Marta Johansson Werkmäster

According to defenders of the popular buck-passing account of value (the BPA of value), values should be understood in terms of reasons for pro- and con-responses. While much has been said about how to understand the normative component of the BPA of value, that is, how to understand ‘reasons’, including how to distinguish between reasons that imply value (the ‘right’ kind of reasons) and those that do not (the ‘wrong’ kind of reasons), less has been said about how to understand the response component, that is, how to interpret ‘pro- and con-responses’. Contrary to common usage in the debate, we argue against understanding values in terms of reasons for attitudes and reasons for action. Briefly, we contend that including reasons for action is unnecessary, has undesirable consequences for the debate on the wrong kind of reason problem, and enables us to generate novel yet mundane cases of the wrong kind of value problem. An important upshot of the paper is that it supports an alternative, prima facie attractive picture of the hierarchy of the normative landscape, in which reasons for attitudes are explanatorily prior to value and to our value-related reasons for action.

According to defenders of the popular buck‐passing account of value (the BPA of value), values should be understood in terms of reasons for pro‐ and con‐responses. While much has been said about how to understand the normative component of the BPA of value, that is, how to understand ‘reasons’, including how to distinguish between reasons that imply value (the ‘right’ kind of reasons) and those that do not (the ‘wrong’ kind of reasons), less has been said about how to understand the response component, that is, how to interpret ‘pro‐ and con‐responses’. Contrary to common usage in the debate, we argue against understanding values in terms of reasons for attitudes and reasons for action. Briefly, we contend that including reasons for action is unnecessary, has undesirable consequences for the debate on the wrong kind of reason problem, and enables us to generate novel yet mundane cases of the wrong kind of value problem. An important upshot of the paper is that it supports an alternative, prima facie attractive picture of the hierarchy of the normative landscape, in which reasons for attitudes are explanatorily prior to value and to our value‐related reasons for action.

We argue that we should be sceptical towards the claim that there is such a thing as the standing to blame someone privately, understood in terms of holding the attitude of blame. Key features of the idea about standing to blame do not apply to private blame. For example, we argue that private blame is not the exercise of some normative power, and it is not even pro tanto wrong for a hypocrite to privately blame a blameworthy agent. Thus, contrary to the prevailing sentiment, it is doubtful that there are conditions of standing for private blame. Importantly, our conclusions leave the idea of standing to blame intact when it comes to overt blame, which is understood as something voluntary.

The ethics of blame includes conditions determining whether an instance of blame is permissible. One generally recognised condition is that blame should be proportionate. If it is not proportionate, that speaks against its permissibility. All the same, what exactly amounts to proportionate blame is currently under-theorised. In this paper, we aim to amend this. More precisely, we distinguish between private and overt blame and highlight some of their differences – e.g., that they aggregate differently. Then, we develop an account of proportional blame and draw out some practical implications of our account.

The nature of blame is not to be identified solely with a judgment, or an overt act, or an angry emotion. Instead, blame should be identified with a sentiment: more specifically, a multi-track disposition that manifests itself in various different emotions, thoughts or actions in a range of different circumstances. This paper aims to argue for these two claims. I start by arguing that blame is not solely a judgment, overt act, or an angry emotion. Then I develop the view that blame is a sentiment. In doing so, I also show how viewing blame as a sentiment avoids objections that justifies us in dismissing the previous accounts. In addition, I argue that it significantly affects other inquiries concerning blame. I end by answering a skeptical challenge that there cannot be an illuminating and unifying analysis of blame.