Marta Faustino

This paper presents a reading of Nietzsche's revaluation of all values in light of the Cynic practice of parakharáttein to nómisma (“change the value of the currency”), according to Foucault's interpretation of this precept in his course The Courage of Truth. After contextualizing this approach within the broader framework of the influence of Cynicism on Nietzsche's thought, I will analyze the analogous use of the notion of Falschmünzerei in the latter's work, with particular focus on On the Genealogy of Morality, thereby revealing another possible trace of the influence of Cynicism in Nietzsche's philosophy.

Martha Nussbaum é uma das principais referências para o debate contemporâneo sobre a felicidade e o bem-estar humanos. Neste contexto, a obra de Nussbaum distingue-se, por um lado, pela sua interpretação e análise da filosofia antiga como uma terapia da alma vocacionada para o alcance da eudaimonia, e, por outro lado, pelo seu desenvolvimento, com Amartya Sen, da abordagem das capacidades, que se apresenta como um ideal de organização da sociedade, por forma a providenciar aos seres humanos um pleno desenvolvimento e florescimento. Apesar de intimamente relacionadas no seu propósito prático e transformador, estas duas visões de felicidade humana e dos meios para a alcançar divergem radicalmente, podendo até mesmo considerar-se contraditórias. Se na perspectiva da felicidade proposta pelas escolas helenistas a eudaimonia é uma tarefa individual, alheia a e independente de qualquer florescimento social ou coletivo, para a abordagem das capacidades o florescimento social ou coletivo é a verdadeira condição de possibilidade de qualquer florescimento individual. Neste ensaio discutiremos ambas as abordagens e procuraremos mostrar como estas não só são conciliáveis como se encontram mesmo estreitamente relacionadas no pensamento de Nussbaum, constituindo duas abordagens diferentes, mas complementares ao problema do florescimento humano e da procura filosófica da felicidade.

The distinction between theory and practice, as well as their specific role, function, and relevance within philosophy is at the core of most metaphilosophical discussions of philosophy as a way of life (PWL). At the same time, Hadot’s emphasis on the practical dimension of ancient philosophy and its alleged privilege of practice over theory is one of the most polemic and controversial aspects of his account of PWL. In this paper I will discuss three alternative ways of interpreting Hadot’s characterization of PWL and the roles and functions of theory and practice in his account: John Cooper’s, Miranda Vilchi’s and Matthew Sharpe’s. After critically evaluating each one of these readings, I will present my own view on the matter and conclude with some reflections on the relevance (or irrelevance) of maintaining the opposition between theory and practice in our account of PWL.

Preview: Philosophy as a way of life (PWL) is an emerging field of study which in the last decades has experienced a vibrant and multifaceted development. Particularly proliferous in the areas of metaphilosophy and the history of philosophy, PWL has also been applied to a wide variety of knowledge domains beyond the academic world. Ever more prominent in contemporary debates, PWL has become a banner under which a very diversified work is being developed by scholars with originally very different areas of research and expertise, who gather under PWL by their dissatisfaction with what has become of philosophy (an abstract and purely theoretical undertaking) and their hopes about what philosophy can be (a way of thinking about and transforming one’s life). Despite the dynamic development of PWL and the wealth of literature it has inspired in recent years – or precisely because of it – there is still no consensus on what it precisely means. What exactly does this expression contain? What does it entail? To what extent is it clear and univocal? And how clear and univocal should it be?

Over the past few decades, the idea of philosophy as a way of life (PWL) has gained undeniable prominence in contemporary debates about the nature and function of philosophy. Pierre Hadot forged the notion to denote the specific way in which ancient philosophers conceived of and practiced philosophy, stressing its performative character and its potential for self-transformation on the basis of what he called “spiritual exercises.” Referring primarily to the Hellenistic and Roman eras, Hadot claimed that “philosophy was a mode of existing-in-the-world, which had to be practiced at each instant, and the goal of which was to transform the whole of the individual’s life. Furthermore, he also implied that some modern and contemporary philosophers came close to this model of philosophical practice and described it as his own metaphilosophical ideal. As he comments in the same text: “Such is the lesson of ancient philosophy: an invitation to each human being to transform himself. Philosophy is a conversion, a transformation of one’s way of being and living, and a quest for wisdom.” This normative and pedagogic component is a crucial aspect of Hadot’s account of PWL. Indeed, Hadot is not just describing what philosophy was in the past, but also evaluating what it is in the present and considering what it could become beyond his (and our) time. This is one of the reasons that made his approach so popular and led to so many fruitful developments in the field of PWL. Inspired by Hadot’s account, which was complemented by the late Foucault’s own reflections on philosophy’s practical and performative potential, recent scholarship has characterized PWL as a metaphilosophical model that can be fruitfully used to criticize current academic practices and to develop innovative methodological approaches to the study, research, and teaching of philosophy, which in turn might enable a transformation of philosophical practices in the context of modern universities.

