•  19
    Languages of Possibility (review)
    Philosophical Review 103 (1): 139. 1994.
  • La pensée contemporaine. Les grands courants
    with J. Chalumeau
    Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 44 (4): 741-743. 1982.
  • Meanings as Species
    Oxford University Press. 2019.
    Mark Richard presents an original theory of meaning, as the collection of assumptions speakers make in using it and expect their hearers to recognize as being made. Meaning is spread across a population, inherited by each new generation of speakers from the last, and evolving through the interactions of speakers with their environment.
  •  92
    Marcus on Belief and Belief in the Impossible
    Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 28 (3): 407-420. 2013.
    I review but don’t endorse Marcus’ arguments that impossible beliefs are impossible. I defend her claim that belief’s objects are, in some important sense, not the bearers of truth and falsity, discuss her disposition- alism about belief, and argue it’s a good fit with the idea that belief’s objects are Russellian states of affairs.
  •  15
    Precis of When Truth Gives Out
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2): 143-147. 2011.
    When Truth Gives Out discusses some of the relations between performative and expressive aspects of language and those aspects of language that determine truth conditions. Among the topics it takes up are slurring speech, the ‘Frege-Geach’ objection to expressivism, vagueness, and relativism. It develops an alternative to standard truth conditional semantics, one based on the notion of a commitment.
  • Truth and Truth Bearers: Meaning in Context Volume Ii
    Oxford University Press UK. 2015.
    This book collects nine seminal essays by Mark Richard published between 1980 and 2014, alongside four new essays and an introduction that puts the essays in context. Each essay is an attempt, in one way or another, to understand the idea of a proposition. Part I discusses whether the objects of thought and assertion can change truth value over time. Part II develops and defends a relativist view of the objects of assertion and thought; and Part III discusses issues having to do with relations b…Read more
  •  7
    Demonstratives, Indexicals, and Tensed Attributions of Belief
    Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst. 1982.
    Sentences of natural languages are often said to express propositions and to have meanings . This work is about the nature of such entities and their role in an account of the truth conditions of tensed attributions of belief containing demonstratives and indexicals. ;In Chapter I, I discuss the temporal properties of propositions. Two views concerning the temporal properties of propositions--temporalism and eternalism--are characterized; eternalism is defended as the correct view. I show that t…Read more
  •  110
  •  4
    Semantic pretense
    In T. Hofweber & A. Everett (eds.), Empty Names, Fiction, and the Puzzles of Non-Existence, Csli Publications. pp. 205--32. 2000.
  •  51
    Content Inside Out
    Analytic Philosophy 54 (2): 258-267. 2013.
  •  42
    How I Say What You Think
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14 (1): 317-337. 1989.
  •  44
    Defective Contexts, Accommodation, and Normalization
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (4). 1995.
    Propositional Attitudes defends an account of ‘believes’ on which the verb is contextually sensitive. x believes that S says that x has a belief which is ‘well rendered’ or acceptably translated by S; since contextually variable information about what makes for a good translation helps determine the extension of ‘believes,’ the verb is contextually sensitive. Sider and Soames criticize this account. They say it has unacceptable consequences in cases in which we make multiple ascriptions of belie…Read more
  •  100
    Attitudes in context
    Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (2). 1993.
  •  30
    Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind
    Philosophical Review 106 (4): 614. 1997.
    When I started the book, I thought that if there are beliefs, then they are brain states. I still believe that. I express three caveats about the book.
  •  342
    Contextualism and relativism
    Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2): 215-242. 2004.
  •  39
    XIV—Attitude Ascriptions, Semantic Theory, and Pragmatic Evidence
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87 (1): 243-262. 1987.
  •  45
    Sense, necessity and belief
    Philosophical Studies 69 (2-3). 1993.
  •  84
    Quotation, grammar, and opacity
    Linguistics and Philosophy 9 (3). 1986.
  •  91
    Meaning (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2003.
    _ Meaning_ brings together some of the most significant philosophical work on linguistic representation and understanding, presenting canonical essays on core questions in the philosophy of language. Brings together essential readings which define and advance the literature on linguistic representation and understanding. Examines key topics in philosophy of language, including analyticity; translational indeterminacy; theories of reference; meaning as use; the nature of linguistic competence; tr…Read more
  •  59
    Articulated terms
    Philosophical Perspectives 7 207-230. 1993.
  •  15
    Taking the Fregean seriously
    In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 219--239. 1988.
  •  37
    Reply to Lynch, Miščević, and Stojanović
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2): 197-208. 2011.
    This paper responds to discussions of my book When Truth Gives Out by Michael Lynch, Nenad Miščević, and Isidora Stojanović. Among the topics discussed are: whether relativism is incoherent (because it requires one to think that certain of one’s views are and are not epistemically superior to views one denies); whether and when sentences in which one slurs an individual or group are truth valued; whether relativism about matters of taste gives an account of “faultless disagreement” superior to c…Read more
  •  174
    This book makes a stimulating contribution to the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. It begins with a spirited defence of the view that propositions are structured and that propositional structure is 'psychologically real'. The author then develops a subtle view of propositions and attitude ascription. The view is worked out in detail with attention to such topics as the semantics of conversations, iterated attitude ascriptions, and the role of propositions as bearers of truth. Along…Read more
  •  37
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (sup1): 165-209. 1997.