Martijn Boven

Édouard Glissant argues that writing occurs ‘in the presence of all the languages of the world,’ in which languages resonate through echoes, opaque residues, and silences, allowing literature to register the world’s relational complexity. Yet his thought remains grounded in Martinique and the Antillean archipelago, a ‘laboratory’ whose interruptions, passages, and entanglements exemplify his ‘pensée archipélique’: the local place in direct relation to the unfinished complexity of the Tout-monde. Against the historical background of a 17th-century plantation society marked by the slave trade and its aftermath, this framework challenges philosophies of fixed identity and treats fragmentation and uncertainty as constitutive, increasingly resonant with contemporary human conditions. This special issue aims to demonstrate the relevance of Glissant for European philosophy by tracing how insights arise from situated, incomplete and shifting perspectives that move from place (lieu) to connection (lien). The four contributions to this special issue explore different dimensions of Édouard Glissant’s thought and poetics. Martijn Boven examines Glissant’s poetics of mutual opacity as an alternative to traditional hermeneutics focused on forced transparency, illustrating this through William Faulkner’s ambiguous work. Divya Nadkarni analyzes the sea in Glissant’s thinking as a paradoxical archive (fluid, fragmented, and resistant to conventional historiography) and connects this to Glissant’s concept of non-history, critiquing contemporary oceanic logistics as a continuation of imperialist violence concealed by opacity. Birgit Kaiser and Tom van Bunnik offer an ecocritical reading of Glissant’s poetry, showing how the geography of Martinique shapes the lyrical subject and emphasizing that Glissant’s rootedness in place transcends local limitations, resonating globally. Jesse Havinga engages Glissant in dialogue with psychoanalyst Tobie Nathan, comparing their shared focus on ‘dwelling’ (errance) as a form of resistance and highlighting Nathan’s concept of ‘ain’, which underscores the cultural ties endangered by forced migration.

This article explores Édouard Glissant’s poetics of opacity as a critical response to forms of enforced transparency. It highlights the inherent ambiguity of Glissant’s notion of opacity, which simultaneously critiques oppressive power structures that impose transparency and advocates for an ethical right to mutual opacity. The article contrasts Glissant’s poetics of reciprocal opacity with the dominant Western hermeneutics of enforced transparency, which is rooted in a desire for complete understanding and control. This exposes how this hermeneutics perpetuates epistemic violence, particularly in colonial contexts. The concept of opacity challenges the reduction of otherness to comprehensible terms and instead embraces opacity as a relational, creative principle that preserves irreducible difference, without understanding. In the article, this discussion is anchored in Glissant’s engagement with the French philosophy of difference and his dialogue with William Faulkner’s oeuvre, particularly Absalom, Absalom!, which exemplifies the poetics of opacity through its fragmented narrative and postponed revelations about racial trauma. Ultimately, the article argues that Glissant’s poetics offers a transformative framework that resists the illusion of full transparency, foregrounding complexity and the ethical acceptance of unknowability in texts, relationships, and histories.

This article illustrates that metamorphosis functions not only as a literary motif but also as a narrative technique: thematic metamorphoses within a narrative often require corresponding textual transformations that alter the narrative’s presentation. Although ancient Greek literature features numerous examples of (bodily) transformations, the Greek term ‘metamorphosis’ is notably absent, appearing only in Hellenistic and Roman texts, with Ovid’s "Metamorphoses" being the most prominent example. In Ovid’s work, metamorphosis functions as both a cosmological principle and a poetic device: divine intervention alters the characters' bodies within the narrative, while playful word order ambiguously transforms the storytelling itself. The article challenges the inclination to view Ovid’s "Metamorphoses" as the definitive model for literary metamorphoses, arguing instead that no single, unequivocal model exists. Various other models are available, two of which will be further discussed here. In Sophocles’ "Oidípous Túrannos", metamorphosis assumes a tragic dimension: Oidipous’ status shifts through reversal and recognition, with wordplay involving oĩda (I know) and pous (foot) undermining his supposed superior knowledge. In Melville’s "Moby-Dick", hermeneutic metamorphosis highlights interpretative transformations, where meaning expands through subjective interpretations, culminating in the multifaceted understandings of the white whale Moby Dick. Together these three models demonstrate metamorphosis as a narrative technique that reshapes both the story and its telling.

This article examines dramatisation in Deleuze and Kierkegaard, encapsulated in the formulas ‘the stuttering of language’ and ‘the question that silences’. Deleuze’s differential approach actualises virtual ideas within a system of heterogenesis through the interplay between actual concepts and intensive dramas. Conversely, Kierkegaard’s existential approach, examined in The Concept of Anxiety, establishes an infinite loop between the psychological language of anxiety and the dogmatic language of hereditary sin, leading to a third existential language centred on the moment of appropriation. The article concludes by contrasting Deleuze’s focus on expression through internal differences with Kierkegaard’s emphasis on making an existential choice.

