Martin Cappelen Prasir

The reliability of one´s memory is far from certain. Have you ever misplaced an item, forgotten a name or gotten the date wrong? Everyday situations can introduce doubt about our memorial faculties. This raises epistemological questions: Can we trust our memory as a source of knowledge? If memory is fallible, how can we justify beliefs that depend on it? Andrew Moon` global skeptical argument about memory states that we lack knowledge or warrant when it comes to trusting our memory as a reliable faculty. His argument is the following: I. I can know a proposition on the basis of a faculty only if I know that faculty is reliable. II. I cannot know that my memory is reliable. III. Therefore, I cannot know a proposition on the basis of my memory. Moon’s stance on premise I. is that any reasoning to support the conclusion that one’s memory is reliable will either result in epistemic circularity or fail to sufficiently justify the belief. While he does offer a positive response to circularity by distinguishing between declarative and non-declarative memory, his solution primarily applies to non-declarative memory, such as remembering of how to ride a bike. Within the scope of this text, however, I will focus exclusively on declarative memory, episodic, as in remembering walking to the grocery store, in thought experiments and semantic, as in deriving general conclusions like "going to the grocery store involves leaving home", in deriving conclusions. Moon introduces a refinement to premise I. by suggesting that unless we encounter strong reasons to doubt the reliability of memory, we can trust it as a source of knowledge. This condition is meant to avoid over-intellectualization by not requiring explicit knowledge of memory’s reliability. The text is structured into three sections. In Section A, I begin by introducing Memory-Skepticism. We will build on Moon´s skeptical argument and consider whether we can maintain confidence in our memorial faculties by drawing on Moore’s distinction between epistemic and dialectical issues. I will further demonstrate how an inference to the best explanation can help overcome skeptical challenges. Turning to premise II., Moon argues that knowing whether memory is reliable involves reasoning in its favor. Even if we consider memory to be non-inferential in nature, that is, basic and independent of other beliefs, explaining concepts and theories still requires background knowledge, which, in turn, relies on memory. Regardless of memory´s innate reliability, we are still left with the need of avoiding either epistemic circularity or insufficient justification. However, not all circularity is problematic. Moon introduces the concept of benign circularity, which refers to circular reasoning that does not undermine a belief’s warrant. For instance, if I have no reason to doubt the reliability of my memory, I can use it to recall past experiences and form the belief that my memory is reliable. In Section B, I will build on this idea by starting with Foundationalism and develop Memory-Reliabilism as a contender theory for understanding the reliability of memory. I will try to flesh out the theory in detail. Finally, in Section C, I will turn to Memory-Knowledge and explore how memory can function as a source of knowledge. By drawing on Moon´s cases about forgotten evidence and stored beliefs, we will formulate a memory-related Gettier Case and analyze it for its justification and evidence. By focusing on sensitivity and E=K, I hope to expand on Moon´s approach to memory-skepticism. To narrow the focus of this text, we will consider memory to be non-inferential in nature. That is, memory-based beliefs are justified independently of any inferential relations to other beliefs. The act of remembering itself acts as a source of immediate justification. By examining how memory fits with foundationalist and reliabilist perspectives, I aim to explore memory´s capacity to function as a trustworthy source of knowledge.