Mark Maller

Wishful thinking is an ambiguous term which requires a new name that shows it is an unjustified belief that lacks epistemic support and is false hoping. I introduce Unjustified Wishfulness (UW) as the preferred nomenclature which emphasizes its lack of justification. UW is a universal desire in which humans believe what they wish and is pleasing, regardless of the evidence or good reasons. Rule utilitarianism is proposed to end or decrease UW in ethical decisions. I argue that it provides the best theory when it confers pragmatic moral rules when prudently followed, should curtail self-centered wishful thinking, and support the happiness of the greater number of people. Social-political implications are included. UW is also a moral character trait utilizing Aristotle’s virtue ethics. James’s ethical theory and pragmatic views on wishful thinking supports my position. Finally, the ground or basis of UW may be present in neuronal brain activity as extreme optimistic thinking, and possibly inherent in consciousness.

Alvin Plantinga’s controversial free will defense (FWD) for the problem of evil is an important attempt to show with certainty that moral evils are compatible and justifiable with God’s omnipotence and omniscience. I agree with critics who argue that it is untenable and the FWD fails. This paper proposes new criticisms by analyzing Plantinga’s presuppositions and objectionable assumptions in God, Freedom and Evil. Notably, his limited concept of omnipotence, and possible worlds theory lack rigorous argument and are subjectively biased with irrelevant weak examples. My ontological possible worlds theory (Possible Conditional Timelines) shows that it is very likely that the omnipotent God exists of necessity in some worlds but perhaps not this one. Omnipotence is total and absolute, and should imply the freedom of will to actualize all worlds God chooses. Plantinga’s position regarding God’s omniscience of future counterfactuals is implausible based on modal logic conjecture.

Berkeley is famous for denying the existence of matter and unperceived things except in God’s eternal mind. Although his subjective idealism (immaterialism) is dismissed and rejected, he is commonly ranked among the great modern philosophers. My analysis questions his epistemic relativism and skepticism, and presents new critical arguments against spiritual immaterialism, and his theory of God that are relevant today. Discussion of the essential place of God is crucial yet neglected and my article fills this lacuna. Berkeley’s skepticism of scientific principles, and devotion to literal Scripture falsifies and misguides his thought. Against the tradition, I argue that as a bishop, his major purpose and motivation was to validate and strengthen God’s absolute necessity in the world. Berkeley’s dubious yet intriguing immaterialism raises dissent against his legendary status. He influenced Enlightenment philosophy and beyond, albeit critically, especially Hume and Kant. It is past time for a fresh reevaluation of his contribution and niche in the history of philosophy.

This reply is a refutation of Santiago Vrech’s article “The End of the Case? A Metaphilosophical Critique of Thought Experiments” (2022) which argues that thought experiments used in argumentation cannot hold in All Possible Worlds (APW) modality, and thus should end. Cases are used to justify or refute a philosophical theory, but should not have the power to refute an entire theory, especially ad infinitum. Significant variations in intuitions, he argues, invalidate cases and are not proven. I argue some variation is acceptable and expected, and his bar of criteria is too high—APW validity is unnecessary. Vrech’s three arguments are faulty and/ or too weak, and his thought experiment is of questionable value. Experimental and armchair philosophy (or philosophers) are misnomers, misleading and false dichotomy.

The first pathway toward a new conceptualist answer to the existence of universals begins with Descartes. The article is guided by a Cartesian method of starting anew in metaphysics and our knowledge of mind-dependent universals. Relevant examples and learning experiments defend and validate the pragmatic utility of conceptualism. It is past time for analytic ontology to set aside its assumptions, reevaluate its methodology and simplify itself. I raise novel objections through metaphor and analogy against standard and Platonic realism. Independent universals of realism are speculative and are neither necessary nor sufficient. This rejection of metaphysical realism defends the validity of scientific empiricist realism. Historical arguments such as William James’ empirical conceptualism and J.S. Mill’s criticisms strengthen this position. Nominalist methods are also considered. My theory is confirmed and useful for a preliminary epistemic-ontology which evaluates concepts and universals of mineral species. This appendix is consistent with Descartes’ theory of attributes and provides a new important approach to this field of study. The article, long dormant, is made possible by the work of Rene Descartes.