William Faulkner (1897-1962), one of the United States’ most renowned authors, was born on Sept. 25, 1897, in New Albany, Mississippi. He initially focused on poetry, culminating in his first publication: "The Marble Faun" (1924). Subsequently, he transitioned to prose, producing novels such as "The Sound and the Fury" (1929), "As I lay Dying" (1930), "Light in August" (1932) and "Absalom, Absalom!" (1936), which are considered his most significant works. Like most of his oeuvre, these novels are set in a fictional Southern region that Faulkner termed ‘Yoknapatawpha county.’ Nearly all works set in this fictional county are characterized by themes of race, incest, the American Civil War, and the decline of the antebellum South. Faulkner frequently employs diverse perspectives and techniques that directly represent the consciousness of his characters. Recognition for his literary achievements came relatively late in his career. The primary catalyst for this recognition was the Nobel Prize for Literature awarded to him in 1949, when he had arguably passed the zenith of his writing career. Faulkner’s extensive oeuvre, which spans from 1924 to 1962, also encompasses lesser-known works, such as "Sanctuary" (1931) and "Intruder in the Dust" (1948). In addition to novels, Faulkner authored numerous short stories that are considered among the finest in American literature. These include the story translated here, “Dry September” originally published in 1931, in the January issue of Scribner’s magazine. Faulkner died July 6 in Byhalia, Mississippi, of a heart attack. [In Dutch: William Faulkner (1897-1962), een van de beroemdste schrijvers uit de Verenigde Staten, werd geboren op 25 september 1897 in New Albany, Mississippi. Hij begon aanvankelijk met het schrijven van poëzie, wat resulteerde in zijn eerste publicatie: "The Marble Faun" (1924). Kort daarna liet hij poëzie voor wat het was en stortte hij zich op het proza. Dit leidde tot romans als "The Sound and the Fury" (1929), "As I lay Dying" (1930), "Light in August" (1932) en "Absalom, Absalom!" (1936) die als zijn belangrijkste werken worden beschouwd. Net als het merendeel van zijn oeuvre spelen deze romans zich af in een fictioneel Zuiden dat door Faulkner ‘Yoknapatawpha county’ genoemd werd. Vrijwel alle werken die zich in deze fictieve streek afspelen, worden gekenmerkt door thema’s als ras, incest, de Amerikaanse burgeroorlog en de teloorgang van het oude Zuiden. Faulkner maakt vaak gebruik van verschillende perspectieven en technieken die direct het bewustzijn van zijn personages representeren. Pas relatief laat in zijn carrière kreeg hij erkenning voor zijn literaire verdiensten. De belangrijkste stimulans hiervoor was de Nobelprijs voor de litera¬tuur die hem werd toegekend in 1949, toen hij als schrijver eigenlijk al over zijn toppunt heen was. Faulkners omvangrijke oeuvre, dat ontstond in de periode van 1924 tot 1962, omvat ook minder bekende werken, zoals "Sanctuary" (1931) en "Intruder in the Dust" (1948). Naast romans schreef Faulkner echter ook nog een groot aantal korte verhalen die tot de absolute top van het Amerikaanse verhaal gerekend worden. Daartoe behoort ook het hier vertaalde verhaal ‘Septemberdroogte [Dry September]’, dat oorspronkelijk werd gepubliceerd in 1931, in het januarinummer van het tijdschrift "Scribner's". Faulkner stierf op 6 juli in Byhalia, Mississippi, aan een hartaanval.]

Title: "A Rose for Emily" ("Een roos voor Emily") Author: William Faulkner Translators: Martijn Boven and Maarten Jansen Original language: English Target language: Dutch William Faulkner's "A Rose for Emily", presented her in a Dutch translation, was first published in 1930, in the April issue of Forum magazine. By 1930, Faulkner had already authored four novels; however, "A Rose for Emily" marked his debut in the short story genre. While not as experimental as his novels The Sound and the Fury and Absalom, Absalom!, it nonetheless incorporates certain characteristic Faulknerian elements, such as an unconventional narrative perspective and a non-linear chronology. Consistent with the majority of Faulkner's oeuvre, this narrative is situated in the fictional Southern setting to which Faulkner gave the name Yoknapatawpha County. [In Dutch: Wiliam Faulkners 'Een roos voor Emily’ (‘A Rose for Emily’) werd voor het eerst gepubliceerd in 1930, in het aprilnummer van het tijdschrift Forum. Faulkner had in 1930 al vier romans op zijn naam staan, maar ‘Een roos voor Emily’ was het eerste korte verhaal dat hij publiceerde. Het is niet zo experimenteel als zijn romans The Sound and the Fury (Het geraas en gebral) en Absalom, Absalom! Desondanks bevat het toch enkele karakteristieke Faulkneriaanse elementen, zoals een ongebruikelijk vertel perspectief en een gefragmenteerde chronologie. Net als het merendeel van Faulkners oeuvre speelt ook dit verhaal zich af in het fictionele Zuiden waar Faulkner de naam Yoknapatawpha County aan gaf."]

