives them. Axiomatically Epictetus states that in order for man to be free, it is necessary to be liberated from what the body forces him to do. Desires, passions and beliefs are considered as elements which are external to the moral agent. The moral agent “shrinks” into the Will. Thus man has the capability to free himself from anything external to his Will and therefore to harmonise his own Will to the Will of Nature/God; namely, to will what Nature/God wills and thus never conflict to the external facts. Consequently, Epictetus’ solution, is to include in the category of τά οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν anything that he defines as external to the prohairesis: the desires, beliefs, passions and in general anything the body entails, the external facts. Thus the prohairesis, remains unhindered and it is completely depended on man’s power ; as characteristically Epictetus writes, “not even Zeus himself can overpower” the prohairesis. Dissertation for the MSc Ancient Philosophy (2008-2009) at The University of Edinburgh, supervised by Inna Kupreeva.