•  88
    De Pulchritudine non est Disputandum? A cross‐cultural investigation of the alleged intersubjective validity of aesthetic judgment
    with Florian Cova, Christopher Y. Olivola, Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich, David Rose, Adriano Angelucci, Renatas Berniūnas, Emma E. Buchtel, Amita Chatterjee, Hyundeuk Cheon, In-Rae Cho, Daniel Cohnitz, Vilius Dranseika, Ángeles E. Lagos, Laleh Ghadakpour, Maurice Grinberg, Ivar Hannikainen, Takaaki Hashimoto, Amir Horowitz, Evgeniya Hristova, Yasmina Jraissati, Veselina Kadreva, Kaori Karasawa, Hackjin Kim, Yeonjeong Kim, Minwoo Lee, Carlos Mauro, Masaharu Mizumoto, Sebastiano Moruzzi, Jorge Ornelas, Barbara Osimani, Carlos Romero, Alejandro Rosas, Massimo Sangoi, Andrea Sereni, Sarah Songhorian, Paulo Sousa, Noel Struchiner, Vera Tripodi, Naoki Usui, Alejandro V. del Mercado, Giorgio Volpe, Hrag A. Vosgerichian, Xueyi Zhang, and Jing Zhu
    Mind and Language 34 (3): 317-338. 2018.
    Since at least Hume and Kant, philosophers working on the nature of aesthetic judgment have generally agreed that common sense does not treat aesthetic judgments in the same way as typical expressions of subjective preferences—rather, it endows them with intersubjective validity, the property of being right or wrong regardless of disagreement. Moreover, this apparent intersubjective validity has been taken to constitute one of the main explananda for philosophical accounts of aesthetic judgment.…Read more
  • Il pregiudizio a favore del reale
    with Carola Barbero E. Venanzio Raspa, Andrea Tabarroni, Marina Manotta, Rosaria Egidi, Albeno Voltolini, Arianna Betti, Francesco Orilia, Roberto Poli, and Francesco Armezzani
    rivista di Estetica special Issue. 2005.
  • Karl Popper philosopher of science : proceedings of the conference (edited book)
    with Gino Tarozzi
    Rubbettino. 2006.
    The contributions to this book touch the different aspects of Popper's philosophy of science
  • Strong predictivism, the idea that novel predictions per se confirm theories more than accommodations, is based on a “no miracle” argument from novel predictions to the truth of theories (NMAT). Eric Barnes rejects both: he reconstructs the NMAT as seeking an explanation for the entailment relation between a theory and its novel consequences, and argues that it involves a fallacious application of Occam’s razor. However, he accepts a no miracle argument for the truth of background beliefs (NMABB…Read more
  •  32
    The Underdetermination of Theories and Scientific Realism
    Axiomathes 29 (6): 621-637. 2019.
    The empirical underdetermination of theories is a philosophical problem which until the last century has not seriously troubled actual science. The reason is that confirmation does not depend only on empirical consequences, and theoretical virtues allow to choose among empirically equivalent theories. Moreover, I argue that the theories selected in this way are not just pragmatically or aesthetically better, but more probably true. At present in quantum mechanics not even theoretical virtues all…Read more
  •  46
    Behavioral Circumscription and the Folk Psychology of Belief: A Study in Ethno-Mentalizing
    with David Rose, Machery Edouard, Stephen Stich, Angelucci Adriano, Renatas Berniūnas, Emma E. Buchtel, Amita Chatterjee, Hyundeuk Cheon, In‐Rae Cho, Daniel Cohnitz, Cova Florian, Vilius Dranseika, Eraña Lagos Ángeles, Laleh Ghadakpour, Maurice Grinberg, Ivar Hannikainen, Takaaki Hashimoto, Amir Horowitz, Evgeniya Hristova, Yasmina Jraissati, Veselina Kadreva, Kaori Karasawa, Kim Hackjin, Kim Yeonjeong, Lee Minwoo, Carlos Mauro, Masaharu Mizumoto, Moruzzi Sebastiano, Christopher Y. Olivola, Jorge Ornelas, Barbara Osimani, Carlos Romero, Alejandro Rosas, Sangoi Massimo, Andrea Sereni, Sarah Songhorian, Paulo Sousa, Noel Struchiner, Vera Tripodi, Naoki Usui, del Mercado Alejandro Vázquez, Giorgio Volpe, A. Vosgerichian Hrag, Xueyi Zhang, and Jing Zhu
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3): 193-203. 2017.
    Is behavioral integration a necessary feature of belief in folk psychology? Our data from over 5,000 people across 26 samples, spanning 22 countries suggests that it is not. Given the surprising cross-cultural robustness of our findings, we argue that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, lexicographically ordered: assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely asserts that p, nonlinguistic behavioral evidence is disregard…Read more
  •  49
  •  65
    review and discussion of: John Wright: Explaining science’s success: Understanding how scientific knowledge works. Durham: Acumen, 2012
  •  132
    Levin and Ghins on the “no miracle” argument and naturalism
    European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1): 85-110. 2012.
    On the basis of Levin’s claim that truth is not a scientific explanatory factor, Michel Ghins argues that the “no miracle” argument (NMA) is not scientific, therefore scientific realism is not a scientific hypothesis, and naturalism is wrong. I argue that there are genuine senses of ‘scientific’ and ‘explanation’ in which truth can yield scientific explanations. Hence, the NMA can be considered scientific in the sense that it hinges on a scientific explanation, it follows a typically scientific …Read more
  •  9
    How Deployment Realism withstands Doppelt's Criticisms
    Spontaneous Generations 9 (1): 122-135. 2018.