William Faulkner (1897-1962), one of the United States’ most renowned authors, was born on Sept. 25, 1897, in New Albany, Mississippi. He initially focused on poetry, culminating in his first publication: "The Marble Faun" (1924). Subsequently, he transitioned to prose, producing novels such as "The Sound and the Fury" (1929), "As I lay Dying" (1930), "Light in August" (1932) and "Absalom, Absalom!" (1936), which are considered his most significant works. Like most of his oeuvre, these novels are set in a fictional Southern region that Faulkner termed ‘Yoknapatawpha county.’ Nearly all works set in this fictional county are characterized by themes of race, incest, the American Civil War, and the decline of the antebellum South. Faulkner frequently employs diverse perspectives and techniques that directly represent the consciousness of his characters. Recognition for his literary achievements came relatively late in his career. The primary catalyst for this recognition was the Nobel Prize for Literature awarded to him in 1949, when he had arguably passed the zenith of his writing career. Faulkner’s extensive oeuvre, which spans from 1924 to 1962, also encompasses lesser-known works, such as Sanctuary (1931) and Intruder in the Dust (1948). In addition to novels, Faulkner authored numerous short stories that are considered among the finest in American literature. These include the story translated here, “Barn Burningr” originally published in 1939, in the June issue of Harper’s magazine. Faulkner died July 6 in Byhalia, Mississippi, of a heart attack. In Dutch: William Faulkner (1897-1962) …, een van de beroemdste schrijvers uit de Verenigde Staten, werd geboren op 25 september 1897 in New Albany, Mississippi. Hij begon aanvankelijk met het schrijven van poëzie, wat resulteerde in zijn eerste publicatie: The Marble Faun (1924). Kort daarna liet hij poëzie voor wat het was en stortte hij zich op het proza. Dit leidde tot romans als The Sound and the Fury (1929), As I lay Dying (1930), Light in August (1932) en Absalom, Absalom! (1936) die als zijn belangrijkste werken worden beschouwd. Net als het merendeel van zijn oeuvre spelen deze romans zich af in een fictioneel Zuiden dat door Faulkner ‘Yoknapatawpha county’ genoemd werd. Vrijwel alle werken die zich in deze fictieve streek afspelen, worden gekenmerkt door thema’s als ras, incest, de Amerikaanse burgeroorlog en de teloorgang van het oude Zuiden. Faulkner maakt vaak gebruik van verschillende perspectieven en technieken die direct het bewustzijn van zijn personages representeren. Pas relatief laat in zijn carrière kreeg hij erkenning voor zijn literaire verdiensten. De belangrijkste stimulans hiervoor was de Nobelprijs voor de literatuur die hem werd toegekend in 1949, toen hij als schrijver eigenlijk al over zijn toppunt heen was. Faulkners omvangrijke oeuvre, dat ontstond in de periode van 1924 tot 1962, omvat ook minder bekende werken, zoals Sanctuary (1931) en Intruder in the Dust (1948). Naast romans schreef Faulkner echter ook nog een groot aantal korte verhalen die tot de absolute top van het Amerikaanse verhaal gerekend worden. Daartoe behoort ook het hier vertaalde verhaal ‘In vlammen op’ (‘Barn Burning’), dat oorspronkelijk werd gepubliceerd in 1939, in het juninummer van het tijdschrift Harper’s. Faulkner stierf op 6 juli in Byhalia, Mississippi, aan een hartaanval.

This chapter from Michel Serres’s comprehensive study on Leibniz—"The System of Leibniz and its Mathematical Models [Le système de Leibniz et ses modèles mathématiques]"—examines Leibniz’s epistemological framework. This framework, which Leibniz developed for a large part in his “Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas [Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis],” is pitched against Descartes’s "Meditations on First Philosophy [Meditationes de Prima Philosophia]" and the method of systematic doubt developed therein. While Descartes rejects any knowledge with the slightest possibility of falsehood, Leibniz accepts knowledge with even a minimal degree of truth. Leibniz’s approach involves a progressive genesis of truth through a series of filters, each further refining knowledge. This process is intrinsically linked to infinitism and combinatorics, allowing for a gradual differentiation of the distinct from the indistinct. The filters are applied sequentially, with each filter proceeding through its own oppositions, resulting in a spectrum of knowledge ranging from obscure to clear, confused to distinct, inadequate to adequate, and symbolic to intuitive. This framework facilitates pluralism within rationalism that proceeds through evolving or regional truths. The filters overlap, and only the final stage of knowledge is devoid of mixture. Leibniz’s epistemology is non-Cartesian, as it relativizes truth and falsehood at each stage of the filtering process. It also accounts for the limitations of sensory perception, attributing them to the imperfection of the human mind in its current state. (Translated by Martijn Boven)

Rob van Gerwen, senior docent filosofie van de kunsten aan de Universiteit Utrecht, schreef met "Moderne filosofen over kunst" een nieuwe inleiding in de filosofie van de kunsten gezien vanuit wat hij ‘het moderne systeem van de schone kunsten’ noemt. De term ‘modern’ verwijst hier niet naar wat gewoonlijk ‘de moderne kunst’ genoemd wordt, maar vooral naar een veranderende houding die in de zeventiende eeuw langzaam opgang begint te maken. De term markeert zodoende het moment waarop een functionele opvatting over kunst plaatsmaakt voor een modern kunstbegrip waarin de esthetische waardering van het werk zelf centraal komt te staan. ‘De kern van dat moderne begrip is dat kunst niet langer gewaardeerd wordt als instrumenteel voor een of ander extern doel, maar om haar esthetische aspect: de manier waarop ze haar beschouwer beweegt’.