Nietzsche is commonly interpreted as strongly rejecting and even despising any possible conception (or pursuit) of happiness. And yet, one of the most pervasive topics in Nietzsche’s work is the problem of human suffering, the pursuit of meaning (or purpose) in life, and the possibility of a joyful or affirmative disposition toward existence. In this article, I argue that Nietzsche’s criticism of common conceptions of happiness should be seen as a redefinition, rather than a rejection, of the notion of human happiness, with important implications for contemporary discussions on the topic. I start by addressing three of the main contemporary theories of happiness from a Nietzschean perspective, underlining both the points of convergence and the points of divergence between Nietzsche and each of these accounts. I then gather the conclusions of the previous section, add Nietzsche’s positive claims on happiness and the meaningful life, and sketch what might be called a Nietzschean theory of happiness. Finally, I situate Nietzsche’s position in the contemporary debate on the topic and outline what I take to be his most important contributions to current discussions on happiness, meaning, and well-being in human life.

This article reflects on the way the Covid-19 hecatomb has disclosed and unraveled the ongoing crisis of professional philosophy, and suggests some lessons that might be taken from the pandemic, urging academic philosophers to take action regarding the future of their work in philosophy departments and institutions. In the first section of the article, we highlight some lasting criticisms to academic philosophy and explore one particular nasty thorn in the side of philosophers doing the kind of work that might speak to broad audiences facing a crisis of meaning and living: the rush to publish instead of “perishing” without a secure academic position. In the next section, we discuss philosophy as a way of life as an alternative nascent field in academic philosophy that, while garnering respect and recognition within the academy, has regained connections with a broader public desperate for ways to chart their own paths of meaningful living, especially when facing a deeply challenged and fractured world. PWL helps address the crises of meaning many in the academy face and the absence of rich philosophical reflection and communities in the broader public, which otherwise all too easily fall prey to hucksters, con-artists, and authoritarian and conspiratorial forces. We argue that this kind of wholistic critical development of PWL from the ancient world is designed to enact a prefigurative or eutopian politics. We conclude by situating our recommendations into a broader reconstruction of professional philosophy needed at this critical cultural moment.

This essay discusses the possibility, relevance, and pertinence of a reactivation of philosophy as a way of life today on the basis of Pierre Hadot’s account and recent scholarly approaches to the topic. In the wake of John Sellars, it regards philosophy as a way of life as a metaphilosophical option that can still be applied today. The essay starts by addressing John Cooper’s criticism of philosophy as a way of life in the contemporary philosophical landscape and shows that, against the background of the model defined by Hadot, Cooper’s objections do not apply. It then illustrates the clear expression of the model in contemporary philosophy through the particular case of Nietzsche. It concludes by outlining some of the considerations that, in the wake of Hadot, Sellars, Michael Chase, and others, might persuade researchers, teachers, and academics to embrace philosophy as a way of life in their work and lives.

Nas últimas décadas do século passado Pierre Hadot e Michel Foucaultrevolucionaram a história da filosofia ao, nos seus Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique e L’herméneutique du sujet, respectivamente, colocarem um imperativo ético nas origens do pensamento filosófico ocidental e firmarem que, nessa altura, a filosofia era essencialmente uma “escolha de vida” ou “modo de vida”, no caso do primeiro, e um “cuidado de si”, na expressão do último. Uma vez que ambos os autores contrastam a orientação e função originais da filosofia com a sua forma contemporânea, as suas análises têm, para além da sua clara relevância históricofilosófica, um forte potencial de crítica contra a prática académica e institucionalizada da filosofia actual. Tomando a ideia da filosofia como modo de vida como forma de dissidência contra a filosofia universitária contemporânea, e como forma de experimentação com uma compreensão e prática alternativas da filosofia, este ensaio delineia as principais características do modelo da filosofia como modo de vida no seu contraste com a prática académica conteporânea e defende a relevância do modelo para uma eventual restruturação da filosofia profissionalizada perante a actual crise nas humanidades e desafios sociais, culturais e ambientais inéditos.

