Marius Baumann

Das Kapitel geht der Frage nach, wie sich der Utilitarismus zu einer der neusten Fortentwicklungen des Konsequentialismus, der sogenannten Konsequentialisierung, positionieren sollte. Gemäß der Konsequentialisierung können die Einzelfallurteile, die aus jeder (plausiblen) nonkonsequentialistischen Theorien folgen, vom Konsequentialismus kopiert werden. Dies ist auf den ersten Blick attraktiv, erlaubt es doch scheinbar, die strukturell attraktiven Eigenschaften des Utilitarismus mit Einzelfallurteilen zu verbinden, die weniger kontraintuitiv sind. Doch der Schein trügt. Zum einen erfordert die Konsequentialisierung strukturelle Modifikationen, die ihre Attraktivität stark einschränken. Zum anderen ist höchst zweifelhaft, ob die Konsequentialisierung noch in eine Reihe mit früheren Entwicklungen des Konsequentialismus gestellt werden kann. Stattdessen scheint die Konsequentialisierung auf eine Form von Unterbestimmtheit hinauszulaufen, die mehr Probleme schafft, als sie löst.

In diesem Beitrag gehen wir der Frage nach, ob Utilitarismus und Liberalismus miteinander kompatible Theoriefamilien sind. Dabei unterscheiden wir zwischen zwei Arten der Kompatibilität, rein extensionaler und explanatorischer Kompatibilität. Wir argumentieren, dass es plausibel ist, dass Utilitarismus und Liberalismus rein extensional miteinander kompatibel sind, sie also trotz offensichtlicher struktureller Unterschiede auf Ebene der Handlungsempfehlungen zu den gleichen Schlüssen kommen können. Dies hängt allerdings von verschiedenen empirischen Annahmen ab. Explanatorische Kompatibilität, also Kompatibilität auf der Ebene der Rechtfertigung dieser Handlungsempfehlungen, ist deutlich schwerer oder vielleicht gar nicht zu erreichen. Dies wird besonders augenscheinlich, wenn wir uns den Libertarismus als extremste Ausprägung der liberalen Tradition ansehen.

In normative ethics, a small number of moral theories, such as Kantianism or consequentialism, take centre stage. Conventional wisdom has it that these individual theories posit very different ways of looking at the world. In this book Marius Baumann develops the idea that just as scientific theories can be underdetermined by data, so can moral theories be underdetermined by our considered judgments about particular cases. Baumann goes on to ask whether moral theories from different traditions might arrive at the same verdicts while remaining explanatorily incompatible. He applies this idea to recent projects in normative ethics, such as Derek Parfit's On What Matters and so-called consequentializing and deontologizing, and outlines its important implications for our understanding of the relationship between the main moral traditions as well as the moral realism debate. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

In this paper, I introduce a new challenge to moral realism: the skeptical argument from moral underdetermination. The challenge arises as a consequence of two recent projects in normative ethics. Both Parfit and a group called consequentializers have independently claimed that the main traditions of normative theories can agree on the set of correct particular deontic verdicts. Nonetheless, as Dietrich and List :421–479, 2017) and myself :191–221, 2018; Australas J Philos 97:511–527, 2019; Ethical Theory Moral Pract 24:999–1018, 2021a) have argued, the traditions still disagree about why these are the correct verdicts. This means that we can understand the situation in terms of an idea from the philosophy of science, the underdetermination of theory by the evidence. Yet underdetermination figures in one of the most important skeptical challenges to scientific realism. I show how an analogous skeptical argument can be construed for the moral realm. I propose a standard form for that argument. I then defend it against three possible objections, arguing that it is at least as plausible as, if not more plausible than, its counterpart in the philosophy of science.

Theodore Sider has argued that while there are some philosophical debates about which there is no fact of the matter, debates in normative ethics are likely not among them. This essay investigates a possible counterexample: the debate about so-called dirty hands. The essay first surveys several cases where No-Fact-of-the-Matter (NFM) claims have been made. Taking its cue from these cases, it then outlines two strategies that factualists about some domain can take, as well as two non-factualist counter strategies. Next, it shows how an NFM claim can be defended for the debate about dirty hands. Finally, it argues that this NFM claim is at least as, if not more, plausible for normative ethics as it is for the other instances where NFM claims have been made.

I outline a dilemma for Derek Parfit’s project to vindicate moral realism. In On What Matters, Parfit argues that the best versions of three of the main moral traditions agree on a set of moral principles, which should make us more confident about the prospects of truth in ethics. I show that the result of this Convergence Argument can be interpreted in two ways. Either there remain three separate and deontically equivalent theories or there remains just one theory, the Triple Theory. Both interpretations fail to deliver what Parfit is looking for. The first interpretation leads to a situation of underdetermination of theory choice that gives rise to a skeptical challenge. The second interpretation jettisons Parfit’s Conciliatory Project, that is, the reconciliation of the three moral traditions. The dilemma, I contend, is the result of Parfit failing to resolve two antithetical lines of thought. His search for the Trinity of moral theorizing must thus fail.