Mario Natiello

The paper analyses the historical and epistemological rise of instrumentalism in the natural sciences, tracing its roots to the second industrial revolution and focusing particularly on the German scientific and educational system. The authors argue that instrumentalism, understood as the reduction of scientific theories to predictive or utilitarian tools, cannot be separated from the processes of specialisation, state intervention, and the transformation of science into an economic resource. The paper contrasts this instrumentalist approach with the Enlightenment tradition of rational empiricism, emphasising the loss of critical reason, conceptual understanding, and unity of knowledge. The discussion extends to twentieth-century physics, technoscience, and contemporary Artificial Intelligence, which is presented as the ultimate form of instrumental knowledge devoid of genuine understanding.

We discuss instrumentalism as a component of the social changes that accompanied the second industrial revolution, following particularly the case of Germany. These changes constituted a departure from the Enlightenment tradition of natural philosophers towards a new approach to knowledge. We claim that instrumentalism cannot be separated from the disciplining of science that produced the sciences and further specialism, nor can it be separated from the intervention of the State, in representation of society, that conceived science as an economic resource, invested in it, in its teaching and use, making scientific knowledge an instrument of massive use, massively developed. But science as ``economy of thought'' (a view developed by Mach and others) has collateral casualties; ranking first among them is: free reasoning. The changes in education implemented in Prussia and the personalities displayed by the leaders of the new ethos of science produced (as expected) social conditions in which the development of critical reason was impeded. Only instrumental reason developed, thus producing technoscience, a constant development of new techniques (instruments) and a decline in the human constitution of the intellectual elite. The distance between the professional graduated from the universities and logic machines decreased by the improvement of the second and the decline in autonomous, self-controlled reasoning of the former.

In the present essay we attempt to reconstruct Newtonian mechanics under the guidance of logical principles and of a constructive approach related to the genetic epistemology of Piaget and García (Psychogenesis and the history of science, Columbia University Press, New York, 1989). Instead of addressing Newton’s equations as a set of axioms, ultimately given by the revelation of a prodigious mind, we search for the fundamental knowledge, beliefs and provisional assumptions that can produce classical mechanics. We start by developing our main tool: the no arbitrariness principle, that we present in a form that is apt for a mathematical theory as classical mechanics. Subsequently, we introduce the presence of the observer, analysing then the relation objective–subjective and seeking objectivity going across subjectivity. We take special care of establishing the precedence among all contributions to mechanics, something that can be better appreciated by considering the consequences of removing them: (a) the consequence of renouncing logic and the laws of understanding is not being able to understand the world, (b) renouncing the early elaborations of primary concepts such as time and space leads to a dissociation between everyday life and physics, the latter becoming entirely pragmatic and justified a-posteriori (because it is convenient), (c) changing our temporary beliefs has no real cost other than effort. Finally, we exemplify the present approach by reconsidering the constancy of the velocity of light. It is shown that it is a result of Newtonian mechanics, rather than being in contradiction with it. We also indicate the hidden assumption that leads to the (apparent) contradiction.

We present a fully relational definition of inertial systems based in the No Arbitrariness Principle, that eliminates the need for absolute inertial frames of reference or distinguished reference systems as the ``fixed stars'' in order to formulate Newtonian mechanics. The historical roots of this approach to mechanics are discussed as well. The work is based in part in the constructivist perspective of space advanced by Piaget. We argue that inertial systems admit approximations and that what is of practical use are precisely such approximations. We finally discuss a slightly larger class of systems that we call ``relatively inertial'' which are the fundamental systems in a relational view of mechanics.

While mechanics was developed under the idea of reciprocal action (interactions), electromagnetism, as we know it today, takes a form more akin to unilateral action. Interactions call for spatial relations, unilateral action calls for space, just one reference centre. In contrast, interactions are matters of relations that require at least two centres. The development of the relational electromagnetism encouraged by Gauss appears to stop around 1870 for reasons that are not completely clear but are certainly not solely scientific. By the same time, Maxwell recognised the equivalence in formulae of his electromagnetism and the one advocated by Gauss and called for an explanation of why such theories so differently conceived have such a large part in common. In this work we reconstruct and update the relational electromagnetism up to the contributions of Lorentz guided by the non-arbitrariness principle (NAP) that requests arbitrary choices to be accompanied by groups of symmetries. We show that a-priori there must be two more symmetries in electromagnetism, one related to the breaking (in the description) of the relation source/detector and one relating all the perceptions of the same source by detectors moving with different (constant) relative velocities. We show that the idea of electromagnetic waves put forward in concept by Lorenz (1861-1863) before Maxwell (1865) and in formulae (1867) just after Maxwell, together with the ``least action principle'' proposed by Lorentz are enough to derive Maxwell's equations, the continuity equation and the Lorentz' force, and that there is a dual formulation in terms of fields of the receiver (as opposed to fields of the source). While Galilean transformations are associated with removing the arbitrariness implied in the election of a reference space, they will not explicitly appear in a formulation based upon a relational space although we occasionally mention their usefulness. In contrast, Lorentz' transformations will emerge in this formulation involving the relations between the perceived fields of different receivers. Moreover, the role of the full Poincaré-Lorentz group as a group of transformations of the perceived actions is elucidated. In summary, we answer Maxwell's philosophical question showing how the same theory in formulae can be abduced using different inferred entities. Each form of abduction implies as well an interpretation and a facilitation of the theoretical construction. This work relies heavily on logical concepts as abduction put forward by C. Peirce, needed for the construction of theories.

