Mark Anthony Dacela

This paper provides added foundational support to the three proffered paradigms of artificial intelligence in education. Specifically, it gives a preliminary analysis of the key epistemic aims present in each of the said frameworks. In order to account for the different ways in which artificial intelligence-related educational strategies have been employed to address issues in learning and instruction, three paradigms have been previously put forward: AI-directed (learner-as-recipient), AI-supported (learner-as-collaborator), and AI-empowered (learner-as-leader). In this paper, it is argued that the different standard views on what ought to be the objectives of education (i.e., philosophical theories that highlight knowledge and truth, critical thinking, intellectual virtues, and understanding) manifest themselves distinctly in these three paradigms. Moreover, apart from epistemically grounding the differing artificial intelligence in education frameworks, this study also demonstrates that more complex models, in principle, could espouse a greater number of epistemic aims.

Deathbots are artificial intelligence tools that enable the possibility of encountering deceased loved ones. The advancement of Large Language Models in deathbots makes the imitation of the deceased possible by inputting personal data, messages, photos, and videos. Such AI systems can process new information and provide appropriate responses while mimicking the dead, offering the bereaved a way to sustain connections with them. However, we claim that deathbots put at risk a special kind of knowledge that we can only acquire from grief. In this paper, we hold that grief provides irreplaceable moral insight, illuminating the unique bond between individuals and fostering an appreciation of human goodness. By offering an artificial replacement for this natural process, deathbots may inadvertently prevent grievers from engaging with the true depth of loss and the moral reflection that it inspires. This paper explores how deathbots reshape the grieving experience, potentially distorting the moral dimensions of loss and deterring grievers from the introspection that comes with grieving. We argue that deathbots potentially deprive grievers of having the sort of transformative moral knowledge that arises from the experience of coming to terms with losing someone in its full, unmediated reality.

Delusional beliefs are often associated with mental illness, and it is linked with schizophrenia spectrum and delusional disorder. Delusions are characterized as a failure of reasoning, and patients with delusions typically view their actions as caused by impervious beliefs. For this reason, a person with delusions loses their sense of agency and ownership, which is usually treated as an excusing condition for moral responsibility. We argue that this is not true in all cases. Lisa Bortolotti claims that some delusional beliefs contribute to achieving the patient’s epistemic goals and maintaining their sense of epistemic agency. Following this, we offer an analysis of patients with delusional beliefs to show that in cases where such beliefs remain epistemically functional, a patient could still be morally responsible. Our analysis is twofold: 1) we discuss the basis of moral exemption for a person with delusions owing to mental illness, and then 2) we examine the epistemic value of delusional belief in schizophrenia spectrum cases, its significance in epistemic agency, and what this implies for moral responsibility.

Delusional beliefs are often associated with mental illness, and it is linked with schizophrenia spectrum and delusional disorder. Delusions are characterized as a failure of reasoning, and patients with delusions typically view their actions as caused by impervious beliefs. For this reason, a person with delusions loses their sense of agency and ownership, which is usually treated as an excusing condition for moral responsibility. We argue that this is not true in all cases. Lisa Bortolotti claims that some delusional beliefs contribute to achieving the patient’s epistemic goals and maintaining their sense of epistemic agency. Following this, we offer an analysis of patients with delusional beliefs to show that in cases where such beliefs remain epistemically functional, a patient could still be morally responsible. Our analysis is twofold: 1) we discuss the basis of moral exemption for a person with delusions owing to mental illness, and then 2) we examine the epistemic value of delusional belief in schizophrenia spectrum cases, its significance in epistemic agency, and what this implies for moral responsibility.

Medical populism, a performance-based political style that orchestrates antagonistic relations between the people and medical establishments, has served as a concept for analyzing the politicization of healthcare. With its four fundamental features, that is, invoking knowledge claims contrary to medical experts’ advice, simplifying discourse, dramatizing responses to public health crises, and forging divisions, medical populism compromises our access to accurate medical or public health information. Populist leaders abuse their epistemic authority and betray public trust when they propagate false information, medical or otherwise. And insofar as accurate medical or public health information is an epistemic good that we have the right to access, and not having so harms us precisely as knowers, we claim that medical populism violates our epistemic rights.

In ‘The Case of Patient Smith: Pain-Belief, Epistemic Luck, and Acquaintance,’ Elliott Crozat challenged the infallibility of the belief that “I feel pain” by providing a Gettier-type example that shows that such a pain-belief can be fallibly justified and luckily true. We claim that this move is problematic given that the case is not the Gettier sort. To demonstrate this, we first question the causal relation or lack thereof between the subject’s pain-belief and the pain he felt. We argue that this leads us to a dilemma. Either the painbelief and the pain are causally connected or not. If there is a causal connection, the subject’s true belief is justified, not epistemically lucky, and therefore qualifies as knowledge. If we grant no causal connection, we show that this leads to either an unjustified pain-belief or a justified false one. The result of both horns shows that Crozat’s Gettier-type example does not qualify as a bona fide Gettier case.

This article is a general introduction to the psychology of reasoning. Specifically, it focuses on the dual process theory of human cognition. Proponents of the said two-system view hold that human cognition involves two processes (viz., System 1 and System 2). System 1 is an automatic, intuitive thinking process where judgments and reasoning rely on fast thinking and ready-to-hand data. On the other hand, System 2 is a slow, logical cognitive process where our judgments and reasoning rely on reflective, careful analysis and data evaluation. Supposedly, these two cognitive processes are at play in every thinking task, and they sometimes work together and sometimes go against each other.