This article analyzes Richard Swinburne’s arguments in the problem of evil and raises new criticism and understanding regarding genocides, especially the Holocaust. Genocides are the greatest challenge for theodicies and free-will defenses, yet they are rarely addressed in the scholarship. My empirical approach questions why a loving omnipotent God permits genocides of evil. Swinburne argues that evils are necessary for good free acts, such as the creation of moral virtues. However, future goods do not justify the millions of horrific and unnecessary deaths and suffering in genocides. Swinburne’s theory that free will is so valuable that evil acts must be permitted is also very weak. Moreover, his position that God lacks foreknowledge of our free actions limits divine omniscience. Thus, Swinburne's theodicy cannot resolve the Problem of Evil and fails to justify or defend the omnipotent God. Ultimately, he relies on faith, not his arguments.

ABSTRACT The Evil That Free Will Does: Plantinga’s Dubious Defense Alvin Plantinga’s controversial free will defense (FWD) for the problem of evil is an important attempt to show with certainty that moral evils are compatible and justifiable with God’s omnipotence and omniscience. I agree with critics who argue that it is untenable and the FWD fails. This paper proposes new criticisms by analyzing Plantinga’s presuppositions and objectionable assumptions in God, Freedom and Evil. Notably, his limited concept of omnipotence, and possible worlds theory lack rigorous argument and are subjectively biased with irrelevant weak examples. My ontological possible worlds theory (Possible Conditional Timelines) shows that it is very likely that the omnipotent God exists of necessity in some worlds but perhaps not this one. Omnipotence is total and absolute, and should imply the freedom of will to actualize all worlds God chooses. Plantinga’s position regarding God’s omniscience of future counterfactuals is implausible based on modal logic conjecture.

In this novel, Rob Silvers is preoccupied with getting even with his Catholic college, parents, wife and others who compromise his desires and expectations. He battles with an eccentric biology professor who dominates his college. Midst controversy, he begins a free thinker's club that questions the prevalent pseudoscience, and finally transfers to an eastern university. Part Two occurs over 20 years later. Now married, he is desperate to survive without a job or any money in Pennsylvania. Meanwhile he suspects that his wife is unfaithful and seeks a harsh revenge. He searches for a psychology career. The humorous story questions whether life is determined (compatibilism) or if our choices are truly free.

It is argued that wishful thinking is an informal logical fallacy and is distinguished from self-deception and delusion. Wishful thinking is unique in that a human desire is the starting point, which remains unfulfilled because of insufficient or no evidence or ignorance, despite the agent’s beliefs. It contrasts with self-deception, a more serious mental state in which the agent hides or denies the truth from himself, regardless of whether it is desired. Wishful thinking is a logical fallacy, depending on the agent’s genuine beliefs as an epistemic dilemma or merely a harmless fantasy. pp. 30–42

The Holocaust is one of the most intractable and challenging tragedies of moral evil to understand, assuming the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and all-loving God, and it has important implications for all theists. This paper critically examines the problem of evil in the philosophical theologies of two prominent Jewish philosophers: Emil Fackenheim and Richard Rubenstein. The article defends their view that the six million deaths are existentially meaningless because no justifiable reason exists why God permitted this. Thus, a Jewish theodicy is not possible for them. Fackenheim attempts to salvage traditional Judaism, and urges Jews not to lose their faith, lest Hitler be given a posthumous victory. Rubenstein rejects Fackenheim’s position and encourages Jews to accept the death of God and his mystical radical theology, and still continue traditional religious practices. I question both these responses, and hold that it is more plausible that God is not perfectly loving.

William James and the early Jean-Paul Sartre share strikingly similar similar views on ethics, despite their radically divergent approaches and styles. The strengths and weaknesses of their ethical relativism and/or subjectivism are examined in an attempt to show that these positions are problematic, and tenable only with careful qualifications. This evaluation is a result of a critical, yet constructive assessment of their ethical views. ;Specifically, I question whether Sartre's phenomenological ontology in Being and Nothingness can imply an ethics, and the extent to which his ontological terminology is itself meaningful or useful for developing his ontology, and for accepting his ethics. Sartre's major concepts of freedom, bad faith, consciousness, and relations with the Other are critically evaluated in order to show their ethical implications. I argue that his earlier views are a moral subjectivism, despite the possibility that freedom can be understood as an objective value. Sartre's descriptive ethics as existential psychoanalysis is discussed in such works as Anti-Semite and Jew. ;William James's ethical position is best presented in his essays, primarily "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life" and the Principles of Psychology. In that work, his strong empiricism serves as the foundation for his theory of consciousness and ethics, which has a subjectivist-relativist perspective. These views are examined through his positions on the free-will, social-political liberalism, theory of the stream of consciousness, pragmatism, and theory of universals. ;I contend that a meaningful and significant rapproachement can exist between these two philosophers because of their common ethical views and perspectives. This can have implications for future discourse between mainstream analytic philosophers and philosophers sympathetic to phenomenology