-
15The case for virtuous robotsAI and Ethics 3 (1): 135-144. 2023.Is it possible to build virtuous robots? And is it a good idea? In this paper in machine ethics, I offer a positive answer to both questions. Although moral architectures based on deontology and utilitarianism have been most often considered, I argue that a virtue ethics approach may ultimately be more promising to program artificial moral agents (AMA). The basic idea is that a robot should behave as a virtuous person would (or recommend). Now, with the help of machine learning technology, it is…Read more
-
7L'imagination en moraleHermann. 2014.La morale n'est pas seulement affaire de raison. Elle engage aussi l'imagination. Tout ce qui compte moralement dans une situation ne se donne pas d'emblee, au premier coup d'oeil. Pour percevoir ce qui importe, il faut changer de perspective, recadrer la situation ou la comparer avec des alternatives contrefactuelles. L'imagination nous permet ainsi de voir les choses autrement et d'elargir notre perception morale. Elle enrichit notre connaissance, comme le montre encore le recours aux experien…Read more
-
69In search of the moral status of AI: why sentience is a strong argumentAI and Society 37 (1): 319-330. 2022.Is it OK to lie to Siri? Is it bad to mistreat a robot for our own pleasure? Under what condition should we grant a moral status to an artificial intelligence (AI) system? This paper looks at different arguments for granting moral status to an AI system: the idea of indirect duties, the relational argument, the argument from intelligence, the arguments from life and information, and the argument from sentience. In each but the last case, we find unresolved issues with the particular argument, wh…Read more
-
6
-
171In search of the moral status of AI: why sentience is a strong argumentAI and Society 1 1-12. 2021.Is it OK to lie to Siri? Is it bad to mistreat a robot for our own pleasure? Under what condition should we grant a moral status to an artificial intelligence system? This paper looks at different arguments for granting moral status to an AI system: the idea of indirect duties, the relational argument, the argument from intelligence, the arguments from life and information, and the argument from sentience. In each but the last case, we find unresolved issues with the particular argument, which l…Read more
-
595L’imagination et les biais de l’empathieLes ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 5 (1): 50-65. 2010.L'empathie est un mode émotionnel qui associe le point de vue d'autrui à des sensations physiologiques. Ce phénomène a tendance à être plus important envers certaines personnes qu'envers d'autres. Or, il existe parfois de bonnes raisons morales de promouvoir une empathie plus égalitaire. Notre hypothèse de psychologie morale est qu'il est possible d'utiliser l'imagination, et en particulier sa dimension volontaire et sa transparence aux émotions, pour corriger certains biais empathiques.
-
70L’éthique de la vertu et le critère de l’action correcteDialogue 50 (2): 367-390. 2011.ABSTRACT : According to the most popular version of virtue ethics (Hursthouse, 1991; Zagzebsk,i 1996), the right action in a given situation is the action that a fully virtuous agent would do given the circumstances. However, this criterion raises two objections: in some situations, it does not determine the right action correctly, and in other situations, it does not determine any right action at all. In this article, we argue that these objections stem from either simple imaginative resistance…Read more
Montreal, Quebec, Canada
Areas of Specialization
Applied Ethics |
Technology Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Normative Ethics |
Applied Ethics |
Meta-Ethics |
Moral Psychology |
Technology Ethics |