Mark Johnston

This chapter distinguishes the clusters of psychologically real heuristics that govern our use of terms—the “psi-concepts”—from the “phi-concepts” or meanings that are the semantic determinants of the extensions of the terms in question, and hence of the truth-conditions of the sentences that contain those terms. Concerning the psi-concepts the chapter proposes a new, empirically motivated, and philosophically consequential amendment to both the theory-theory and the prototype theory, namely the generic encoding hypothesis: the heuristics which typically guide our use of terms by exploiting prevalence, cue-validity, and causal explanatory structure are properly formulated in generic terms. The chapter then explores the philosophical consequences of the generic encoding hypothesis, exploring its destructive impact on the method of cases (with particular attention to its use in the philosophy of personal identity), philosophical analysis, the “normativity of meaning,” and the idea that we know how to use terms by grasping meanings.

God’s creative act, if genuinely free, would ground the existence of creatures without necessitating them. Since God is perfectly responsive to reason, his freely creating requires that he have an adequate but non-coercive reason to create. A coercive reason for an act is one that outweighs the reasons for any alternative act, whereas an adequate reason is one that is not outweighed by the reasons in favor of any alternative act. How, in the absence of an offsetting reason not to create, is God’s adequate reason not also a coercive reason, i.e., one that would necessitate creation? Chapter 7 argues that God’s creating and God’s remaining within himself each have to be understood as determinate manners in which God may affirm his own unsurpassable goodness. Cantorian reflections are then deployed to explain how God’s extra, i.e., un-offset, reason to create does not give him more of a reason to create than to not create. Finally, God’s actual reason to create is identified.

In this book, Mark Johnston argues that God needs to be saved not only from the distortions of the "undergraduate atheists" (Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens, and Sam Harris) but, more importantly, from the idolatrous tendencies of religion itself. Each monotheistic religion has its characteristic ways of domesticating True Divinity, of taming God's demands so that they do not radically threaten our self-love and false righteousness. Turning the monotheistic critique of idolatry on the monotheisms themselves, Johnston shows that much in these traditions must be condemned as false and spiritually debilitating. A central claim of the book is that supernaturalism is idolatry. If this is right, everything changes; we cannot place our salvation in jeopardy by tying it essentially to the supernatural cosmologies of the ancient Near East. Remarkably, Johnston rehabilitates the ideas of the Fall and of salvation within a naturalistic framework; he then presents a conception of God that both resists idolatry and is wholly consistent with the deliverances of the natural sciences. Princeton University Press is publishing Saving God in conjunction with Johnston's forthcoming book Surviving Death, which takes up the crux of supernaturalist belief, namely, the belief in life after death.

In this extraordinary book, Mark Johnston sets out a new understanding of personal identity and the self, thereby providing a purely naturalistic account of surviving death. Death threatens our sense of the importance of goodness. The threat can be met if there is, as Socrates said, "something in death that is better for the good than for the bad." Yet, as Johnston shows, all existing theological conceptions of the afterlife are either incoherent or at odds with the workings of nature. These supernaturalist pictures of the rewards for goodness also obscure a striking consilience between the philosophical study of the self and an account of goodness common to Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism: the good person is one who has undergone a kind of death of the self and who lives a life transformed by entering imaginatively into the lives of others, anticipating their needs and true interests. As a caretaker of humanity who finds his or her own death comparatively unimportant, the good person can see through death. But this is not all. Johnston's closely argued claims that there is no persisting self and that our identities are in a particular way "Protean" imply that the good survive death. Given the future-directed concern that defines true goodness, the good quite literally live on in the onward rush of humankind. Every time a baby is born a good person acquires a new face.

Barry Stroud’s The Quest for Reality is a fine book that requires and repays several re-readings. Among the book’s many virtues is its appropriate skepticism towards the metaphysical ambition to treat some basic physical science as a fundamental ontology, an exhaustive account of what there is and how it hangs together. When Galileo concluded that mathematics was the key to the labyrinth of nature, he was prepared to treat all qualitative aspects of reality as sensational effects produced in us by a world that was essentially quantitative in character. This subjectivization of quality, its “introjection” into the mind, was perhaps initially driven by a reluctance to examine the abstractive preconditions of developing and deploying a quantitative vocabulary. Certain topics, among them sensed qualities, had to be set aside because they were not amenable to treatment in such terms. As Stroud emphasizes, to simply go on to suppose that such sensed qualities are not to be found in the world because they are not amenable to such treatment is unmotivated metaphysics, not a simple deliverance of any physical science.

The world-view to which the long arc of modern philosophy since Descartes bends is Materialism With A Bad Conscience, a Materialism continually bedeviled by the need to deal with apparently irreducible mental items. I believe this world-view to be the offspring of an introjective error; in effect, the mentalization of sensible form, finality and value. Hence the characteristic modernist accusation is that when we take sensible form, finality and value to be genuine features of the manifest we are thereby "projecting" aspects of our mental life onto an environment devoid of these features. David Hume went furthest in this Projectivist direction arguing that indeed even the very notion of an efficient cause was a projection of our habitual expectations that the regularly observed consequences of certain classes of events would continue. So far from these expectations constituting a practical knowledge of efficient causes, acquired over immense periods of time in the life of our species as it adapted to and with its complex causal environment, those expectations are merely appearances which we mistake for a mind-independent relation among the things themselves. Thus the manifest is traded in for the "manifest image of the world," an image interposed between a subject and deracinated environment.