Marta Faustino and Gianfranco Ferraro present a collection of essays by esteemed academics on the ethical and political questions present in Michel Foucault's late work. As one of the most important and controversial thinkers of the twentieth century, the philosopher's last works are at the centre of much current academic research and debate. Comprising 15 essays written by specialists on Foucault's thought from 10 different countries, the perspectives offered by the contributors and the thinker himself can help us to unravel modernity and give us the tools to understand and ethically and politically transform our present.

Preview: /Commentary: Richard Shusterman, Ars Erotica: Sex and Somaesthetics in the Classical Arts of Love, 436 pages./ Richard Shusterman’s Ars Erotica: Sex and Somaesthetics in the Classical Arts of Love is a masterpiece in a number of respects. With its focus on erotic love and the aesthetics of lovemaking, the book is to be admired for having the audacity to broach a topic that tends to be neglected – if not repressed – in contemporary academic scholarship. But Ars Erotica is far from being “simply” about sex and different arts of love. In exploring classical erotic theories and ideals in Western, Chinese, Indian, Islamic and Japanese cultures, it reveals an impressive amount of knowledge and erudition when analyzing, documenting, and contextualizing the various ars erotica in their different social, cultural, political, philosophical, and religious milieus. Moreover, although Shusterman’s guiding thread is the aesthetic dimension of classic ars erotica, the book also has an important ethical and spiritual dimension, as it compellingly demonstrates how the cultivation of physical beauty and sensual pleasures was – at least in classical ancient traditions – indissociable from a wider concern with the cultivation of one’s character and virtue, that is, with an art of living in which sexual practices and attitudes were strongly embedded and from which they ultimately derived their deep symbolic meaning and relevance.

This paper aims to discuss the coherence and consistency of the Stoic and the Nietzschean “art of dying at the right time”. Throughout this paper, we will use this expression to refer to the Stoics’ and Nietzsche’s treatment both of involuntary and voluntary death, inasmuch as both seem to be strongly connected to and grounded on the notion of timeliness. Taking this notion as a guiding thread, we will emphasize the several similarities that link their approach to suicide. Indeed, as will be shown, it is plausible to assume that Nietzsche’s understanding of voluntary death is particularly influenced by the Stoic tradition. At the same time, we will point out the relevant differences that make these two approaches differ. In dealing with the Stoic and the Nietzschean attitude towards suicide, the underlying question will be whether the legitimization and defense of voluntary death is compatible—and if so, to which extent—with their teachings, in particular, with their notions of happiness and affirmation of life, on the one hand, and their ideals of living in accordance with nature and amor fati, on the other.

This essay discusses the possibility, relevance, and pertinence of a reactivation of philosophy as a way of life today on the basis of Pierre Hadot’s account and recent scholarly approaches to the topic. In the wake of John Sellars, it regards philosophy as a way of life as a metaphilosophical option that can still be applied today. The essay starts by addressing John Cooper’s criticism of philosophy as a way of life in the contemporary philosophical landscape and shows that, against the background of the model defined by Hadot, Cooper’s objections do not apply. It then illustrates the clear expression of the model in contemporary philosophy through the particular case of Nietzsche. It concludes by outlining some of the considerations that, in the wake of Hadot, Sellars, Michael Chase, and others, might persuade researchers, teachers, and academics to embrace philosophy as a way of life in their work and lives.

O presente artigo tem como foco a relação ambivalente de Nietzsche com os filósofos do período helenista, em particular os estóicos e os epicuristas. Mais concretamente, procuraremos determinar por que razão, apesar da extraordinária influência que estas escolas exerceram no seu pensamento, Nietzsche se lhes viria a opor tão violentamente na fase mais tardia da sua obra. Seguindo o trilho da avaliação que Nietzsche faz destes filósofos terapeutas enquanto, ele próprio, "médico da cultura", verificaremos que as principais críticas de Nietzsche a estas escolas são muito semelhantes às que dirigiria ao cristianismo e vão ao encontro da própria ideia de terapia, tal como tradicionalmente concebida. Defenderemos que Nietzsche vê os filósofos helenistas como importantes precursores do cristianismo, responsabilizando-os pela criação do enquadramento e mundividência sem os quais este não se teria podido desenvolver. Tanto estóicos como epicuristas se revelam, assim, "pseudo-médicos", razão pela qual, como concluiremos, Nietzsche os vê como promotores fundamentais do niilismo que diagnostica na cultura ocidental.