    Gerald Doppelt claims that Deployment Realism cannot withstand the antirealist objections based on the “pessimistic meta-induction” and Laudan’s historical counterexamples. Moreover it is incomplete, as it purports to explain the predictive success of theories, but overlooks the necessity to explain also their explanatory success. Accordingly, he proposes a new version of realism, presented as the best explanation of both predictive and explanatory success, and committed only to the truth of bes…Read more
  •  183
    Novel Predictions and the No Miracle Argument
    Erkenntnis 79 (2): 297-326. 2014.
    Predictivists use the no miracle argument to argue that “novel” predictions are decisive evidence for theories, while mere accommodation of “old” data cannot confirm to a significant degree. But deductivists claim that since confirmation is a logical theory-data relationship, predicted data cannot confirm more than merely deduced data, and cite historical cases in which known data confirmed theories quite strongly. On the other hand, the advantage of prediction over accommodation is needed by sc…Read more
  •  22
    Defending Deployment Realism against Alleged Counterexamples
    In Javier Cumpa, Greg Jesson & Guido Bonino (eds.), Defending Realism: Ontological and Epistemological Investigations, De Gruyter. pp. 265-290. 2014.
    Criticisms à la Laudan can block the “no miracles” argument for the (approximate) truth of whole theories. Realists have thus retrenched, arguing that at least the individual claims deployed in the derivation of novel predictions should be considered (approximately) true. But for Lyons (2002) there are historical counterexamples even to this weaker “deployment” realism: he lists a number of novel predictions supposedly derived from (radically) false claims. But if so, those successes would seem …Read more
  •  39
    The" No Miracles" Justification of Induction
    Epistemologia 32 (2): 303. 2009.
    Il problema apparentemente insolubile di una giustificazione non circolare dell’induzione diverrebbe più abbordabile se invece di chiederci solo cosa ci assicura che un fenomeno osservato si riprodurrà in modo uguale in un numero potenzialmente infinito di casi futuri, ci chiedessimo anche come si spiega che esso si sia manifestato fin qui in modo identico e senza eccezioni in un numero di casi finito ma assai alto. E’ questa l’idea della giustificazione abduttiva dell’induzione, avanzata in for…Read more
  •  37
    Lewis, Change and Temporary Intrinsics
    Axiomathes 26 (4): 467-487. 2016.
    This is an attempt to sort out what is it that makes many of us uncomfortable with the perdurantist solution to the problem of change. Lewis argues that only perdurantism can reconcile change with persistence over time, while neither presentism nor endurantism can. So, first, I defend the endurantist solution to the problem of change, by arguing that what is relative to time are not properties, but their possession. Second, I explore the anti-perdurantist strategy of arguing that Lewis cannot so…Read more
  •  169
    A.I., Scientific discovery and realism
    Minds and Machines 14 (1): 21-42. 2004.
    Epistemologists have debated at length whether scientific discovery is a rational and logical process. If it is, according to the Artificial Intelligence hypothesis, it should be possible to write computer programs able to discover laws or theories; and if such programs were written, this would definitely prove the existence of a logic of discovery. Attempts in this direction, however, have been unsuccessful: the programs written by Simon's group, indeed, infer famous laws of physics and chemist…Read more
  •  50
    There are two possible realist defense strategies against the pessimistic meta-induction and Laudan’s meta-modus tollens: the selective strategy, claiming that discarded theories are partially true, and the discontinuity strategy, denying that pessimism about past theories can be extended to current ones. A radical version of discontinuity realism is proposed by Gerald Doppelt: rather than discriminating between true and false components within theories, he holds that superseded theories cannot …Read more
  •  6
    Evandro Agazzi’s Scientific Objectivity and its Contexts
    Axiomathes 27 (6): 699-704. 2017.
    Evandro Agazzi’s volume Scientific Objectivity and its Contexts is here introduced. First, the genesis and the content of the book are outlined. Secondly, an overview of Agazzi’s philosophy of science is provided. Its main roots are epistemological realism in the Aristotelian/scholastic tradition, and contemporary science-oriented epistemology, especially in Logical Empiricism. As a result, Agazzi’s thought is nicely balanced between empiricism and rationalism, it avoids gnoseologistic dualism b…Read more
  •  99
    L'equivoco del realismo interno di Hilary Putnam
    Rivista di Filosofia 81 (2): 263-290. 1990.
  •  13
    Stegmüller e la struttura delle teorie
    Scientia 120 (1-2-3-4): 91-115. 1985.
  •  13
    A Critique of Putnam's Antirealism
    Dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park. 1989.
    Many philosophers have shown great interest in the recent anti-realist turn in Hilary Putnam's thought, whereby he rejects "meta-physical realism" in favor of "internal realism". However, many have also found it difficult to gain an exact understanding, and hence a correct assessment of Putnam's ideas. This work strives for some progress on both of these accounts. ;Part one explicates what Putnam understands by "metaphysical realism" and considers to what extent Putnam himself formerly adhered t…Read more
  •  41
    The currently most plausible version of scientific realism is probably “deployment” realism, based on various contributions in the recent literature, and worked out as a unitary account in Psillos. According to it we can believe in the at least partial truth of theories, because that is the best explanation of their predictive success, and discarded theories which had novel predictive success had nonetheless some true parts, those necessary to derive their novel predictions. According to Doppelt…Read more