Philosophical texts always have a form as well as content. This seemingly self-evident fact is often overlooked by interpreters. Philosophy is frequently discussed as if it were solely concerned with formulating clear arguments and consistent concepts. The consequence of this fixation on content is that form is dismissed as little more than an incidental and insignificant packaging. However, a brief look at the history of philosophy reveals that neglecting form in this way creates a significant blind spot. The choice of a particular form often arises precisely in response to fundamental problems that are difficult to address in purely content-based terms. How can truth be expressed in language? How can others be inspired to lead a philosophical life? For this issue of Wijsgerig Perspectief, we have invited experts from different periods in the history of Western philosophy to reflect on the various ways in which the relationship between form and content in philosophical texts can be understood. [In Dutch: Filosofische teksten hebben, behalve een inhoud, ook altijd een vorm. Dit schijnbaar evidente gegeven wordt lang niet altijd door interpreten in ogenschouw genomen. Vaak wordt er over de filosofie gesproken alsof zij alleen maar zou draaien om het formuleren van heldere argumenten en consistente concepten. Het gevolg van deze fixatie op de inhoud van de tekst is dat de vorm wordt afgedaan als weinig meer dan een toevallige en onbelangrijke verpakking. Een korte blik op de geschiedenis van de filosofie wijst echter uit dat een dergelijke veronachtzaming van vorm een grote blinde vlek creëert. De keuze voor een bepaalde vorm komt vaak juist voort uit een reactie op fundamentele problemen die zich moeilijk aan de orde laten stellen in puur inhoudelijke termen. Hoe kan waarheid in taal worden uitgedrukt? Hoe kunnen andere mensen ertoe worden bewogen een filosofisch leven te leiden? Voor dit nummer van Wijsgerig Perspectief hebben we kenners van verschillende tijdvlakken in de geschiedenis van de Westerse filosofie uitgenodigd om te reflecteren op de verschillende manieren waarop de relatie tussen vorm en inhoud in filosofische teksten begrepen kan worden.

Speculative realism is driven by a strong resistance to anthropocentrism. It assumes that the non-human world contains within itself ways of organizing (or disorganizing) itself. This leads to a political analysis in which the boundaries of the human are mapped out in a fairer manner—that is, in a non-anthropocentric way. Or, to use the words of Bruno Latour, we as humans are part of a network of actors in which we still play an important role, but in which we are more strongly influenced by other, non-human actors than we are often willing to admit. Speculative realism has various branches, each emphasizing a specific philosophical, ethical, or political issue. To do justice to the diversity of theories and applications, we have invited five authors to describe one of the movements or themes at stake from their own area of expertise. [In Dutch: Het speculatief realisme wordt gedreven door een sterk verzet tegen het antropocentrisme. Daarbij wordt verondersteld dat de niet-menselijke wereld in zichzelf manieren bevat om zich te organiseren (of te desorganiseren). Dit geeft aanleiding tot een politieke analyse waarin de grenzen van de mens op een eerlijkere (dat wil zeggen op een nietantropocentrische) wijze in kaart worden gebracht. Of, om met Bruno Latour te spreken, dat wij als mensen deel uitmaken van een netwerk van actoren, waarin we nog steeds een belangrijke rol spelen, maar waarin we sterker bepaald worden door andere, nietmenselijke actoren dan we zelf vaak willen toegeven. Het speculatief realisme kent verschillende vertakkingen, die ieder weer hun eigen nadruk leggen op een bepaald filosofisch, ethisch of politiek probleem. Om aan de verscheidenheid van theorieën en toepassingen recht te doen, hebben we vijf auteurs gevraagd om vanuit hun eigen expertise een van de stromingen of thema’s die erin op het spel staan te omschrijven.]

In his thought-provoking new book, "Being Grateful: Reflections on Gratitude After the Death of God", the Dutch philosopher Paul van Tongeren argues that our experience of gratitude has become a problem that requires fresh consideration. His focus is not so much on interpersonal gratitude—the exchange of benefits between individuals—but rather on another form of gratitude: the kind directed toward all the good that is not granted to us by a specific person or institution but simply befalls us or happens to us. Can we still be grateful for the birth of a baby, our happiness in life, good health, or the wondrous beauty of nature after the death of God? If so, how? [In Dutch: In zijn prikkelende nieuwe boek "Dankbaar: Denken over danken na de dood van God" stelt de Nijmeegse filosoof Paul van Tongeren dat onze ervaring van dankbaarheid een probleem is geworden dat vraagt om een nieuwe doordenking. Het gaat hem daarbij niet zozeer om de interpersoonlijke dankbaarheid die de uitwisseling van weldaden tussen personen betreft. Hij is vooral geïnteresseerd in die andere vorm van dankbaarheid die betrekking heeft op al het goede dat ons niet door een specifiek individu of instantie geschonken is, maar dat ons simpelweg toevalt of overkomt. Kunnen we na de dood van God nog dankbaar zijn voor de geboorte van een baby, ons levensgeluk, een goede gezondheid of de wonderlijke schoonheid van de natuur? Zo ja, hoe dan?]

In 1995, the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben (born 1942) published the first volume of what would later develop into a series of political-philosophical studies under the title Homo Sacer. The series began with Homo Sacer: Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita (Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life) and was concluded in 2014 with L’uso dei corpi (The Use of Bodies). Now that the project has been completed, we aim to make a first attempt at an evaluation in this special issue. [In Dutch: Van de Italiaanse filosoof Giorgio Agamben (1942) verscheen in 1995 het eerste deel van wat onder de noemer Homo sacer zou uitgroeien tot een reeks politiek-filosofische studies. De reeks werd geopend met Homo sacer. Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita (Homo sacer. De soevereine macht en het naakte leven) en in 2014 afgesloten met L’uso dei corpi (Het gebruik van lichamen). Nu het project is afgerond willen wij in dit themanummer een poging doen tot een eerste evaluatie.]

