This study addressed the prima facie incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom and pursued an explanation of how divine foreknowledge may be reasonably held to be compatible with human freedom, understood in the libertarian sense of 'freedom to do otherwise.' The study was an exercise in philosophical theology that sought to present a speculative metaphysical system which would set forth the rational possibility and plausibility of affirming the compatibility of divine foreknowle…
Read moreThis study addressed the prima facie incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom and pursued an explanation of how divine foreknowledge may be reasonably held to be compatible with human freedom, understood in the libertarian sense of 'freedom to do otherwise.' The study was an exercise in philosophical theology that sought to present a speculative metaphysical system which would set forth the rational possibility and plausibility of affirming the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. ;Chapter one surveyed the possible responses to the incompatibilist objection that divine foreknowledge of the future actions of human agents entails theological fatalism. The 'timeless omniscience,' 'compatibilist freedom,' and 'qualified omniscience' responses were dismissed in chapter one, as each assumes or asserts that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. The 'Ockhamist' account of divine foreknowledge was entertained as a possible explanation of the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. ;As an affirmation of an Ockhamist explanation of divine foreknowledge would require an affirmation of the justified true belief analysis of omniscience, that analysis was investigated in chapter two and was held to be a valid analysis of omniscience when suitable qualifications are made to the ordinary logic of belief. ;Chapter three surveyed significant contributions in the contemporary debate as to whether divine existence and/or divine fore-beliefs may be held to be soft facts about the past. It was argued that a compelling case has yet to be made that either divine existence or divine fore-beliefs are hard facts about the past. It was argued that divine existence and divine fore-beliefs may be reasonably held to be soft facts about the past. ;Chapter four reviewed the conclusions of the previous chapters and affirmed that the Ockhamist account of divine fore-belief and the middle knowledge account of essential omniscience do constitute a speculative metaphysical system which provides an explanation of the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom