Mark Johnston

God’s creative act, if genuinely free, would ground the existence of creatures without necessitating them. Since God is perfectly responsive to reason, his freely creating requires that he have an adequate but non-coercive reason to create. A coercive reason for an act is one that outweighs the reasons for any alternative act, whereas an adequate reason is one that is not outweighed by the reasons in favor of any alternative act. How, in the absence of an offsetting reason not to create, is God’s adequate reason not also a coercive reason, i.e., one that would necessitate creation? Chapter 7 argues that God’s creating and God’s remaining within himself each have to be understood as determinate manners in which God may affirm his own unsurpassable goodness. Cantorian reflections are then deployed to explain how God’s extra, i.e., un-offset, reason to create does not give him more of a reason to create than to not create. Finally, God’s actual reason to create is identified.

In this book, Mark Johnston argues that God needs to be saved not only from the distortions of the "undergraduate atheists" but, more importantly, from the idolatrous tendencies of religion itself. Each monotheistic religion has its characteristic ways of domesticating True Divinity, of taming God's demands so that they do not radically threaten our self-love and false righteousness. Turning the monotheistic critique of idolatry on the monotheisms themselves, Johnston shows that much in these traditions must be condemned as false and spiritually debilitating. A central claim of the book is that supernaturalism is idolatry. If this is right, everything changes; we cannot place our salvation in jeopardy by tying it essentially to the supernatural cosmologies of the ancient Near East. Remarkably, Johnston rehabilitates the ideas of the Fall and of salvation within a naturalistic framework; he then presents a conception of God that both resists idolatry and is wholly consistent with the deliverances of the natural sciences. Princeton University Press is publishing Saving God in conjunction with Johnston's forthcoming book Surviving Death, which takes up the crux of supernaturalist belief, namely, the belief in life after death

The prospect of using cell-based interventions to treat neurological conditions raises several important ethical and policy questions. In this target article, we focus on issues related to the unique constellation of traits that characterize CBIs targeted at the central nervous system. In particular, there is at least a theoretical prospect that these cells will alter the recipients' cognition, mood, and behavior—brain functions that are central to our concept of the self. The potential for such changes, although perhaps remote, is cause for concern and careful ethical analysis. Both to enable better informed consent in the future and as an end in itself, we argue that early human trials of CBIs for neurological conditions must monitor subjects for changes in cognition, mood, and behavior; further, we recommend concrete steps for that monitoring. Such steps will help better characterize the potential risks and benefits of CBIs as they are tested and potentially used for treatment.

Barry Stroud’s The Quest for Reality is a fine book that requires and repays several re-readings. Among the book’s many virtues is its appropriate skepticism towards the metaphysical ambition to treat some basic physical science as a fundamental ontology, an exhaustive account of what there is and how it hangs together. When Galileo concluded that mathematics was the key to the labyrinth of nature, he was prepared to treat all qualitative aspects of reality as sensational effects produced in us by a world that was essentially quantitative in character. This subjectivization of quality, its “introjection” into the mind, was perhaps initially driven by a reluctance to examine the abstractive preconditions of developing and deploying a quantitative vocabulary. Certain topics, among them sensed qualities, had to be set aside because they were not amenable to treatment in such terms. As Stroud emphasizes, to simply go on to suppose that such sensed qualities are not to be found in the world because they are not amenable to such treatment is unmotivated metaphysics, not a simple deliverance of any physical science.

The world-view to which the long arc of modern philosophy since Descartes bends is Materialism With A Bad Conscience, a Materialism continually bedeviled by the need to deal with apparently irreducible mental items. I believe this world-view to be the offspring of an introjective error; in effect, the mentalization of sensible form, finality and value. Hence the characteristic modernist accusation is that when we take sensible form, finality and value to be genuine features of the manifest we are thereby "projecting" aspects of our mental life onto an environment devoid of these features. David Hume went furthest in this Projectivist direction arguing that indeed even the very notion of an efficient cause was a projection of our habitual expectations that the regularly observed consequences of certain classes of events would continue. So far from these expectations constituting a practical knowledge of efficient causes, acquired over immense periods of time in the life of our species as it adapted to and with its complex causal environment, those expectations are merely appearances which we mistake for a mind-independent relation among the things themselves. Thus the manifest is traded in for the "manifest image of the world," an image interposed between a subject and deracinated environment.