•  405
    Two notions of necessity
    with Lloyd Humberstone
    Philosophical Studies 38 (1): 1-31. 1980.
  •  302
    Connectionism, modularity, and tacit knowledge
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (December): 541-55. 1989.
    In this paper, I define tacit knowledge as a kind of causal-explanatory structure, mirroring the derivational structure in the theory that is tacitly known. On this definition, tacit knowledge does not have to be explicitly represented. I then take the notion of a modular theory, and project the idea of modularity to several different levels of description: in particular, to the processing level and the neurophysiological level. The fundamental description of a connectionist network lies at a le…Read more
  •  290
    Chomsky among the philosophers
    with Tony Stone
    Mind and Language 17 (3): 276-289. 2002.
    A major recurrent feature of the intellectual landscape in cognitive science is the appearance of a collection of essays by Noam Chomsky. These collections serve both to inform the wider cognitive science community about the latest developments in the approach to the study of language that Chomsky has advocated for almost fifty years now,1 and to provide trenchant criticisms of what he takes to be mistaken philosophical objections to this approach. This new collection contains seven essays, the …Read more
  •  257
    Folk psychology and mental simulation
    with Tony Stone
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43 53-82. 1998.
    This paper is about the contemporary debate concerning folk psychology – the debate between the proponents of the theory theory of folk psychology and the friends of the simulation alternative.<sup>1</sup> At the outset, we need to ask: What should we mean by this term ‘folk psychology’?
  •  237
    Starting from Dennett's distinction between personal and sub-personal levels of description, I consider the relationships amongst three levels: the personal level, the level of information-processing mechanisms, and the level of neurobiology. I defend a conception of the relationship between the personal level and the sub-personal level of information-processing mechanisms as interaction without reduction . Even given a nonreductionist conception of persons, philosophical theorizing sometimes su…Read more
  •  215
    Epistemic Entitlement, Warrant Transmission and Easy Knowledge
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1): 213-245. 2004.
  •  187
    Reference, contingency, and the two-dimensional framework
    Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2): 83-131. 2004.
    I review and reconsider some of the themes of ‘Two notions of necessity’ (Davies and Humberstone, 1980) and attempt to reach a deeper understanding and appreciation of Gareth Evans’s reflections (in ‘Reference and contingency’, 1979) on both modality and reference. My aim is to plot the relationships between the notions of necessity that Humberstone and I characterised in terms of operators in two-dimensional modal logic, the notions of superficial and deep necessity that Evans himself described, …Read more
  •  159
    Mental Simulation, Tacit Theory, and the Threat of Collapse
    Philosophical Topics 29 (1/2): 127-173. 2001.
    According to the theory theory of folk psychology, our engagement in the folk psychological practices of prediction, interpretation and explanation draws on a rich body of knowledge about psychological matters. According to the simulation theory, in apparent contrast, a fundamental role is played by our ability to identify with another person in imagination and to replicate or re-enact aspects of the other person’s mental life. But amongst theory theorists, and amongst simulation theorists, ther…Read more
  •  158
    In his paper ‘Scmantic Theory and Tacit Knowlcdgc’, Gareth Evans uscs a familiar kind of cxamplc in ordcr to render vivid his account of tacit knowledge. We arc to consider a finite language, with just one hundrcd scntcnccs. Each scntcncc is made up of a subjcct (a name) and a prcdicatc. The names are ‘a’, ‘b’, . . ., T. The prcdicatcs arc ‘F’, ‘G’, . . ., ‘O’. Thc scntcnccs have meanings which dcpcnd in a systematic way upon their construction. Thus, all scntcnccs containing ‘a’ mean something …Read more
  •  151
    Folk psychology and mental simulation
    with Tony Stone
    In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Cambridge University Press. pp. 53-82. 1998.
    This paper is about the contemporary debate concerning folk psychology – the debate between the proponents of the theory theory of folk psychology and the friends of the simulation alternative.<sup>1</sup> At the outset, we need to ask: What should we mean by this term ‘folk psychology’?
  •  145
    The mental simulation debate: A progress report
    with Tony Stone
    In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind, Cambridge University Press. pp. 119--137. 1996.
    1. Introduction For philosophers, the current phase of the debate with which this volume is concerned can be taken to have begun in 1986, when Jane Heal and Robert Gordon published their seminal papers (Heal, 1986; Gordon, 1986; though see also, for example, Stich, 1981; Dennett, 1981). They raised a dissenting voice against what was becoming a philosophical orthodoxy: that our everyday, or folk, understanding of the mind should be thought of as theoretical. In opposition to this picture, Gordon…Read more
  •  143
    Anosognosia and the two-factor theory of delusions
    with Anne Aimola Davies and Max Coltheart
    Mind and Language 20 (2): 241-57. 2005.