The Homo Sacer series can be understood as an inquiry into the conditions of possibility of Western politics. Martijn Boven discusses the coherence of the series and how Agamben unfolds this "philosophical archaeology" within it. In 1995, the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben published Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Homo sacer. Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita), the first book in a series of nine. Nearly twenty years later, in a gesture characteristic of Agamben, the project was not so much concluded as "abandoned" (abbandonata). According to Agamben, this is the only way a philosophical work can come to an end—it can never be completed, only discontinued. He perceives philosophical work as an impossible construction, one that, from its very inception, can only be conceived of as a ruin. The structuring of the Homo Sacer series into four unequal sections evokes this same image of a deliberately constructed ruin. [In Dutch: De Homo sacer-reeks kan begrepen worden als een onderzoek naar de mogelijkheidsvoorwaarden van de westerse politiek. Martijn Boven bespreekt de samenhang van de reeks en hoe Agamben daarin deze ‘filosofische archeologie’ uiteenzet. In 1995 verscheen Homo sacer. De soevereine macht en het naakte leven (Homo sacer. Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita) van de Italiaanse filosoof Giorgio Agamben, het eerste boek in een reeks van negen. Bijna twintig jaar later, met een geste die typerend is voor Agamben, wordt het project niet zozeer afgerond, maar ‘opgegeven’ (abbandonata). Dit is volgens Agamben de enige manier waarop een filosofisch werk kan worden beëindigd. Het kan nooit worden voltooid, maar kan alleen worden gestaakt. Hij ziet het filosofische werk als een onmogelijk bouwwerk dat al vanaf zijn vroegste begin alleen als ruïne denkbaar is. De indeling van de Homo sacer-reeks in vier ongelijke afdelingen roept ditzelfde beeld van een bewust geconstrueerde ruïne op.]

The French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy passed away last August at the age of 81. In the Netherlands, Nancy became widely known to a broader audience through his short essay The Intruder (2000). In it, he describes the process surrounding the heart transplant he underwent in 1990: the surgery, the trials, the medication to prevent rejection, the cancer that resulted from it, and the chemotherapy required to combat it. Nancy describes how the heart of a stranger—the intruder—penetrated the very core of his being. He writes: "Never before have I been so sharply struck by the strangeness of my own identity, a strangeness that, despite everything, had always been perfectly clear to me (...)." [In Dutch: De Franse filosoof Jean-Luc Nancy overleed vorig jaar augustus op 81-jarige leeftijd. In Nederland is Nancy bij een breder publiek vooral bekend geworden met zijn korte essay De Indringer (2000). Hierin beschrijft hij het proces rondom de harttransplantatie die hij in 1990 onderging: de operatie, de beproevingen, de medicatie om afstoting te voorkomen, de kanker die daar het gevolg van was en die moest worden bestreden met chemokuren. Nancy beschrijft hoe het hart van een vreemde ander – de indringer – tot de kern van zijn hele wezen is doorgedrongen. Zo schrijft hij: ‘Nooit eerder ben ik met een dergelijke scherpte geraakt door de vreemdheid van mijn eigen identiteit, een vreemdheid die me desondanks altijd zonneklaar was (…).’

Philosopher and linguist Wouter Kusters experienced psychotic episodes twice, was hospitalized, and even ended up in solitary confinement. In _Philosophy of Madness_, he seeks to make these psychotic episodes intellectually productive. In this extensive study, he employs philosophy to theoretically untangle madness while simultaneously using madness to push philosophy to its ultimate consequences. In doing so, he draws a parallel between "philosophical deep thinking" and "practical breakdown." As Kusters states: “Madness is philosophy lived out in practice.” By this, he means that philosophical movements such as idealism, solipsism, or determinism are no longer merely theoretical positions but are embodied in the concrete experience of the madman. [In Dutch: Filosoof en taalkundige Wouter Kusters maakte tot twee keer toe een psychotische episode door, werd opgenomen en belandde zelfs in de isoleercel. In _Filosofie van de waanzin_ probeert hij deze psychotische episodes vruchtbaar te maken. In deze breedvoerige studie zet hij de filosofie in om de waanzin theoretisch te ontwarren en gebruikt hij tegelijkertijd de waanzin om de filosofie tot zijn uiterste consequenties te dwingen. Op deze manier wordt er een parallel getrokken tussen ‘filosofisch doordenken’ en ‘praktisch doordraaien’. Zoals Kusters stelt: ‘waanzin is in de praktijk uitgeleefde filosofie.’ Hij bedoelt daarmee dat filosofische stromingen als idealisme, solipsisme of determinisme niet langer zuiver theoretische posities zijn, maar belichaamd worden in de concrete ervaring van de waanzinnige.]

In 1848, the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard wrote a short yet highly significant theater review, titled “Mr. Phister as Captain Scipio.” This review deals with a seemingly prosaic problem: how can an actor convincingly play the role of a drunk police captain while simultaneously disclosing that this captain is deliberately concealing his intoxicated condition? This article argues that this ‘disclosure of concealment’ underlies Kierkegaard’s oeuvre. It elucidates this argument by illustrating that the three levels of theatrical performance highlighted in “Mr. Phister as Captain Scipio” correspond to three parallel levels of authorial performance. Drawing inspiration from the actor, Kierkegaard adopts the persona of a pseudonym who conceals his true identity behind an incognito while simultaneously disclosing that this pseudonym is hiding something. Emulating the dramatic performativity of the actor, Kierkegaard developed a method of indirect communication that constantly works against itself and thus relies on a form of linguistic performativity.

Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788) was a public servant from Konigsberg - dubbed der Magus im Norden - who maintained friendly relations with almost the entire Prus­sian intelligentsia of his time. He wrote various dense and idiosyncratic texts that never failed to both attract and offend his contemporaries. In "Johann Georg Hamann and the Enlightenment Project", Robert Alan Sparling addresses this enigmatic thinker from the perspective of political philosophy. The basic scheme of Sparling's book is to pit Hamann against the Enlighten­ment. In his introductory chapter, Sparling argues that the term Enlightenment must be understood in a double sense. For him, the term indicates a "historical movement" that took place in the eighteenth century as well as an "ongoing political project" that builds upon this historical movement. Sparling argues that Hamann's resistance against the Enlightenment as a historical movement can be made relevant for philosophical discussions in the present. This would imply that Hamann offers an alternative for the two traditions that dominate political philosophy today: the Enlightenment (as on­going political project) and the counter-Enlightenment (in the form of romanticism and post-modernism). The aim of Sparling's book is therefore twofold: (1) "to illuminate Hamann's location within the history of political thought" and (2) "to indicate his im­portance for political philosophy today" (ix). This review briefly examines both aims.

In 1842, Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard published Repetition: A Venture in Experimenting Psychology under the pseudonym Constantin Constantius. In this complex and distinctive work, he introduced a novel approach to philosophical inquiry. In Gilles Deleuze’s apt summary, Kierkegaard invents “an incredible equivalent of theater within philosophy” and establishes repetition as “the fundamental category of the philosophy of the future.” [In Dutch: In 1842 publiceert de Deense filosoof Søren Kierkegaard De herhaling: een proeve van experimenterende psychologie onder het pseudoniem Constantin Constantius. In dit curieuze en eigenzinnige boek introduceert hij een nieuwe manier van filosofie bedrijven. Kierkegaard, zo vat Gilles Deleuze het treffend samen, verzint “een verbluffend equivalent van het theater in de filosofie” en maakt de herhaling tot “de fundamentele categorie van de filosofie van de toekomst”.]

Willem Witteveen, a member of the Upper House for the Dutch Labour Party and professor at Tilburg University, was among the passengers on the MH17 aircraft that crashed in eastern Ukraine in July 2014. Prior to this tragic incident, he had submitted the manuscript of “De wet als kunstwerk [The Law as a Work of Art]”. The posthumous edition of the book has been augmented with a foreword by his son, Freek Witteveen, and a series of collages and miniatures. Consequently, it serves as a tribute and memorial to a distinguished jurist and esteemed politician. In his book, Witteveen presents a measured critique of the neoliberal ideology that has predominated in Dutch society for numerous years and has been embraced by both conservative and progressive political factions. He posits that this ideology demonstrates limited regard for the law as an end in itself, instead primarily utilizing the law as a means for addressing social issues: 'As soon as someone discovers the possibility of establishing rules, whether or not enforced with power or carried by authority, the temptation arises to see the rule as a solution to a problem, as the instrument in the hands of the community to make the problem manageable.' (450) Witteveen problematizes this inclination by examining the central metaphor underlying it: the metaphor of the tool. In this context, the laws enacted by the legislature are analogous to the tools employed by a craftsman, such as a mechanic or carpenter. [in Dutch: Willem Witteveen, Eerste Kamerlid voor de PvdA en hoogleraar in Tilburg, was een van de inzittenden van het passagiersvliegtuig MH17 dat in juli 2014 neerstortte in Oost-Oekraïne. Vlak voor deze tragische vlucht had hij het manuscript van De wet als kunstwerk ingeleverd. De postume uitgave van het boek is uitgebreid met een voorwoord van zoon Freek Witteveen en een serie collages en miniaturen. Het functioneert zodoende als eerbetoon en nagedachtenis aan een begaafd jurist en een bevlogen politicus. In zijn boek verzet Witteveen zich op ingetogen wijze tegen de neoliberale ideologie die de Nederlandse samenleving al vele jaren domineert en die door zowel de rechter als de linkerflank van de politiek is omhelsd. Volgens hem heeft deze ideologie weinig oog voor de wet als een doel op zichzelf, maar gebruikt ze de wet vooral als middel voor het oplossen van maatschappelijke problemen: ‘Zodra iemand de mogelijkheid ontdekt om regels vast te stellen, al dan niet met macht gehandhaafd of door gezag gedragen, doet zich de verleiding voor om de regel als een oplossing van een probleem te zien, als het instrument dat de gemeenschap in handen heeft om het probleem hanteerbaar te maken.’ (450) Witteveen problematiseert deze impuls door te kijken naar de centrale metafoor die eraan ten grondslag ligt: de metafoor van het gereedschap. Hierin worden de wetten van de wetgever vergeleken met het gereedschap van een ambachtsman, zoals een monteur of timmerman.]

