Mark Crooks

Suggestions and arguments put forward by the philosophers Herbert Feigl, Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty, and Paul Churchland are critiqued as to the feasibility of a “direct,” quasi-perceptual apprehension of neural states through neuroscience-informed introspection. The conceptual origins of this presumptuous direct introspecting are shown to be derivative from a scientifically inadequate theory of philosophical realism. Direct perception and its integral realist theory, as well as an analogical equation of perception with introspection, are focused as to their inherent intelligibility and coherence with sensory psychology. Claims of nominal intertheoretic identities are reviewed as to possible mind–brain applications. A summary elucidation of the known nature of perception and its phenomenology reveals that though there may be an initial plausibility given to a projected direct introspection of brain from a supposed equally direct perception of stimuli, once the latter is definitively rejected from considerations of psychology, so its extrapolation to nominal brain introspection must be rejected

Traditional epistemology has had an overriding emphasis since Descartes upon knowing, certainty, and truth, said to be obtained through cogitation. An alternative epistemology would emphasize cognitive meaning, ambiguity, and meaninglessness within a presumptive scheme of semantiks, in contrast to the gnostic Cartesian model. Thereby cognition becomes naturalized and intelligible within the framework of biological evolution, in which species-characteristic forms of intelligence may be seen to unfold through phylogeny. Both scientific advance and pedestrian reasoning may be fruitfully interpreted by this novel focus upon cognitive meaning devoid of any epistemic function professedly providing psychological or objective “certainty.” Objective rationality as a whole may be seen to emerge solely from the operations of understanding itself within individual and cultural contexts. Suggestions are given as to the structure and dynamics of comprehension that generate species-characteristic forms of cognitive meaning. Requests for reprints should be sent to Mark Crooks, Institute of Mind and Behavior, P.O. Box 522, Village Station, New York City, New York 10014. Email: [email protected] or [email protected]

A recurrent candidate for exemplification of intertheoretic reduction, put forward over past decades within philosophy of science, is the proposition "pitch is identical with sound-frequency." Paul Churchland revives this nominal ontological reduction, placing it beside others as "lightning is an electrical discharge," and "heat is high kinetic energy." Yet no matter whether frequency is considered physically or merely semantically, there is no conceivable format in which such an identity is viable. An analysis of objective qualia said to represent the ground of such equations indicates their fictitious existence, save as misidentified percepts. The criterion of logical identity cannot bridge sensory and stimulus field divisions of perception, hence Churchland's objective qualia, said to straddle both fields, cannot furnish an intelligible or sound basis for identification. Naive realism and its intellectualization as direct realism are shown to be at bottom of confoundment of these fields, generating pseudo-problems involving the putative nature and localization of qualia. These conclusions collectively would then disallow the usual attempts to extrapolate from such fictive identities to a further positing of mind-brain identity, by analogy therewith. It is suggested that the method employed in refutation of "pitch is frequency" may have a more general application. The misemployment of the concept and method of intertheoretical identification in connection with phenomenological experience and science of perception is made explicit

The systematic phenomenology-denial within the works of Paul and Patricia Churchland is critiqued as to its coherence with the known elelmentary physics and physiology of perception. Paul Churchland misidentifies "qualia" with psychology's sensorimotor schemas, while Patricia Churchland illicitly propounds the intertheoretic identities of logical empiricism while rejecting the premises upon which those identities are based. Their analogies from such arguments to an identity of mind and brain thus have no inductive probability.

The evolution of nervous systems culminating in human consciousness might best be studied through an analysis of wakefulness and its constituent functions of sentience and cognition. The operative assumption in this model is that wakefulness emerged at the dawn of phylogeny and has been successively in-formed by an increasing complexity of sensory and cognitive functions. Wakefulness constitutes the essence of human consciousness but the cognitive and sentient functions complicate the analysis of the forms of awareness afforded to lower species. Folk psychology is recognized as a proper starting point for the analysis, as against a philosophical behaviorism that dispenses with the supposition of infrahuman sentience. The concepts of a dim awareness and instinctive automatisms, hitherto applied to non-human animals, are shown to confuse the dimness of primitive sensory and cognitive processing with a phylogenetically invariant wakefulness that, by hypothesis, cannot be attenuated in any species. Mundane behavioral evidence from infrahumans must remain the touchstone by which models of consciousness are to be assessed, not any program interpreting empirical evidence to the end of outlawing phenomenal experience in humans or infrahumans.