This book attempts to reconstruct elementary physics in full compliance with reason, thus continuing the work of philosophers (experimental and mathematical) throughout the centuries. The unabridged Newton's mechanics is recovered, Gauss intuitions about relational electromagnetism are developed and completed and Schrödingers undulatory quantum theory is reproposed, unifying all three theories in one formulation, and connecting with psychological and philosophical works, as well as with the historical context. Out of the development of the three fundamental theories in physics spawns a discussion about how general scientific theories evolve, as well as the decisive role of reason highlighted through its "marvelous self-correcting property" (Peirce).

We integrate dualistic conceptions of the real with Peirce's perspectives about reality and abduction, emphasizing the concept of reason underlying Peirce's thoughts. Peirce's abduction is related to the notions of retrogression and grounding in Hegel, later re-encountered in Hansonian-abduction. Abduction in turn is considered in relation to abstraction acquiring its fullest sense as a stage in the process of producing a theory. The process is iterative and self improving, it incorporates ``turbid thinking'' making it increasingly ``clear'' at successive iterations that incorporate the lessons taught by failed predictions, i.e., refutations. The cycle of thoughts promoted by doubts comes to rest when belief is reached. We discuss how this coming to rest depends on a criterion for cessation of doubts. The observation is illustrated with two different criteria, one proposed by Mach that only demands analogy and the criteria of dualists such as Goethe and Whewell that inspire the present work. Hence, it is possible to produce, and socially accept, imperfect theories unless we demand the highest level of rationality, avoiding any leftover of the turbid thoughts that have been used in the early developments. This work rests upon the existence of some objective form of reason. Influenced by a constructivist, Piagetian, perspective of science, we propose and discuss a small number of conditions that we identify as characteristics of rational abduction: rules for the rational construction of theories. We show how a classical example of belief that satisfies today's most common definition of abduction does not match the standards of rational retroduction. We further show how the same rules indicate the partial detachment of Special Relativity from the observable world, a fact actually known to Einstein. We close arguing that there is an urgent need to develop a critical epistemology incorporating dualistic perspectives.

We analyse Peirce's original idea concerning abduction from the perspective of a critical philosophy, the same philosophy in Peirce's background. Peirce's realism is directly related to reason and experience and has ties with the idea of abstraction. We show how the philosophical environment of science abruptly changed, specially for physics, in the last period of the XIX century and the initial period of the XX century, when science was divided in disciplines and set free from the control of philosophy. The phenotype of the physicist changed from abstract into imaginative thinker. Further, abstraction was linked to metaphysics and attacked as such. Elements of phantasy and dogmatism entered the scene in place of abstraction alongside ideas taken from the observable world. We provide evidence that the scientists of the newer kind had problems understanding those of the older school. As a consequence of the problems arisen in conciliating the idea of science grounded in experience and reason with the science actually practised, the former conceptualisation was abandoned. Abduction was then expelled from science. In the late part of the XX century and the early part of our century abduction re-emerged but without its scientific attributes. Influenced by a constructivist, Piagetian, perspective of science, we propose and discuss a small number of conditions that we identify as characteristics of rational abduction: rules for the rational construction of theories. We show how a classical example of belief that satisfies today's most common definition of abduction does not match the standards of scientific retroduction. We further show how the same rules indicate the detachment of Special Relativity from the observable world, a fact actually known to Einstein. Finally, the same rules indicate the initial point in the path to re-conciliate Electromagnetism with the classical view of spatial relations, a matter not possible for the imaginative scientist but not extremely difficult for the abstract scientist. We close arguing that there is an urgent need to develop a critical epistemology, and to give room in science for the abstract scientist.

