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Mark Phelan

Lawrence University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    5
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    1
  •  Philosophical Views

 More details
  • Lawrence University
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2010
Email (login required)
Homepage
Appleton, Wisconsin, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Value Theory
Philosophy, Misc
Areas of Interest
Theory of Mind and Folk Psychology
Linguistic Communication
Normativity of Meaning and Content
Friendship
Philosophy, Misc
Metaphysics and Epistemology
1 more
  • All publications (5)
  •  16
    List of Contributors
    with Stephan Kornmesser, Alexander Max Bauer, Justin Sytsma, Joseph Ulatowski, Chad Gonnerman, Eugen Fischer, Joachim Horvath, Theodore Bach, Paul Henne, James R. Beebe, Edouard Machery, Igor Douven, Shira Elqayam, Karolina Krzyżanowska, Jonathan Waskan, Justin Bruner, Raff Donelson, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Rodrigo Díaz, Ian M. Church, and Florian Cova
    In Alexander Max Bauer & Stephan Kornmesser (eds.), The Compact Compendium of Experimental Philosophy, De Gruyter. pp. 417-420. 2023.
  •  11
    Index
    with Stephan Kornmesser, Alexander Max Bauer, Justin Sytsma, Joseph Ulatowski, Chad Gonnerman, Eugen Fischer, Joachim Horvath, Theodore Bach, Paul Henne, James R. Beebe, Edouard Machery, Igor Douven, Shira Elqayam, Karolina Krzyżanowska, Jonathan Waskan, Justin Bruner, Raff Donelson, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Rodrigo Díaz, Ian M. Church, and Florian Cova
    In Alexander Max Bauer & Stephan Kornmesser (eds.), The Compact Compendium of Experimental Philosophy, De Gruyter. pp. 421-426. 2023.
  •  10
    Correction to: Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy
    with Xiang Zhou, Daniel Wilkenfeld, Hugo Viciana, Kevin Tobia, Emile Thalabard, Jan Sprenger, Paulo Sousa, Felipe Romero, Kevin Reuter, Navin Rambharose, Jonathan Phillips, Christian Mott, Tania Moerenhout, Edouard Machery, Shen-yi Liao, Anthony Lantian, Miklos Kurthy, Joshua Knobe, Markus Kneer, Hanna Kim, Kareem Khalifa, François Jaquet, Wenjia Hu, José V. Hernández-Conde, Ivar Hannikainen, Antonio Gaitán Torres, Brian D. Earp, Vilius Dranseika, Noah N’Djaye Nikolai van Dongen, Rodrigo Diaz, Fiery Cushman, Matteo Colombo, Jordane Boudesseul, Renatas Berniūnas, James Beebe, Mario Attie, James Andow, Aurélien Allard, Angela Abatista, Brent Strickland, and Florian Cova
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (4): 999-1003. 2021.
    Philosophy of Mind
  •  486
    Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy
    with Florian Cova, Brent Strickland, Angela Abatista, Aurélien Allard, James Andow, Mario Attie, James Beebe, Renatas Berniūnas, Jordane Boudesseul, Matteo Colombo, Fiery Cushman, Rodrigo Diaz, Noah N’Djaye Nikolai van Dongen, Vilius Dranseika, Brian D. Earp, Antonio Gaitán Torres, Ivar Hannikainen, José V. Hernández-Conde, Wenjia Hu, François Jaquet, Kareem Khalifa, Hanna Kim, Markus Kneer, Joshua Knobe, Miklos Kurthy, Anthony Lantian, Shen-yi Liao, Edouard Machery, Tania Moerenhout, Christian Mott, Jonathan Phillips, Navin Rambharose, Kevin Reuter, Felipe Romero, Paulo Sousa, Jan Sprenger, Emile Thalabard, Kevin Tobia, Hugo Viciana, Daniel Wilkenfeld, and Xiang Zhou
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 1-36. 2018.
    Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature in psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project to estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy. Drawing on a representative sample of 40 x-phi studies published between 2003 and 2015, we enlisted 20 research teams across 8 countries to conduct a high-quality replication of each study in order to compare the results to the original published findings. We found that x-phi stud…Read more
    Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature in psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project to estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy. Drawing on a representative sample of 40 x-phi studies published between 2003 and 2015, we enlisted 20 research teams across 8 countries to conduct a high-quality replication of each study in order to compare the results to the original published findings. We found that x-phi studies – as represented in our sample – successfully replicated about 70% of the time. We discuss possible reasons for this relatively high replication rate in the field of experimental philosophy and offer suggestions for best research practices going forward.
    Philosophy of MindFoundations of Experimental Philosophy, MiscCritiques of Experimental PhilosophyEx…Read more
    Philosophy of MindFoundations of Experimental Philosophy, MiscCritiques of Experimental PhilosophyExperimental Aesthetics
  •  181
    Making the Metaphor Move: The Problem of Differentiating Figurative and Literal Language
    Sally and Sid have worked together for a while, and Sally knows Sid to be a hard worker. She might make this point about him by saying, “Sid is a hard worker.” Or, she might make it by saying, “Sid is a Sherman tank.” We all recognize that there is some distinction between the first assertion, in which Sally is speaking literally, and the second, in which she is speaking figuratively. This is a distinction that any theory of figurative language worth its salt should capture. But, as I will argue…Read more
    Sally and Sid have worked together for a while, and Sally knows Sid to be a hard worker. She might make this point about him by saying, “Sid is a hard worker.” Or, she might make it by saying, “Sid is a Sherman tank.” We all recognize that there is some distinction between the first assertion, in which Sally is speaking literally, and the second, in which she is speaking figuratively. This is a distinction that any theory of figurative language worth its salt should capture. But, as I will argue, it is a distinction that contemporary accounts of figurative language fail to successfully explain. This is because such theories have been mostly concerned to explore the nature of figurative understanding and the status of figurative meanings. Perhaps proponents of these theories suppose that, by appealing to a special kind of figurative meaning, we can eventually explain the difference between speaking literally and speaking figuratively. I believe this approach gets the order of explanation backwards. I contend that accounts of figurative meaning and understanding can only be fully articulated against a prior account of the distinction between figurative and literal language. What’s more, once my account of figurative language is in place, we can begin to see why people bother speaking figuratively at all, or so I will argue.
    MetaphorRelevance TheoryLinguistic CommunicationSpeech ActsSemantics-Pragmatics Distinction
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