    Anosognosia is literally ‘unawareness of or failure to acknowledge one’s hemi- plegia or other disability’ (OED). Etymology would suggest the meaning ‘lack of knowledge of disease’ so that anosognosia would include any denial of impairment, such as denial of blindness (Anton’s syndrome). But Babinski, who introduced the term in 1914, applied it only to patients with hemiplegia who fail to acknowledge their paralysis. Most commonly, this is failure to acknowledge paralysis of the left side of the…Read more
  •  135
    Monothematic delusions: Towards a two-factor account
    with Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon, and N. Breen
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3): 133-58. 2001.
    We provide a battery of examples of delusions against which theoretical accounts can be tested. Then, we identify neuropsychological anomalies that could produce the unusual experiences that may lead, in turn, to the delusions in our battery. However, we argue against Maher’s view that delusions are false beliefs that arise as normal responses to anomalous experiences. We propose, instead, that a second factor is required to account for the transition from unusual experience to delusional belief…Read more
  •  135
    The mental simulation debate
    Philosophical Issues 5 189-218. 1994.
    For philosophers, the current phase of the debate with which this volume is concerned can be taken to have begun in 1986, when Jane Heal and Robert Gordon published their seminal papers (Heal, 1986; Gordon, 1986; though see also, for example, Stich, 1981; Dennett, 1981). They raised a dissenting voice against what was becoming a philosophical orthodoxy: that our everyday, or folk, understanding of the mind should be thought of as theoretical. In opposition to this picture, Gordon and Heal argued…Read more
  •  119
    Language, thought, and the language of thought (aunty's own argument revisited)
    In P. Carruthers & J. Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes, Cambridge University Press. pp. 226. 1998.
    In this chapter, I shall be examining an argument for the language of thought hypothesis
  •  118
    Thinking is special. There is nothing quite like it. Thinking
  •  116
    The paper makes three points about the role of double dissociation in cognitive neuropsychology. First, arguments from double dissociation to separate modules work by inference to the best, not the only possible, explanation. Second, in the development of computational cognitive neuropsychology, the contribution of connectionist cognitive science has been to broaden the range of potential explanations of double dissociation. As a result, the competition between explanations, and the characterist…Read more
  •  113
    Cognitive neuropsychology and the philosophy of mind
    with Tony Stone
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (4): 589-622. 1993.
  •  109
    Individualism and Supervenience
    with Jerry Fodor
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 60 235-283. 1986.
  •  108
    Introduction: Pathologies of belief
    with Max Coltheart
    Mind and Language 15 (1). 2000.
    who are unrecognizable because they are in disguise. ¼ The person I see in the mirror is not really me. ¼ A person I knew who died is nevertheless in the hospital ward today. ¼ This arm [the speaker’s left arm] is not mine it is yours; you have..
  •  107
    Concepts, connectionism, and the language of thought
    In W Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory, Hillsdale, Nj: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. pp. 485-503. 1991.
    The aim of this paper is to demonstrate a _prima facie_ tension between our commonsense conception of ourselves as thinkers and the connectionist programme for modelling cognitive processes. The language of thought hypothesis plays a pivotal role. The connectionist paradigm is opposed to the language of thought; and there is an argument for the language of thought that draws on features of the commonsense scheme of thoughts, concepts, and inference. Most of the paper (Sections 3-7) is taken up w…Read more
  •  106
    Inference and explanation in cognitive neuropsychology
    with Max Coltheart
    Cortex 39 (1): 188-191. 2003.
    The question posed by Dunn and Kirsner (D&K) is an instance of a more general one: What can we infer from data? One answer, if we are talking about logically valid deductive inference, is that we cannot infer theories from data. A theory is supposed to explain the data and so cannot be a mere summary of the data to be explained. The truth of an explanatory theory goes beyond the data and so is never logically guaranteed by the data. This is not just a point about cognitive neuropsychology, or ev…Read more
  •  96
    Understanding minds and understanding communicated meanings in schizophrenia
    with Robyn Langdon and Max Coltheart
    Mind and Language 17 (1-2): 68-104. 2002.
    Cognitive neuropsychology is that branch of cognitive psychology that investi- gates people with acquired or developmental disorders of cognition. The aim is to learn more about how cognitive systems normally operate or about how they are normally acquired by studying selective patterns of cognitive break- down after brain damage or selective dif?culties in acquiring particular cogni- tive abilities. In the early days of modern cognitive neuropsychology, research focused on rather basic cognitiv…Read more
  •  92
    Autonomous psychology and the moderate neuron doctrine
    with Tony Stone
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5): 849-850. 1999.
    _Two notions of autonomy are distinguished. The respective_ _denials that psychology is autonomous from neurobiology are neuron_ _doctrines, moderate and radical. According to the moderate neuron_ _doctrine, inter-disciplinary interaction need not aim at reduction. It is_ _proposed that it is more plausible that there is slippage from the_ _moderate to the radical neuron doctrine than that there is confusion_ _between the radical neuron doctrine and the trivial version._.