: Daniel Dennett's philosophical abolition of mind is examined with reference to its methodology, intent, philosophic origins, and internal consistency. His treatment of the contents of perception and introspection is shown to be derivative from realist reductionist misinterpretations of physics, physiology, and phenomenology of perception. In order to rectify inconsistencies of that realistic paradigm devolved from psycho-neural identity theory of mid-twentieth century, Dennett radicalizes its logic and redefines even veridical phenomenology of exteroception to be "illusory." This measure in extremis still does not save the appearances of his predecessors, nevertheless, for Dennett tacitly presupposes the existence of veridical phenomenology in his very treatment of non-veridical sensory phenomena that he uses to argue analogically from, to thereby suggest the plausibility of a parallel illusoriness of veridical phenomena of perception and introspection. This inhering inconsistency renders unsound Dennett's radical extension of the logic of identity theory, and ironically shows up the persistence of mental phenomenology that extant reductionism appears so desirous to argumentively eliminate. Nonetheless there is much to be learned from such an analysis of Dennett's purported elimination of mental contents, for a generalization of our critique throws light on the occult assumptions underlying realism and reductionism since early identity theory and its variants, and upon the possible viability of that programme as a whole., Someone does a sum in his head. He uses the result, let's say, for building a bridge or a machine[horizontal ellipsis]. There surely must have been calculation going on, and there was. For he knows that, and how, he calculated; and the correct result he got would be inexplicable without calculation.-But what if I said: "It strikes him as if he had calculated[horizontal ellipsis]." (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, [S] 364), My debt to Wittgenstein is large and longstanding. When I was an undergraduate, he was my hero[horizontal ellipsis]. I gave up trying to "be" a Wittgensteinian, and just took what I thought I had learned from the Investigations and tried to put it to work. ( Dennett, 1991, p. 463), (C) 2003 by the American Psychological Association

Rejoinders to Robert Bishop, John Smythies, and Edmond Wright concerning my paper Phenomenology in Absentia: Dennett's Philosophy of Mind. The untoward social and moral consequences of Daniel Dennett's heterophenomenology are documented. Rhetorical methodology, fallacious reasoning, and lack of empirical support for a philosophical abolition of consciousness and phenomenology are exposed. Consciousness denial by Dennett is shown to proceed by the same fallacious method involved in his phenomenological nihilism. Additional arguments are adduced against the presumed nonexistence of veridical and non-veridical percepts, as interpreted by elementary science of perception, and as this implicates a more general critique of naive realism and its applications to such hypothetical scenarios as our actual existence within cranial vats and the so-called inverted spectrum argument devolved from Locke. 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

Defenses of realist reductionism may involve petitio principii by a tacit and inadvertent reintroduction of naïve realism through continued supposition of stimulus and sensory fields' conflation. The legitimate meaningfulness of identity statements involving scientific discoveries is examined, as are their illicit or gratuitous expressions. While experimental psychological data has a role to play in refutation of direct realism, we should not underestimate the ingenuity of its proponents' extenuations , hence the need for emphasizing the logic of perceptual processes for conclusive refutation of philosophic realism. A further instance of Paul Churchland's misinterpretation of psychophysical correspondence as intertheoretic identification is given, concerning Edwin Land's retinex theory of color vision

Traditional epistemology has had an overriding emphasis since Descartes upon knowing, certainty, and truth, said to be obtained through cogitation. An alternative epistemology would emphasize cognitive meaning, ambiguity, and meaninglessness within a presumptive scheme of semantiks, in contrast to the gnostic Cartesian model. Thereby cognition becomes naturalized and intelligible within the framework of biological evolution, in which species-characteristic forms of intelligence may be seen to unfold through phylogeny. Both scientific advance and pedestrian reasoning may be fruitfully interpreted by this novel focus upon cognitive meaning devoid of any epistemic function professedly providing psychological or objective “certainty.” Objective rationality as a whole may be seen to emerge solely from the operations of understanding itself within individual and cultural contexts. Suggestions are given as to the structure and dynamics of comprehension that generate species-characteristic forms of cognitive meaning