In philosophical discourse, the notion of freedom demands rigorous examination. Traditionally, a distinction has been made between negative freedom (freedom from external constraints that impede one's self-realization) and positive freedom (freedom to utilize one's own capabilities). In the essay "A Strange Freedom: New Meanings of Liberalism and Humanism in the 21st Century [De vreemde vrijheid. Nieuwe betekenissen van vrijzinnigheid en humanisme in de 21ste eeuw]," philosopher and theologian Laurens ten Kate proposes a conceptualization of freedom that transcends this traditional dichotomy. This is a creative freedom that is no longer bound to self-realization, but manifests itself precisely at the moment when the self is called into question. The approximately seventy-page essay was published by Sjibbolet Publishers, a small, independent publishing house that emphasizes hermeneutics and is mostly known for publishing several translations of Giorgio Agamben's works into Dutch. In addition to these translations, Sjibbolet also publishes original Dutch-language philosophical works that merit inclusion in this category. The name Sjibbolet is derived from the work of Jacques Derrida and denotes the boundary between the self and the other. As the title "The Strange Freedom" suggests, this essay also explores this boundary. It is an expanded version of Ten Kate's inaugural address, delivered upon accepting the chair of Liberal Religiosity and Humanism [Vrijzinnige religiositeit en humanism]. Two closely intertwined themes are central to the work: the liberal condition and alien freedom. In the Dutch word "vrijzinnigheid [liberal]” the root word "vrijheid [freedom]" is already present, accompanied by the root word "zin [sense]." In the first part of his essay, Ten Kate focuses primarily on sense in relation to what he terms the liberal condition. He states, "Freedom is not primarily a choice of a particular philosophy of life, but a situation to which everyone participates to some extent and to which one must relate (...)." According to Ten Kate, this is the situation in which the meaning of human life is no longer given nor received from above, but must be constructed.

“According to the principle by which it is only in the burning house that the fundamental architectural problem becomes visible for the first time, art, at the furthest point of its destiny, makes visible its original project.” The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, in the final sentence of his book The Man Without Content (L'uomo senza contenuto), just quoted, compares the current state of art to a burning house. At the same time, he points out that precisely at this moment of absolute crisis, we can regain sight of the original stakes of art. Man Without Content, Agamben's most explicit contribution to the philosophy of art, is his debut. The book was first published in 1970 and reissued in 1994. Almost 35 years later, in 2014, he published the collection of essays Il fuoco e il racconto, which was recently translated into English under the title The Fire and the Tale. Although Agamben often focuses on literature in this collection of stand-alone essays, it can be read as a further elaboration of his philosophy of art. This philosophy of art can be summarized as a poetics of inoperativity, which at the same time implies a certain politics. To figure out how to understand Agamen's philosophy of art, this review will place this poetics in the broader framework of The Man Without Content.

[Presented at the 52nd Annual Conference of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP), University of Oregon, 24-26 October. Part of the panel Events, Actions and the Problem of Agency in the Wake of Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, organized in collaboration with Sean Bowden and James Williams.] In this paper I will bring the positions of Gilles Deleuze and Paul Ricoeur into proximity with each other in order to draw out points of conflict. I do not aim to solve these conflicts, nor to develop them into a full clash. Rather, I will show that both Ricoeur and Deleuze develop a theory of novelty that can be characterized as a reversal of Platonism. These theories are not opposed per se, but they differ in orientation. Deleuze situates novelty in the virtual event. This virtual event can be understood as a singular point of transition that transforms one system into another. Or to catch the event in a somewhat more concrete image, it is a kind of metamorphosis (in Kafka’s sense). In contrast, Ricoeur situates novelty in human actions that are played out as a fruitful tension between two poles. This tension opens up a field of potentiality in which new ideas and novel meanings can emerge. Ricoeur has analysed this tension on many levels. Its most basic structure can be found in what Ricoeur calls a living metaphor. This living metaphor is itself something ‘in action’; it brings two opposed semantic fields into a fruitful tension with each other. This tension reveals a previously unnoticed proximity between these two semantic fields, without destroying their distance. In this way a new, third semantic field is opened up that is only given in potential. Ricoeur argues that it is within tensions like this that generative differences arise, resulting in new ideas and novel meanings. The main point of divergence between Deleuze and Ricoeur can therefore be framed in two contrasting pairs: virtual event versus human action; point of transition versus tension (or: metamorphosis versus metaphor).

This article develops a hermeneutic framework for analyzing the representation of imminent future threats. The framework will be derived from the later works of Paul Ricoeur, in which he employs the concept of 'imagination' rather than 'fantasy' (both originating from the Greek term phantasia). Ricoeur posits the significance of what shall be referred to as 'the site of initiative'. It is within this site of initiative that two types of events converge: events that happen to us and events that we make happen. Furthermore, the site of initiative is constituted between two orders of imagination: the space of experience (reproductive) and the horizon of expectation (productive). To enhance the framework's relevance for political and social theory, it will be extended to incorporate Ricoeur's analysis of ideology and utopia. This extension facilitates a preliminary analysis of contemporary dystopias in which fears are exploited for political gain. It will be argued that these dystopias have the tendency to spur a society into arbitrary and unwarranted actions that eclipse the site of initiative.

This paper seeks to initiate a theory of “imaginative dialogues” by articulating four dialogical principles that enable such a dialogue to occur. It is part of a larger project that takes the Socratic dialogue, a widely utilized conversation technique in philosophy education, as a starting point and aims to reinterpret it by shifting emphasis to the pre-reflective, pre-linguistic, and multimodal aspects of dialogues, involving both their verbal and embodied dimensions. To integrate the verbal dimensions of a dialogue with its more elusive embodied dimensions, the paper will examine the notion ‘dialogue’ from the perspective of two different strategies. The first strategy chiefly focuses on the dialogic encounter. The ‘in-between’ of this dialogic encounter enables something to emerge that transcends the individual perspective of the speakers involved. The second strategy is primarily concerned with internal differentiation. The minor differences that constitute this internal differentiation, differentiate a dialogue from within. These strategies are not mutually exclusive but indicate a variation in starting point and orientation. This paper proposes to combine these two strategies by linking accounts of the productive moments in verbal dialogues to an account of the imaginative potential of embodied dialogues. This will enable the articulation of four dialogical principles (derived from Lev Yakubinsky, Oswald Ducrot, Martin Buber, and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz) through which an imaginative dialogue can proceed.

