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Charles Travis on Truth and PerceptionCanadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (7): 878-889. 2020.Charles Travis has developed a distinction between “the historical” and “the conceptual”, which underlies his influential contributions to the philosophy of language and perception. The distinction is based on the observation that there are, for any thought, indefinitely many different circumstances that would render it true. The generality of thoughts and concepts contrasts with the particularity of the sensible world. I challenge the assumption that what exhibits such generality cannot belong …Read more
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Hoe de auteur verdween uit Wittgensteins TractatusAlgemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 115 (2): 153-165. 2023.How the Author Disappeared from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus In this essay, I investigate the status of the written word in the (early, mostly) work of Wittgenstein. In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein tends to imagine language as written rather than spoken. This focus on writing goes together with a sense that the author is absent from the text. I argue that the problem is not with writing in general but specifically with books, and more specifically with the fantasy of a book of ev…Read more
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Dotting the I thinkIn James Conant & Jesse M. Mulder (eds.), Reading Rödl: on Self-consciousness and objectivity, Routledge. 2024.This chapter discusses a central problem in Sebastian Rödl’s Self-Consciousness & Objectivity (SC&O) and in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. In a statement of the form “I think p”, the words “I think” do not contribute to the content and yet they are not redundant. What comes to the same, a thinking subject is not something and yet not nothing. But then in what sense is a thinking subject a part of the world? The problem is intractable on a merely negative understanding of “I think”, like Anscombe’s me…Read more
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Saddled with ContentDissertation, King's College London. 2017.The central issue in this thesis is whether the world, as we find it in perceptual experience, shares structure with thought. According to the view that I label “monism”, it does; according to “dualism”, it does not. It is my aim to defend monism: in a basic case, we think of something that it is some way; we can also see that something is some way, so that it is then manifest before our eyes that something is some way. Thought, experience, and the world share predicative structure. In chapter I…Read more
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