This dissertation challenges two myths about Leibniz' Theodicy: that it is primarily concerned with the problem of evil, and that its ethical implications are reactionary. ;Leibniz' neologism "theodicy" connotes not the justification of God, but the justice of God, a justice Leibniz is at pains to make us realize is no different from our own; we are "little gods." This makes God's world-choice a models for an ethics and politics of imitatio dei, and undermines the unspoken "theodicy or ethics" a…
Read moreThis dissertation challenges two myths about Leibniz' Theodicy: that it is primarily concerned with the problem of evil, and that its ethical implications are reactionary. ;Leibniz' neologism "theodicy" connotes not the justification of God, but the justice of God, a justice Leibniz is at pains to make us realize is no different from our own; we are "little gods." This makes God's world-choice a models for an ethics and politics of imitatio dei, and undermines the unspoken "theodicy or ethics" assumption of much modern thought. The purpose of the Theodicy is "edification"--the encouragement of active piety in charity. Not evil but "mistaken notions of liberty, necessity and destiny" are Leibniz' main concern. ;The "best of all possible worlds" argument is a priori, thus insusceptible to empirical confirmation, rejection--or application. Any knowledge of the nature of the actual world is a posteriori, incomplete and fallible. This applies also to our knowledge of "evil" which, while no more than privation, is experienced as real. Language of "privative beings" has its place not in philosophical reflection on evil but in ethics, where the perception of privations defines the sites for action. ;The model for just choice is God's choice of worlds, and the contours of our ethics may be discerned in the way God's antecedent will to produce all goods and prevent all evils results in the consequent will to produce the goods and permit the evils of the best possible world. All antecedent wills survive in the consequent will, so all permission of evil must be attended by regret; only God in His omniscience can transcend regret. We must anticipate God's antecedent wills, not the consequent, and cannot escape regret. ;Leibniz' anti-voluntarist ethics forces us to think of goods in the context of possible worlds, while his understanding of freedom as "indirect" means that action must be understood in concrete and necessarily social ways with reference to the actual world. As I explore in an epilogue, this makes necessary a particular politics