In Plato's work the "Sophist", Socrates, who typically occupies a central position in Plato's dialogues, is assigned a supporting role. This has led some scholars to argue for a shift in Plato's oeuvre, where he distances himself from Socrates and introduces a new main protagonist. However, this new protagonist remains unnamed and is only identified by his social position as Xenos, indicating that he is an outsider and a stranger whose identity is ambiguous. In this article, I argue that Plato's decision to leave the character unnamed serves to raise a first problem: the question of whether this stranger is a friend or an adversary of philosophy. At the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates employs a series of references to Homer to bring into play a second problem: the problem of disguise. The third problem, “What is a sophist?”, is attributed to the Xenos. This is the only problem that is explicitly developed and is, therefore, the most prominent in the dialogue. If we relate these three problems to each other, it becomes clear that they represent contradictory intuitions without providing us with a strict criterion for deciding which of these intuitions is correct. By presenting these problems in their entanglement without providing a way out, Plato invites his readers to think without making explicit what the outcome of this thinking should be. [In Dutch: In de "Sofist" speelt Sokrates, vaak het meest prominente personage in Plato’s dialogen, alleen maar een bijrol. Dit heeft veel interpreten ertoe verleid om een breuk in het oeuvre van Plato te postuleren, waarbij Plato afstand zou nemen van Sokrates ten behoeve van een nieuw personage. Ik zal echter laten zien dat Plato er bewust voor kiest om dit nieuwe personage naamloos te laten en hem alleen aan te duiden via zijn sociale positie als xenos (vreemdeling). Hiermee roept Plato, zo zal ik betogen, impliciet een eerste probleem op: is deze naamlo- ze Xenos een vriend of een vijand van de filosofie? Aan het begin van de dialoog wordt er door Sokrates een tweede probleem in spel gebracht: het probleem van de vermomming. Het derde probleem — ‘wat is een sofist?’ — wordt toegeschreven aan de Xenos. Dit is het enige probleem dat expliciet wordt uitgewerkt en is dan ook het meest prominent aanwezig in de dialoog. Als we deze drie problemen op elkaar betrekken dan wordt duidelijk dat ze tegenstrijdige intuïties vertolken, zonder dat we een strikt criterium krijgen aangereikt om te beslissen welke van deze intuïties de juiste is. Door deze problemen in een nog niet ontwarde kluwen te presenteren, nodigt Plato zijn lezers uit tot denken, zonder expliciet te maken wat de uitkomst van dit denken zou moeten zijn.]

In this essay, I advance a reading of Philosophical Crumbs or a Crumb of Philosophy, published by Søren Kierkegaard under the pseudonym Johannes Climacus. I argue that this book is animated by a poetics of self-incrimination. Climacus keeps accusing himself of having stolen his words from someone else. In this way, he deliberately adopts the identity of a thief as an incognito. To understand this poetics of self-incrimination, I analyze the hypothetical thought-project that Climacus develops in an attempt to show what it means to go further than Socrates. In my reading, I distinguish between a Socratic and a non-Socratic conception of education, both of which rely on an incognito. Socrates takes on the maieutic incognito of an ignorant bystander in order to force his interlocutors to turn inward so that the truth that is already within them can be born. In contrast, the non-Socratic education that Climacus advances as a hypothesis relies on what I call ‘the incognito as a true form’. It is an incognito insofar as it confronts the pupils with a paradox on which the understanding runs aground. It is a true form insofar as its immediate appearance is not a disguise, but a true form. This indirect mode of communication is necessary, without it pupils will not be able to encounter a truth that is not inherent within them. Climacus’ poetics of self-incrimination, I argue, tries to repeat this indirect mode of communication by adopting the incognito of a thief as a true form.

From the beginning, Augustine's "Confessions" presents itself as a dialogue with God. Taking a cue from Ludwig Feuerbach’s "The Essence of Christianity [Das Wesen des Christentums]," this dialogue can easily be dismissed as a projection of the self. This would imply that the divine otherness is nothing more than a mirror of one’s own fears and preferences. “Does this critique,” I asked myself in this piece, “really do justice to a position like that of Augustine?” For a long time, I did not know how to approach what I had — provisionally — called Augustine’s dialogue with God. It appeared to me that Augustine, in an accidental and indirect way, had re-invented the Platonic dialogue and had turned it into a new Christian genre. “It is true,” I told myself, “that the genre of the Confessions shows family resemblances with the hagiography and the autobiography. But most certainly it cannot be reduced to these genres.” The Greek words ‘hagios’ (holy) and ‘autos’ (self) are in flagrant contradiction with the intention of the Confessions. Augustine tries to stay clear of any claim of holiness and only highlights his own ‘self’ to immediately question it. “Is the Platonic dialogue,” I asked myself, “not a far more appropriate predecessor for Augustine’s dialogue with God?” Both types of dialogues can be seen as true dia logoi in which at least two different voices emerge. However, contrary to what one would expect, it is not the dialogue form itself that frames these two voices. Instead the two voices emerge within the discourse of a single speaker, incorporating true otherness within the discourse of the self. Building on these reflections, I explore how Augustine's dialogue with God succeeds in eluding Feuerbach's charge of self-projection.