We present an epistemological schema of natural sciences inspired by Peirce's pragmaticist view, stressing the role of the \emph{phenomenological map}, that connects reality and our ideas about it. The schema has a recognisable mathematical/logical structure which allows to explore some of its consequences. We show that seemingly independent principles as the requirement of reproducibility of experiments and the Principle of Sufficient Reason are both implied by the schema, as well as Popper's concept of falsifiability. We show that the schema has some power in demarcating science by first comparing with an alternative schema advanced during the first part of the 20th century which has its roots in Hertz and has been developed by Einstein and Popper. Further, the identified differences allow us to focus in the construction of Special Relativity, showing that it uses an intuited concept of velocity that does not satisfy the requirements of reality in Peirce. While the main mathematical observation connected with this issue has been known for more than a century, it has not been investigated from an epistemological point of view. A probable reason could be that the socially dominating epistemology in physics does not encourage such line of work. We briefly discuss the relation of the abduction process presented in this work with discussions regarding ``abduction'' in the literature and its relation with ``analogy''.

Abstract We examine the construction of electromagnetism in its current form, and in an alternative form, from a point of view that combines a minimal realism with strict rational demands. We begin by discussing the requests of reason when constructing a theory and next, we follow the historical development as presented in the record of original publications, the underlying epistemology (often explained by the authors) and the mathematical constructions. The historical construction develops along socio-political disputes (mainly, the reunification of Germany and the second industrial revolution), epistemic disputes (at least two demarcations of science in conflict) and several theories of electromagnetism. Such disputes resulted in the militant adoption of the ether by some, a position that expanded in parallel with the expansion of Prussia. This way of thinking was facilitated by the earlier adoption of a standpoint that required, as a condition for understanding, the use of physical hypothesis in the form of analogies; an attitude that is antithetic to Newton's “hypotheses non fingo”. While the material ether was finally abandoned, the epistemology survived in the form of “substantialism” and a metaphysical ether: the space. The militants of the ether attributed certainties regarding the ether to Faraday and Maxwell, when they only expressed doubts and curiosity. Thus, the official story is not the real history. This was achieved by the operation of detaching Maxwell's electromagnetism from its construction and introducing a new game of formulae and interpretations. Large and important parts of Maxwell work are today not known, as for example, the rules for the transformation of the electromagnetic potentials between moving systems. When experiments showed that all the theories based in the material ether were incorrect, a new interpretation was offered: Special Relativity (SR). At the end of the transformation period a pragmatic view of science, well adapted to the industrial society, had emerged, as well as a new protagonist: the theoretical physicist. The rival theory of delayed action at distance initiated under the influence of Gauss was forgotten in the midst of the intellectual warfare. The theory is indistinguishable in formulae from Maxwell's and its earlier versions are the departing point of Maxwell for the construction of his equations. We show in a mathematical appendix that such (relational) theory can incorporate Lorentz' contributions as well as Maxwell's transformations and C. Neumann's action, without resource to the ether. Demarcation criteria was further changed at the end of the period making room for habits and intuitions. When these intuited criteria are examined by critical reason (seeking for the fundaments) they can be sharpened with the use of the Non Arbitrariness Principle, which throws light over the arbitrariness in the construction of SR. Under a fully rational view SR is not acceptable, it requires to adopt a less demanding epistemology that detaches the concept from the conception, such as Einstein's own view in this respect, inherited from Hertz. In conclusion: we have shown in this relevant exercise how the reality we accept depends on earlier, irrational, decisions that are not offered for examination but rather are inherited from the culture.

In the present essay we attempt to reconstruct Newtonian mechanics under the guidance of logical principles and of a constructive approach related to the genetic epistemology of Piaget and García. Instead of addressing Newton’s equations as a set of axioms, ultimately given by the revelation of a prodigious mind, we search for the fundamental knowledge, beliefs and provisional assumptions that can produce classical mechanics. We start by developing our main tool: the no arbitrariness principle, that we present in a form that is apt for a mathematical theory as classical mechanics. Subsequently, we introduce the presence of the observer, analysing then the relation objective–subjective and seeking objectivity going across subjectivity. We take special care of establishing the precedence among all contributions to mechanics, something that can be better appreciated by considering the consequences of removing them: the consequence of renouncing logic and the laws of understanding is not being able to understand the world, renouncing the early elaborations of primary concepts such as time and space leads to a dissociation between everyday life and physics, the latter becoming entirely pragmatic and justified a-posteriori, changing our temporary beliefs has no real cost other than effort. Finally, we exemplify the present approach by reconsidering the constancy of the velocity of light. It is shown that it is a result of Newtonian mechanics, rather than being in contradiction with it. We also indicate the hidden assumption that leads to the contradiction.